Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution by Spiro, Peter J.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Volume 63, Number 2, 2002
Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs)
Constitution
PETER J. SPIRO*
This article asserts the consequentiality of global context for the development of
constitutional law, past and future. The article offers an account of the differential
doctrines offoreign relations law in which they are contingent on the historical
architecture of international relations, and explains why these doctrines may no
longer be sustainable against the increased institutionalization of interstate
relations, the disaggregation of the nation-state, and heightened international
economic competition. Insofar as these elements of globalization lower the risk of
catastrophic interstate conflict and take account ofactors outside ofthe traditional
diplomatic apparatus, differential foreign relations doctrines departing from
baseline norms of judicial review, federalism, and individual rights are
appropriately contested. These doctrines, the article argues, were once dictated by
a hostile, unstable international system and the threats that itposed to the nation;
all should be reexamined in globalization's wake, the events of September II
notwithstanding. In this respect, the article parts ways with other voices in current
foreign relations law debates that deploy standard, domestically-oriented metrics of
constitutional discourse. The article also sketches, though only suggestively, the
possibility that global context may come to determine constitutional norms beyond
the traditionalforeign relations law canon.
I. INTRODUCTION
We may be witnessing an architectural change in the international system. Only
fifteen years ago the world was divided into two camps, staring each other down with
menacing arsenals. Nation-states and their foreign ministries dominated the conduct
of diplomacy, which itself centered on centuries-old issues of interstate competition
and hostility. It was a world in which Metternich would have been comfortable, a
world of chessboard moves and the balance of power. Today, that state-based system
has become unstable. As traditional threats to national security have receded,
international policy-making has turned to such relatively new issues as the
environment, human rights, trade, health, and development, along with the new
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security threat of terrorism. The shift has brought a variety of new actors-some
governmental, many not-into the realm of international decision-making. No longer
do foreign ministries, or even states, enjoy an unchallenged monopoly on the course
of international affairs. The communications revolution and economic integration,
meanwhile, have suggested a diluted significance to territorial control and the very
meaning of national boundaries.
These and other related developments loosely fall under the descriptive moniker
of "globalization." The term is now firmly a part of our everyday lexicon, taken to
represent the various facets of the post-Cold War world. Globalization has been the
subject of a growing number of commentaries by prominent opinion writers.' It has
also given rise to a burgeoning academic literature in such fields as political science,'
sociology,3 economics,4 anthropology,5 and even geography.6 And yet globalization
'See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OuVE TREE (1999); WILLIAM
GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997); JOHN
MICKLETHwArr & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, A FUTURE PERFECT: THE CHALLENGE AND HIDDEN
PROMISE OF GLOBALIZATION (2000); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING
HEIGHTS: THE BAT'TLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE
WORLD (1998); G. PASCAL ZACHARY, THE GLOBAL ME (2000).
2 Indeed, the globalization literature in political science and other fields is now so vast that any
set of references will necessarily be selective. Noteworthy contributions include BENJAMIN R.
BARBER, JIHAD V. MCWORLD (1996); DAVID J. ELKINS, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: TERRITORY AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO, THE END
OFTHE NATION-STATE (Victoria Elliott trans., 1995); MICHAEL HARDT& ANTONIONEGRI, EMPIRE
(2000); DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE
(1999); ANDREW LINKLATER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY: ETHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE POST-WESTPHALIAN ERA (1998); JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2000); and PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND WORLD
CIVIC POLITICS (1996). A sign ofglobalization's hold is reflected in the appearance of a contrarian
literature asserting the durability of the old order. See, e.g., PAUL N. DOREMUS ET AL., THE MYTH
OF THE GLOBAL CORPORATION (1998); MICHAEL R. FOWLER & JULIE M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER,
AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
(1995); LINDA WEISS, THE MYTH OFTHE POWERLESS STATE (1998). It is, of course, also evidenced
by the significant opposition that globalization has generated, both in the academy and among
activists. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (1998)
(arguing that globalization divides more than it unites); INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION, AND WORLD
POLITICS (Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods eds., 1999) (examining the increasing social and legal
inequalities generated by globalization).
3 See, e.g., MARTIN ALBROW, THE GLOBAL AGE: STATE AND SOCIETY BEYOND MODERNITY
(1997); ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: How GLOBALIZATION Is RESHAPING OUR LIVES
(2000); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
4 See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE WORLD ECONOMY
IN THE 21 ST CENTURY (2000); PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION:
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE (1996); GLOBALIZATION
AND PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC POLICY (Dean Baker et al. eds., 1998).5 See, e.g., ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBALIZATION (1996); LINDA BASCH ET AL., NATIONS UNBOUND: TRANSNATIONAL PROJECTS,
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appears barely to have registered on the consciousness of constitutional law scholars.7
The legal academy appears to be suspended in a sort of splendid isolation, either
oblivious to recent developments (unlikely, given the widespread attention afforded
them in the mainstream media),8 persuaded that globalization is irrelevant to the study
of constitutional law, 9 or ill-equipped to process the implications of the change.°
POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENTS, AND DETERRITORIALIZED NATION-STATES (1994); GLOBALIZATION
AND IDENTITY: DIALECTICS OF FLOW AND CLOSURE (Birgit Meyer & Peter Geschiere eds., 1999).
6 See, e.g., NESTED IDENTITIES: NATIONALISM, TERRITORY AND SCALE (1999) (Guntram H.
Herb & David H. Kaplan eds., 1999) (considering the relationship of territoryto identity in the face
of globalization); Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal,
in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 81 (Thomas J. Biersterker & Cynthia Weber eds.,
1996).
7 For some terse speculations on the consequences of globalization for American
constitutional law, see Marci A. Hamilton, Slouching Toward Globalization: Chartingthe Pialls
in the Drive to Internationalize Religious Human Rights, 46 EMORY L.J. 307 (1997) (exploring the
implications of globalization for constitutional rights implicating religion); Frank I. Michelman,
W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 1063, 1071-83 (2000) (suggesting that the
combination of privatization and globalization could mark the dawn of a new era of deregulation);
and Robert Post, The Challenge of Globalization to American Public Law Scholarship, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 323 (2001), available at http://www.bepress.com/til/default
/vol2/issl/artl I (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (sketching possible intellectual responses to
globalization and issues of institutional legitimation at the international level). Some leading
constitutional law scholars recognize the possible relevance of international structures to
constitutional law. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: An Introduction,
17 CONST. COMM. 187, 194 (2000) ("[C]onstitutional law in the next decade is likely to grapple
with the implications of globalization for the domestic political regime .... I might be wrong, but
at least for the next couple of years there is reason to take up the implications of... international
law[] for U.S. constitutional law."). Judith Resnik has recently produced an important article that
considers the structural implications of globalization in the context of women's rights and
federalism, some themes of which parallel those made in this article. See Judith Resnik,
Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, Ill YALE L.J. 619 (2001).
8 Indeed, the saturation use of the term "globalization" suggests one possibility for the failure
of legal scholars to focus on the phenomenon: a fear of beating well-worn paths rather than
clearing new ones. This is evidenced by a general sense that the term is already clich& See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1247, 1272 (1996) ("It is difficult to avoid clich6 in describing the integration of the world
economy or the rapid globalization of information flows."); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1306 (1999) (referring to the "cliched label
globalization"); cf GIDDENS, supra note 3, at 25 (noting that the word "has come from nowhere to
be almost everywhere"). But that feeling can only result from the label's success; it now seems
fairly clear that "globalization" will in fact identify the current era. Avoiding the term makes about
as much sense as avoiding the label "Cold War" or, for that matter, "international," which was
itself only coined in the late 18th century. In the absence of some other characterization loosely
signifying the many components that come under its umbrella, academics should lose their
embarrassment and accept the word as part of our vocabulary.
9 Globalization appears to have made more significant inroads in other areas of American
legal scholarship. Not surprisingly, it prominently figures in recent work in the field of intellectual
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This article problemizes that isolation. It suggests that, at a minimum,
constitutional law scholars confront globalization with respect to constitutional
doctrine conceived on old-world premises. Rules of constitutional law governing the
relationship of the United States to the rest of the world have always reflected the
structure of the international system. Indeed, these rules were effectively dictated by
that system so long as it portended great perils to the Union, at the necessary expense
of other constitutional norms. It is through this lens that one can both explain and
defend the special rules of constitutional law that have applied in the realm of foreign
relations. These rules have included the political question doctrine, under which the
courts have refrained from intervening in foreign relations controversies;"' the
exclusion of state governments from foreign relations activity; 2 and the judicial and
statutory derogation of individual rights where their vindication might undermine
property. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography ofAuthorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Neil W. Netanel,Asserting Copyright's
Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VANDERBILT L. REV. 217 (1998); Symposium,
Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual Property, 6 INDIANA J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. I
(1998). Other fields with recent prominent offerings exploring the implications of globalization
include bankruptcy, tax, corporate law, and securities regulation. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1573 (2000); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy
of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 696 (1998); Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2177 (2000); Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2276 (2000). The effects of globalization on the practice of law have also been
widely studied. See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001).
'o This possibility would be rooted in part in the law school curriculum. As Martin Flaherty
observes, "[w]herever else they get it, law students do not encounter the world outside ourborders
through American constitutional law casebooks." Martin S. Flaherty, Aim Globally, 17 CONST.
COMM. 205, 208 (2000). Among other lawyers, constitutional law scholars are thus perhaps
unlikely to have significant grounding in international law and the global system. That is perhaps as
good an explanation as any for their failure to confront globalization. Of course, globalization is a
programmatic buzzword at many American law schools, see, e.g., James Traub, John Sexton
Pleads (and Pleads and Pleads) His Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 27
(describing globalization program at New York University Law School), making it all the stranger
that it has yet fully to be confronted among law scholars. But as Flaherty notes, '[g]lobal'
programs, courses, journals, conferences, exchanges, and internships flourish. This form of
flourishing, however, has taken place almost entirely within its own nook." Flaherty, supra, at 217.
" See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (refusing to rule on the power of the
President to unilaterally terminate a treaty); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)
(refusing to consider the legitimacy of the government of Mexico under international law).
12 See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (striking down a
state tax that was inconsistent with the need "to speak[] with one voice" in foreign relations);
Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down a state probate statute found to interfere
with foreign relations).
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national security.13
These rules were justifiable (if not always justified) in a world of hostile nation-
states. But all should be reexamined in globalization's wake. As the use of armed
force overseas comes increasingly to resemble law enforcement (in name and
substance), with no serious threat to the national survival, as other states come to
understand the component parts of United States government (at both the state and
federal level) to be disaggregated actors autonomous within their areas of
responsibility, and as global economic interdependence and competition make
possible direct international discipline of these disaggregated actors, there is less
cause to depart from default rules that would otherwise govern institutional
allocations of power or individual protections from them. As this article will
demonstrate, these developments bring into question the heretofore peremptory
functional justifications for the special rules of foreign relations law.
I will not be the first to question what I have called the "foreign affairs
differential.' 4 Indeed, scholarly assaults on these rules antedate the advent of
globalization 5 and have been reinforced in the work of a new generation of foreign
relations law scholars.16 These other critiques work from a premise of constitutional
13 See, e.g., Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2000) (criminalizing certain communications with
foreign governments); United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (finding
an alien to enjoy no due process protection in exclusion proceedings).
14 See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1223 (1999).
I prefer the tag to Curtis Bradley's "foreign affairs exceptionalism" insofar as his implies an
illegitimacyto these special rules, where I assert their mere obsolescence. See Curtis A. BradleyA
New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089 (1999); see also Louis Henkin,
The Constitution for Its Third Century: Foreign Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 716 (1989)
("Foreign affairs are likely to remain constitutionally 'special' in the next century, as they have
been in the past two.").
15 For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see, for example, THoMAs M. FRANCK,
POLmCAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS (1992); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONsTmTONAL
DIPLOMACY 314-21 (1990); HAROLD HONGJu KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrIY CONs1TunON 214-
24 (1990); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question " Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976)
(hereinafter Henkin, Political Question Doctrine]; Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political
Question Doctrine, " and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (1970). See Richard B.
Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821 (1989), for a
discussion of the ouster of states from foreign relations. For an analysis of limitations on individual
rights, especially in the immigration context, see, for example, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal
Regulation ofAliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989); Louis H. Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100
HARv. L. REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law andthe Principle ofPlenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT: REV. 255; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984).
16 This new generation of foreign relations law scholars is dominated by a group I have
elsewhere described as the "New Sovereigntists," including most notably Curtis Bradley, Jack
Goldsmith, Michael Ramsey, and John Yoo. See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, FOREIGN
AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9. The New Sovereigntists are methodically working their way through
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the foreign relations law canon with revisionist attacks on a longstanding academic consensus in
the area, represented at its zenith by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, Louis Henkin, and his prot6g~s among the following generation of foreign relations
law scholars. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987); Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFA RS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996);
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 836 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, Critique] (attacking the "Restatement view" of the status of customary international
law as "pure bootstrapping" on the part of Henkin, its Chief Reporter); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1857 (1998) (defending the role of
the Restatement in formulating foreign relations law); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense
About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66
FORDAM L. REV. 371,377-80 (1997) (defending the integrity of the Restatement position). The
New Sovereigntists tar this group as "internationalist" in their premises. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV.
529, 539 (1999); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1976-82 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Non-
Self-Execution] (describing the "internationalist view" of the non-self-execution doctrine); see also
John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 205 (2000)
(contrasting the "Globalist" and "Americanist" perspectives on the relationship between the United
States and international institutions). The New Sovereigntists have questioned two of the three
doctrinal components of the foreign relations differential that I focus on in this article: the rule of
federal exclusivity and its corollary that customary international law should be a part of federal
common law, see Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra (questioning the incorporation of
customary international law into federal common law); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
Federalism, and Foreign Affairs, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997) (attacking dormant foreign affairs
power) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federalism]; Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in
Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 341 (1999) (same), and the application of the political question doctrine in the foreign
relations context. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations
Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1427-28 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith, New Formalism]. They
have also attacked a broad reading of the Treaty Power as against federalism concerns, see Curtis
A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390 (1998)
[hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power]; j ustified the pervasive U.S. practice of qualifying its accession
to international human rights convention, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties,
Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399,402 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley
& Goldsmith, Conditional Consent]; questioned the rule of statutory construction under which
domestic statutes are to be read consistently with international law whenever possible, see Curtis
A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive
Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998); denied that treaties can be judicially
cognizable in the absence of legislative implementation, see Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra; and
asserted the constitutional irrelevance of international law to war powers decision-making, see
John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673 (2000)
[hereinafter Yoo, War Powers]. New Sovereigntism is grounded in a general skepticism of
international law and international lawmaking processes. See Spiro, supra; see also, e.g., Bradley
& Goldsmith, Critique, supra, at 838-42 (describing features of "new" customary international
law, including that "it increasingly purports to regulate a state's treatment of its own citizens");
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
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endogeneity, deploying such standard constitutional law metrics as original intent,
doctrinal rationality, and domestic functional efficiency. 17 These strategies can hardly
be deployed without reference to international context, at least as a historical matter.
But even recent commentary on foreign relations law issues has paid little heed to the
possible consequences of globalization. 8 Other critiques of foreign relations law
REV. 1113 (1999) (explaining customary international law as entirely based on the self-interested
behavior of states).
The debate is also being engaged in the historical context, most notably with Ted White's
intellectual history tracing many elements of the foreign affairs differential to academic innovations
of the first half of the twentieth-century. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the
Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. (1999). In White's framework, these
differentials are considered revisionist rather than historically contingent, thus making them
vulnerable to attack on grounds having nothing to do with the global context in which they
developed or in which they should be abandoned. White's treatment stands in contrast to Sarah
Cleveland's work situating the rise of the plenary power doctrine over immigration, Native
Americans, and overseas possessions in an international law context. See Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins
of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
" See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 15, at 61-96 (arguing that, political question doctrine
notwithstanding, courts have often reached the merits in cases involving foreign relations);
Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 16, at 409-22 (arguing the absence of historical basis for a
broad reading of the Treaty Power); Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A
Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration
Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 258 (2000) (arguing that the plenary power cases could have
reached the same results without deploying the doctrine); Goldsmith, Federalism, supra note 16, at
1641-64 (arguing that constitutional practice before 1964 did not support federal exclusivity over
foreign relations); Goldsmith, New Formalism, supra note 16 (arguing that the political question,
act of state, and dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrines all underwent problematic
transformation during the early 1960s).
i8 Although vague nods are made in its direction, lively recent exchanges in the area have left
the consequences of globalization largely unexamined. Both camps in the debate are generally to
be faulted for overlooking the significance of structural changes in the global system wrought by
globalization; each is backward looking in its contextual orientation. The New Sovereigntists seem
to pine for the days before the centralization of foreign relations powers in the federal government,
combining historical, originalist, and other methodologies. Whether or not such days have ever
existed, this group of scholars takes only passing notice of new realities posed by globalization.
Amidst the many recent articles by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, for instance, there are only a
few passing references to the phenomenon. The title notwithstanding ("Globalism and the
Constitution"), John Yoo's recent article on the self-execution doctrine deploys globalization only
briefly, and then only for the proposition that globalization has broadened the substantive scope of
international treaty regimes. See Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 16, at 1967-69. Those
supporting the Restatement positions seem largely stuck on pre-globalization assumptions of the
primacy of the nation-state, as well as of traditional methods of international lawmaking and their
incorporation into domestic law. The work of such scholars as Harold Koh, Gerald Neuman, David
Golove, and Beth Stephens also skims over the advent of globalization. See, e.g., David M.
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1305-06 (2000) (asserting in a
brief discussion that globalization does not require a reassessment of the federal treaty power);
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doctrines fail to address sequencing issues; they are left asserting, in effect, that much
of foreign relations law has long been unconstitutional' 9 and reduced to calling for
reform on a "better late than never" basis.20 The strategy pursued here, by contrast,
calculates the possible abandonment of the rules and explains why they may be
abandoned now as opposed to some other point in time."
Part II of this article unpacks critical components of globalization. I first explore
the institutionalization of interstate relations and the reduced risk of full-scale armed
conflict on a twentieth-century scale. At this trend's core one finds the concept of the
"democratic peace," which holds that democratic states do not make war on one
another. As democracy prevails at the global level, the risk of a level of hostilities
witnessed in the World Wars and threatened in the Cold War is now slight, even
implausible. Terrorism, of course, has emerged as a serious security threat; this
section offers some necessarily tentative thoughts on the events of September 11,
2001. The attacks were no doubt of signal importance, demonstrating grave
vulnerabilities in a globalized world. But terrorism is more akin to criminal activity
Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 674 (1998)
(adverting to globalization only in the context of bringing illiberal states into compliance with
international law); Gerald L. Neuman, The GlobalDimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMM. 33,34
(1997) (suggesting a treaty basis for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but not considering
how globalization might affect the question); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs:
Congres's Power to "Define and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations, " 42 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 447, 552-57 (2000) (considering the scope of congressional power without
reference to the advent of globalization). To the extent that they confront it at all, it is met with
skepticism, if not hostility. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties,
Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1655-56 (1999) (asserting the relevance of international law,
but dispelling the impression that protection of civil liberties and civil rights should depend on
global institutions); see also Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1238-39 (2000) (questioning whether a "much-
ballyhooed leap into globalization" is revolutionary, and even if so, whether it has any necessary
constitutional significance).
19See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federalism, supra note 16, at 1622 (asserting that the "federal
common law of foreign relations as currently practiced by courts and understood by scholars lacks
justification"); Ramsey, supra note 16, at 431 (concluding that the modem view of foreign policy
preemption is unsupported by the original understanding).
2 0 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, Ill YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001) (offering an originalist interpretation of allocation of
foreign affairs powers by wiping "the ... slate clean and start[ing] over").
21 Sarah Cleveland's approach suggestively parallels that pursued here. Though her treatment
is primarily historical, and focuses on the context of international law more than international
decision-making structures, she too asks whether doctrines that were founded on particular
elements of the international context should not be adjusted as those elements have been
abandoned or transformed. See Cleveland, supra note 16, at 228 ("[I]f the government's
constitutional authority derives from customary international law, shouldn't the authority likewise
be limited by customary international law constraints?... If U.S. authority derived from
international law, should those powers evolve as international norms develop?").
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than interstate hostilities, presenting a qualitatively different magnitude of threat and
inviting qualitatively different responses. However devastating the September 11
attacks may have been, especially in its impact on the American national psyche, the
terrorist menace is unlikely to prove to be of the same order as the Cold War threat
from Moscow; however much of a threat it poses, it will not be on the order of that
posed by an enemy empire. Even taking September 11 into account, then, the stakes
in foreign relations have changed.
Second, I consider globalization's disaggregation of the state. In the old
international structure, states were treated as unitary (aggregated) entities;
international rules took no account of constituent actors within states. Today, the
international community is coming increasingly to understand the role and
responsibilities of particular actors within states, including subnational authorities,
corporations, and individuals, and is increasingly coming to interact directly with
those constituent parts. As a result, the conduct of any component part is less likely to
be mistaken as the responsibility of the whole. The state no doubt continues to be a
privileged actor in international relations, but it appears to have lost its previous near-
monopoly hold. As the third critical component of globalization, finally, I briefly
describe the intensified competition among states that has come with economic
globalization. This embedded economic interdependence affords international actors
the capacity to hold disaggregated actors responsible to international norms.
Part H describes the special rules of foreign relations law, and why they are
appropriately contested in the face of these three strands of globalization. The political
question doctrine was premised on both the high stakes of foreign relations and the
aggregated treatment of states; the courts shrunk from intervention in foreign relations
matters for fear that misjudgment could have disastrous consequences for the nation,
in part because such misjudgment could be taken as a national position by
international actors. Today, insofar as the nature of the threat has changed, we can
afford errors on the judiciary's part in most contexts, even more so because other
nations will understand that such misjudgment is on the part of the courts only, and
should not be taken as representing the views of other governmental entities.
Likewise the rule against state-level foreign policy-making. The nation as a whole
was, in the old world of aggregated nations, held responsible for the actions of
individual U.S. states, an intolerable proposition in the face of intolerable
consequences; we could not have a Massachusetts or a California, for instance,
starting us down the road to World War mH. To the extent that international actors
understand the autonomy of a Massachusetts or California, and can respond discretely
against them to remedy non-compliance with international norms, the risk of such
consequences will diminish, and the differential may no longer be sustainable.
Finally, the changed nature of international threats eliminates the justification for
a different definition of rights in the national security context. This Part first
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highlights legislative provisions (including the Logan Act) 22 and constitutional
powers (to terminate citizenship for conducting political activities in another state and
to deny a passport for purposes of international travel) that reflected the former
aggregation of the individual to the state. This discussion also focuses on the extreme
differential constitutional treatment of aliens and argues that globalization may render
the differential in large part obsolete. Indeed, judicial decisions and other relevant
practice indicate that the foreign relations differential in the context of individual
rights has already narrowed. In the wake of September 11, of course, this trend will be
tested. Its reversal is not inevitable, however. Indeed, the resistance to limiting civil
liberties even in the immediate aftershock of September II has been remarkable. And
to the extent that rights have been constrained, it has largely been undifferentiated,
that is, with no particular reference to foreign relations or an international context.
Even alien rights have suffered only marginal reversals as a result of the attacks.
The article concludes, in Part IV, with a suggestion of globalization's broader
future reach into American constitutional law. To the extent that globalization gives
the international community the means to discipline even the United States, the
United States may be incapable of resisting the legal reach of globalization. Global
context dictates only those rules that implicate the global; but it is the global
community, and not any objective criteria, that constructs the line between global and
domestic. In the past, that line has left most of American constitutional law (foreign
relations law doctrines aside) firmly on the domestic side of the divide. That
placement is no longer so clear today. Much of our constitutional jurisprudence-
especially constitutional rights jurisprudence-addresses issues that now present
international concerns.23 International actors may be able to exploit vulnerabilities
created by disaggregation and heightened economic competition to advance related
international norms. No longer will the reach of the outside world be limited to
doctrines, such as those considered in Part Im, that are by their terms related to foreign
relations. At the long-term end point of this dynamic, the Constitution may become
something of an artifact, a regulator of secondary norms, no longer a quantity that can
22 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2000).
23 This development has been brought into focus with recent international protests regarding
continued American use of the death penalty, especially as applied to juvenile offenders and the
mentally retarded. See, e.g., Europe's View ofthe Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, § 4,
at 12 ("In our reliance on capital punishment, America stands apart from the other progressive
democracies."); The World's View of Executions, N.Y. TINES, June 13,2001, at A32 (asserting that
the death penalty is, "as President Bush is learning, a foreign policy liability"). Structural features
of globalization will also likely reverse recently revived assertions of American sovereignty
associated with the rejection of major international treaties such as the Kyoto climate change
accords. See infra notes 285-89; see also, e.g., Thomas Friedman, Noblesse Oblige, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 31, 2001, at A19 (reporting that the United States is being characterized as a "rogue state"
among Europeans for its refusal to join various international regimes); Thom Shanker, White
House Says U.S. is Not a Loner, Just Choosy, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,2001, at Al (reporting the Bush
Administration's defense of its rejection of international treaties).
[Vol. 63:649
GLOBALIZA TION AND THE CONSTITUTION
intelligently be studied in isolation.
Two important cautions are warranted up front. First, it is not the purpose of this
article comprehensively to document the elements of globalization. That is a subject
requiring volumes, many of which have been already written. Rather, the article seeks
to explore the implications of globalization if in fact the critical elements highlighted
below become embedded. If globalization proves a false dawn, then these
speculations may amount to naught.24 But if it proves durable, the implications are of
such gravity as to warrant consideration at this time, even at risk of appearing to jump
the gun. The exercise may be framed as a thought experiment and a matter of
institutional logics, if it helps the reader beyond the hurdle of empirical objection,
however well grounded those objections may be. The exercise may be valuable as
such, insofar as it challenges foundational notions of constitutional process and the
persistently reified nation-state.
Second, this article is hardly offered by way of celebration. Globalization holds
much promise and much peril. 25 There is nothing utopian about globalization.
September 11 is itself a product of globalization. Among other perils is the possibility
that rights, justice, and dignity will be compromised in structures and processes that
go under-examined. To the extent that American constitutionalists continue to
conceive of the Constitution as an insular affair, they may miss the primary action as
it unfolds elsewhere. Opportunities for the expansion of rights and dignity may be
lost, instances of their diminishment may go undefended. In that respect, this article
waves a warning flag to those-progressives and conservatives alike-who would
persist in an almost defiant disdain and willful blindness of international law and
international lawmaking processes. Constitutional autarchy no longer presents a
viable position. Globalization may mark a transformation of millennial proportions. It
is time for the American legal academy to begin to grapple with it.
11. GLOBALIZATION'S ARCHITECTURE
Globalization means different things to different people. 26 Most observers would
14 See, e.g., Peter Beinart, An Illusion for Our Time: The False Promises of Globalization,
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 1997, at 10 (drawing parallels between current economic conditions and
those prevailing at the beginning of the twentieth-century, with an obvious cautionary message).
Part of that promise is found in the asserted obsolescence of the foreign relations law
doctrines examined in this article, the abandonment of which most would welcome. But as I stress
in Part [I below, that is a case only of eliminating a differential, with a reversion to baselines
whose legitimacy was established through conventional domestic law processes. Insofar as global
processes come to dictate norms outside of the foreign relations law context, however, their content
will not be normatively deterministic. That presents a much broader threat to constitutional values.
26 See, e.g., Jan Aart Scholte, Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of
Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43, 45 (Eleonore Kofman & Gillian
Youngs eds., 1996) ("'To some extent, no doubt, globalization is a buzzword, a term as ambiguous
as it is popular.").
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agree that globalization defines a series of developments that were accelerated by (if
not premised on) the end of the Cold War.2 7 Most accounts of globalization also stress
the significance of improved information and communication tools in diminishing the
costs otherwise posed by geographical distance,28 and many highlight the integration
of global economic markets. 29 Beyond that, globalization is so broad a phenomenon
that comprehensive description now seems almost futile. Scholars have responded
with selective treatments, tailored to particular issues or developments.
This Part focuses on three elements of globalization that seem critical to the
future course of foreign relations law: the institutionalization of interstate relations,
the disaggregation of the nation-state, and economic globalization. All three represent
reversals of entrenched constructs on which the foundations of foreign relations law
were built.
A. International Relations Institutionalized
For much of the modem period, nation-states confronted each other in a proto-
anarchical arena characterized by only the loosest constraints on self-interested
behavior. Interstate relations was a game of power projection and self-help. However
27 See FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 355. As Thomas Friedman suggests:
What should Mr. Clinton have said at his first inaugural? Something like this: "My
fellow Americans, my tenure as your President is coinciding with the end of the Cold War
system and the rise of globalization. Globalization is to the 1990s and the next millennium
what the Cold War was to the 1950s through the 1980s .... "
Id. Of course, one has to shrink from crude periodization. Many of globalization's roots stretch
back into the near and distant past; it is impossible to say that globalization emerged suddenly in
1990. See, e.g., HAROLD JAMES, THE END OF GLOBALIZATION: LESSONS FROM THE GREAT
DEPRESSION (2001); KEvIN H. O'ROURKE & JEFFREY G. WILUAMSON, GLOBALIZATION AND
HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OFANINETEENTH-CENTURY ATLANTIC ECONOMY (1999); Michael D.
Bordo et al., Is Globalisation Today Really Different from Globalisation a Hundred Years Ago?,
in GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION 17 (Martin Richardson ed., 2000).
But to the extent that periodization is a necessary element in historical characterization, it seems
fair to mark the end of the Cold War as the juncture at which globalization prevailed. The Cold
War period was dominated by features-most notably the threat of catastrophic interstate
conflict-inconsistent with globalization's premises.
28 See, e.g., SCHOLTE, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that globalization is "widely associated with
technological revolutions in transport, communications and data processing"); Jessica T. Mathews,
Are Networks Better Than Nations?, NEW PERSPECTIVES Q., Mar. 1997, at 10 ("Above all, the
information technologies disrupt hierarchies, diffusing and redistributing power."); Lester C.
Thurow, Globalization: The Product of a Knowledge-Based Economy, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 19, 20 (2000) ("[New] technologies and their interactions are producing a
knowledge-based economy that is systematically changing how all people conduct their economic
and social lives.").
'9 See generally, e.g., GRIEDER,supra note 1, at 11-53 (describingthe globalization of trade);
HELD, supra note 2, at 149-88 (same).
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refined it emerged with respect to a select few activities, international law was blind to
many areas of state conduct. Even in those areas in which it applied, international law
was enforced mostly on an ad hoc horizontal basis, that is, by formally equal actors
against each other in a largely uncoordinated and extrainstitutional dynamic. The use
of force, whether to enforce obligations or simply to extend power, was an accepted
part of the international landscape. War was a constant threat, in response to intended
aggression or perceived slight.
Today, by contrast, interstate relations are increasingly mediated through
rationalized institutional processes. 30 Even where they lack formal and/or effective
enforcement powers, many such institutions have accreted a legitimacy that affords
them top-down decision-making authority. This is perhaps most apparent in the
context of international economic relations. Where states were once free to set the
terms of, and terminate, economic dealings with other countries as they pleased, most
have accepted significant constraints on that discretion under the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs. GATT obligations are now decided in the dispute resolution
arms of the World Trade Organization. 3' The WTO may have no armed forces to
impose its judgments, but early practice evidences a clear pull toward compliance
with its decisions. Regularized dispute resolution lowers the risk that limited disputes
will spiral into broad ones;32 the likelihood of escalating rounds of trade-related
retaliation--of a trade "war"-between major economic states has become
improbable. Although the trade context presents perhaps the clearest example of the
institutionalization of interstate relations, others abound. Thick regulatory regimes are
issuing from international institutions in such diverse areas as environmental
protection, individual rights, labor conditions, intellectual property, public health, and
30 See generally, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, CONSTITUTIONALIZING GLOBALIZATION 19 (1998)
(highlighting the "network of agreements that are not only militarily and economically binding for
de facto reasons but [that] are becoming constitutionally binding, de jure"); Emst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398,
431 (describing "institutionalized supervisory mechanisms for the systematic monitoring of the
implementation of their international agreements"); Eric Stein, International Integration and
Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489,489-90 (2001) ("The solution of vital
problems.., has moved beyond the reach of individual states and has called for institutionalized
commitment and cooperation on global and regional levels."). This institutionalization is a
prominent component of "global governance" perspectives on international relations in the wake of
globalization. See generally, e.g., THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL
NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1995);
APPROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THEORY (Martin Hewson & Timothy J. Sinclair eds.,
1999).
31 On the elaborate dispute resolution system of the WTO, see, for example, JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND WTO 113-92 (2000).
32 See, e.g., GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONALTRADE AGREEMENTS 42
(1992) ("[T]he world trade system of the 1990s is less vulnerable to breakdown than was that of
the 1930s .... ); Mike Moore, Multilateralism and the WTO, in GLOBALISATION AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION 137 (Martin Richardson ed., 2000).
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endangered species.33 Indeed, all governance issues have some corresponding
international outlet.
This institutionalization has facilitated greater stability in relations among states.
Just as the development of legitimated domestic institutions diminishes the incentives
for vigilantism, the development of international ones diminishes the incentives for
self-help in the form of the use of military force. War was always a costly option, but
it often presented a rational means for settling international disputes or enforcing
international norms. Institutionalization reduces the cases in which resort to force
passes this cost/benefit test. If states are willing to submit to dispute-resolution
processes, the incentive to use force dissipates. At least among states that accept
institutionalization, an end to uncabined armed conflict ensues. This occurs (perhaps
counter-intuitively) even as the overall stakes implicated by global governance
regimes increase.
This institutionalization thesis correlates to the notion of the democratic peace. In
its narrower conception, the democratic peace has nothing to do with globalization; as
a thesis, it simply holds that democracies do not make war on one another,34 and of
course democracy as a form of government long antedates the advent of
globalization.3 5 What ties the democratic peace to globalization is the possibility of its
accomplishment through the spread of democratic government. The number of
democracies worldwide has increased dramatically since 1989.36 There are today few
3 See, e.g., ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE wrrH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998); THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Miranda A. Schreurs & Elizabeth
Economy eds., 1997); MANAGING GLOBAL ISSUES (P.J. Simmons & Chantal de Jonge Oudraat eds.,
2001); THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE 21 ST CENTURY (Anne F. Bayefsky ed.,
2000).
34 On the democratic peace, see generally DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E.
Brown et al. eds., 1996); BRUCE RuSSETr, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A
POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993); SPENCER R. WEART, NEVER AT WAR: WHY DEMOCRACIES WILL
NOT FIGHT ONE ANOTHER (1998); Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL.
ScI. REV. 1151 (1986); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 205 (1983); and Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal
States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995). The democratic peace thesis applies to interstate war. But
democracy has consequences for internal stability as well. One recent study estimated that
autocracies were more than twice as likely to suffer violent internal conflict than democracies. See
TED ROBERT GURR ET AL., PEACE AND CONFLICT 2001: A GLOBAL SURVEY OFARMED CONFLICTS,
SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 20 (2001).
" The theory of the democratic peace itself dates to the 18th century political philosopher
Immanuel Kant. See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT'S
POLITICAL WRITINGS 93 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991); see also Erik Gartzke,
Kant We All lust Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace,
42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1(1998).
16 GURR, supra note 34, at 19 (noting that "[a]s recently as 1978 autocracies outnumbered
democracies by more than two to one," a ratio reversed by 1994); Adrian Karatnycky, The
Comparative Survey of Freedom 1996-1997: Freedom on the March, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD:
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states of military or economic significance that are not classified at least as transitional
democracies. The spread of democracy is arguably a byproduct of globalization;
3 7
once democracy takes hold, the forces of globalization appear to render reversal
nearly impossible.38 Thus, even if institutionalization remains incomplete at the
international level, international stability may be the byproduct of globalization.
Whatever its origins,39 the fact remains that at no time in modem history-at no
time since the founding of the Republic-has the prospect of war among major
nations seemed so slight.40 Since the early 1990s, the number and magnitude of
armed conflicts within and among states have decreased by nearly half.41 The
possibility that the United States will face an armed attack by another nation seems
improbable. Whatever national security threats the United States faces today, it will
not be on the order of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. This era of globalization
will not be characterized, as was the last, by staggering casualties on the battlefield or
deprivations on the home front, the hallmarks of total war between peoples. The very
notion of "enemy" states seems to have lost meaning.
42
This is emphatically not to say that international tranquility prevails, that threats
to national security no longer exist, or that there will never be armed international
hostilities to which the United States will be party.4 3 In fact, of course, there is a
certainty of continuing strife in various comers of the world, and the near-certainty of
future military engagements resulting from that strife, of the sort, for example,
undertaken in Kosovo and Afghanistan, invariably implicating the declining numbers
of non-democratic states who are non-participants in the institutionalization of
interstate relations. But these perils are of a completely different order from that posed
by real war. Kosovo and other engagements of the post-Cold War world have all
THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES 1996-97, at 5 (1997) (number of
democracies has grown from 69 in 1987 to 118 in 1997); see also THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF
DEMOCRACY (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2d ed. 1996).
37 See, e.g., GIDDENS, supra note 3, at 23 ("Globalisation lies behind the expansion of
democracy.").
38 Cf Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46 (1992) (concluding that democracy is becoming a requirement of international law).
39 Some contest the democratic peace thesis, at least as a historical matter. See, e.g.,
Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1994,
at 5 (arguing that the theory does not bear historical scrutiny).
40 See, e.g., David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 299,330 (2000) ('he
current imagination of international relations is circular.., and warfare is simply out of the
circle.").
41 See GURR, supra note 34, at 9.
42 See, e.g., GIDDENS, supra note 3, at 36 ("[F]ollowing the dissolving of the Cold War, most
nations no longer have enemies. Who are the enemies of Britain, or France, or Brazil?").
43 It is, however, surely the case that the media highlights ongoing conflict at the expense of
more encouraging news. See G. Pascal Zachary, Give Hope a Headline, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan./Feb.
2001, at 78 ("By missing stories of hope, the media contribute to a pervasive sense that nothing
goes right in the world.").
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(with the possible exception of the Persian Gulf War) involved a limited commitment
of resources and a limited risk of casualties. 4 Such engagements often come under
the category of "peacekeeping operations" or "international police actions," rather
than "war."4 5 This is not the kind of conflict that implicates the dangers of the World
or Cold Wars. Even the recent operation in Afghanistan, although repeatedly
described as "war" (or at least an element thereof), 46 hardly qualifies as such in
historical context. The size of the force deployed (3,000) 4 1 is comparable to recent
peacekeeping deployments and police actions. The Afghanistan deployment is minute
compared to hostilities historically denominated as "war." As with other recent
deployments, U.S. armed forces have suffered minimal casualties. 48 The deployment
itself (as opposed to the attacks to which it responded) has had few domestic
consequences.49 This is not a conflict that will see significant economic repercussions,
much less the ration books of World War II. Even the vocabulary of warfare seems
out of place. No state has been put forth as the enemy; it has not been the people of
Afghanistan that the United States is opposed to, but rather a leadership (the Taliban)
recognized by few as legitimate either in Afghanistan or in the international
community.
50
Terrorism is another story. As demonstrated by the events of September 11,
44 See, e.g., William Schneider, Pols Staying Out of Harm's Way, 31 NAT'L J. 2850 (1999)
(describing new military and political strategies in which the risk of even minimal casualties is
considered unacceptable).
45 See, e.g., HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 2, at 12 (asserting that "war is reduced to the status of
police action"); Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); Charles William Maynes, Relearning
Intervention, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1995, at 96 (describing how peacekeeping operations have
emerged as a high priority security issue); Jim Hoagland, The Trouble with Playing Global Cop,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1999, at A39 (describing recent military deployments as "police actions").46 See, e.g., Presidential Response Concerning the Events of September 11, 2001, 2001
U.S.C.C.A.N. D37, D39 ("Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war?"); War
Without Illusions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A22 ("There is no doubt that this week's terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington were the opening salvos in the first American war of the
21 st century.").4 7 See COALITION INFORMATION CENTERS, THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: THE FIRST 100
DAYS 11 (2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/
I 00dayreport.html#6> (White House press release describing troops deployed in Afghanistan).
48 As of the end of January 2002, the United States had suffered onlytwo casualties as a result
hostile action, one of whom was a Central Intelligence agent killed in the wake of the prison
uprising at Mazar-e-Sharif. See U.S. Deaths During Afghanistan Campaign, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at 6A.
49 See, e.g., Frank Rich, Patriotism on the Cheap, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2002, at A I ("We all
applaud our selfless men and women in uniform, whether at ground zero or in battle, but we are
not inclined to make even a fractionally commensurate sacrifice of our own.").
50 See, e.g., President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21,2001, at B4 ("The United States respects the people of Afghanistan. After all, we
are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid. But we condemn the Taliban regime.").
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international terrorism presents a serious continuing threat to physical security.
Indeed, in the current context, terrorism portends a more significant direct threat than
does force projection by another state. The number of casualties from the World
Trade Center attack dwarfs military losses in any conflict since Vietnam, never mind
the prospect of a biological, chemical, or nuclear terrorist attack.51 Terrorism also has
a substantial home front impact. In many respects, terrorism makes obsolete the very
notion of a war front. With the exception of those suffered as a result of the full-
blown military air assault on Pearl Harbor, the September 11 casualties were the
greatest ever suffered in any attack in the United States. Manifestations of the
response to terrorism are omnipresent in our daily routines. Most of these encounters
amount to mere inconveniences, little more than reminders of the attacks. But in the
aggregate, they have significant economic implications, real and potential5 2
One cannot underestimate the magnitude of the terrorist threat. But terrorism
presents a qualitatively different kind of threat than that previously presented by total
war among states. Terrorism, first of all, ultimately reduces to a kind of criminal
activity, which can be addressed as such. That has gone without saying in those cases
in which the terrorist agent is domestic-the Oklahoma City bombing case presenting
the obvious example. But instances of international terrorism have also been
prosecuted in the courts, including attacks undertaken by bin Laden operatives against
U.S. embassies in Africa and the 1993 World Trade Center truck bombing. 3 An
alleged co-conspirator in the September 11 attacks is being tried on various criminal
law counts in the federal court.5 4 Terrorism no doubt has significant implications for
law enforcement techniques (including closer collaboration among states in
international law enforcement), 5 but it can be conceived as such.
War between nations, by contrast, does not lend itself to a law enforcement
model. As a historical matter, war itself did not constitute a violation of any legal
norm. Even in the wake of the United Nations Charter and its formal prohibition on
5' See, e.g., William J. Broad et al., Assessing Risks, Chemical, Biological, Even Nuclear,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at Al.
"See, e.g., Richard Bemer, The Terror Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at A23
("Terrorism is also causing a... persistent kind of damage as it forces what are likely to be lasting
changes in the way Americans do business and lead their lives."); Is It at Risk?, THE EcoNOMIST,
Feb. 2, 2002, at 65 (describing a "security tax" involved in higher insurance premiums, border
delays, and increased transportation costs brought on by the September 11 attacks).
53 See Benjamin Weiser, 4 Guilty in Terror Bombings of2 US. Embassies in Africa; Jury to
Weigh 2 Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at Al.
54 See Jane Fritsch, Man Named in Terror Conspiracy Ordered to Virginia for Trial, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 14, 2001, at B6 (reporting on the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui).
55 See, e.g., Philip Stephens, A Solo Performer by Nature, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at 21
(describing how September II has facilitated multilateral undertakings); Tim Weiner, The Building
of a Network That Is Global and Reliable, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,2001, at B7 (highlighting the new
relevance of the international Interpol police network).
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most uses of force,56 however, military conflict transpired as part of a conflict
between peoples, as represented by states.57 There was an "us" and a "them"-
populations that could be correlated to territories controlled by governments with
status under international law. Even where a state violated norms against the use of
force, it remained difficult to undertake the conflict as a law enforcement operation.
The Cold War, in particular, could hardly be characterized as law enforcement; at the
time, it amounted to a competition of ideologies, each of which had secured
international legitimacy. However illegitimate communism may appear in retrospect,
at least in its Soviet application, it would be hard then or now to condemn the Soviet
Union as illegal and efforts to bring about its downfall as law enforcement.
Along similar lines, the distinction between terrorism and war may reduce to one
of magnitude. Assuming that terrorism does not emerge from the front line of a clash
of civilizations scenario58 (in which case we are very much in an "us" and "them"
situation), the terrorist threat will be a lesser one. Even the most alarmist predictions
of future terrorist action could not result in the losses of the World Wars, much less
the plausible threat of annihilation suffered through the Cold War. In historical relief,
the events of September 11 may not loom as large as they do today. Perhaps it was a
fluke of sorts, an attack ruthlessly and precisely executed exploiting a low-tech
vulnerability. If the United States does not suffer another significant terrorist attack in,
say, the next five years, September 11 may emerge as less of a watershed. But even if
terrorists continue to undertake successful attacks, it will not be war, at least not in
anything other than a colloquial sense. 59
Whatever the nature of the terrorist threat, it appears not to be one that pits states
against each other, or at least not states representing significant power. That is
56 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
57 Hence my hesitation to use the United Nations itself as part of the institutionalization thesis
or the ban on the use of force included in the U.N. Charter. For more than fortyyears, the Charter's
prohibition gave global governance and international law a bad name, so little did its aspirations
coincide with realities on the ground. Today, however, the United Nations does play a critical role
in institutionalization, as an umbrella organization if nothing else. (Even such organizations as the
International Monetary Fund are, at least as a nominal matter, United Nations agencies.) The
prohibition on the use of force has also become consequential, as the end of the Cold War
stalemate has permitted the Security Council to assume its contemplated role as a guarantor of
collective security. That role is shared with others (as demonstrated by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's lead in the Kosovo episode), but accepted unilateral uses of force are becoming
more circumscribed than in the past, limited to instances of clear self-defense.
58 Samuel P. Huntington propounds the clash of civilations scenario in his now-celebrated
thesis. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER (1996).
59 That is, in the sense of the "war on drugs," or indeed the "war on crime." See, e.g., Bruce
Ackerman, War Is Handy Politicsfor Bush, L.A. TMES, Feb. 3,2002, at M5 ("Inflated war talk is
a defining characteristic of the modem presidency ... ").
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demonstrated by the nearly universal support extended the United States by other
governments in the wake of September 11; every government save Iraq and
Afghanistan condemned the attacks. 60 That response seems consistent with the
institutionalization thesis. Considering the shock effect of September 11, the stability
of interstate relations has in some respects been remarkable. In other contexts,
conflicts are now institutionally managed, reducing the danger of uncabined conflict.
That marks a departure from historically hair-trigger conditions of interstate relations,
in which armed interstate hostilities loomed as a persistent, frightful specter. This new
stability is consequential for foreign relations law doctrines established on different
premises. Doctrines contingent on a world of hostile, competitive interstate relations
should be reexamined with the emergence of global governance systems.
B. The Disaggregated State
For several centuries, the international system has been conceived of as a society
of states, a system that has recognized a state monopoly on power and legitimacy.
International law has assumed states to be unitary actors, amenable to representation
by unitary governmental agents.6' In this world, states talked only to one another, and
only to one another as such. Their communications were highly stylized in the form of
diplomacy, the traditional model of which admits only to centralized expression of
state interests through the sovereign and his representatives to other states (in the form
of ambassadors and the rest of the diplomatic apparatus). In that world-the world of
the Westphalian system62-states did not trouble themselves with, and would take no
60 See, e.g., John Diamond, Shaping Allies from Enmity, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2001, at 4
(noting that of the seven nations-Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba and North Korea-
designated by the Department of State as sponsors of terrorism, only Iraq had failed to extend
condolences in the wake of the September 11 attacks).
61 This premise of traditional international law can be traced back to the image of states as
natural persons, a metaphor that has, until recent years, pervaded the understanding of international
relations and the organization of international institutions. See Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, The
A nalogy Between Natural Persons and International Persons in the Law ofNations, 26 YALE L.J.
564 (1917). The analogy may date from a period in which the king as sovereign was
indistinguishable from his realm. See JuLius GOEBEL, JR., THE EQUALITY OF STATES: A STUDY IN
THE HISTORY OF LAW 47 (1923) (noting that in medieval times, "the state had personality in the
person of its ruler"). It has persisted through the modem period. See, e.g., WILLAM BLOOM,
PERSONAL IDENTITY, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1-3 (1990)
(highlighting quotidian language in which states are described to act with "apparently coherent
personalities"); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER POLITCS 113 (1946) (noting
that comparison has been the "main stock in trade" of the modem international relations
scholarship).
62 See, e.g., Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 28
(1948) (describing Westphalia as "the majestic portal which leads from the old world into the new
world"); see also DANIEL PHILPOTr, REVOLUIIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY 75-110 (2001) (describing the
epochal significance of Westphalia as ushering in the era of the dominant state).
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cognizance of, other components of foreign states. As to each other, states were
63
opaque.
As an important corollary, central governments have been held responsible for
the conduct of their component parts. Thus, central governments through the agency
of foreign ministries have been held responsible for the conduct of subunit or
component governmental actors,64 as well as for the conduct of citizens and subjects
(artificial and human),65 where it implicated relations with other states. This facet of
traditional international relations has been formalized in the doctrine of state
responsibility,66 under which states have been held responsible for the acts of their
component parts, in the way domestic law holds parents responsible for the acts of
their children.
In the old world, this doctrine both reflected and reinforced a reality of central
government control and centralized relations among states in the international arena.
Against the backdrop of thin communication networks and diverse systems of
government, it would have been highly inefficient to require states to interact with
component units of other states. It would also have been difficult for states to enforce
obligations against those component units, for their leverage would, in most cases,
have been minimal; greater international conflict would have been the result. Better to
require that central governments police their own domains, the interposition of
domestic constitutional arrangements notwithstanding, insofar as central governments
were best positioned to discipline potentially disruptive actors. This intemational legal
63 In the classic metaphor of the Realist School of international relations theory, states have
been as billiard balls to one another. See, e.g., ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL PoLrTcS 19-24 (1962); see also GUEHENNO, supra note 2, at x ("The
cold war acted like a vast magnet on the iron filings of political institutions .... ).64 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § 207(b) & n.3; EDWIN M. BORCHARD,
THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CmZENS ABROAD 199-202 (1915); CLYDE EAGLETON, THE
RESPONSIBILrrY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-35 (1928); Harvard Law School, Research
in International Law: Draft Convention on the Law ofResponsibility of States for Damage Done
in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, art. 3 & cmt., reprinted in 23 AM. J.
INT'L L. 133, 145 (Supp. pt. 2 1929) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
65 See, e.g.,Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1933 (1938) (finding a
state responsible for transboundary harm caused by a company located in its territory); EAGLETON,
supra note 64, at 80 ("A State owes at all times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts
by individuals from within its jurisdiction."); PHILIP QUINCY WRIGHT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1916) ("The essential
feature of international law is not that it lays down rules of conduct for states, but that it holds
states responsible for the conduct of persons."); W. Friedmann, The Growth ofState Control Over
the Individual, and Its Effect Upon the Rules of International State Responsibility, 19 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 118, 142-43 (1938) (observing that states are vicariously liable for international
delinquencies committed by individuals). The responsibility for states for the conduct of
individuals has been less complete than that for component governmental units. See infra notes
202-10 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § 207.
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responsibility in turn reinforced highly channeled interstate interaction through
diplomatic agents. Regardless of the source of offense, a state sought redress through
67diplomatic contacts. If redress were not forthcoming, the injured state could respond
in an undifferentiated manner against the state whose component engaged in the
unlawful act.68
But this model of international relations now faces serious pressures from
developments on the ground. Perhaps most notably, where states used to deal with
one another through centralized agents, the channels of communication have
multiplied. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has demonstrated, central governments
increasingly interact through a variety of decentralized networks outside of foreign
ministries.69 Centralized diplomacy is in decline. Officials with substantive
responsibilities in a particular area institutionalize relationships with their counterparts
in other governments, often out of sight of national chief executives .70 Likewise with
respect to governmental subunits; where provincial and municipal authorities used to
have at most sporadic interaction with foreign government entities, such contacts are
now routine. 7' Direct relationships between foreign actors and private entities-
corporate and individual-are so multifarious as to seem unworthy of remark.72 As
such decentralized relationships intensify, states come to understand the structure of
other states; the transaction costs of direct communication with component units
correspondingly diminishes. (Indeed, it may be less efficient to communicate through
centralized agents, insofar as such communication will implicate the transaction costs
67 See, e.g., Claims, 6 Moore DIGEST § 970.
68 See, e.g., BORCHARD, supra note 64, at 178 ("[D]iplomatic measures for the pecuniary
reparation of the injury... may range from the diplomatic presentation of a pecuniary claim to
war.").
69 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183.
It is to Professor Slaughter that I owe the term "disaggregated state." See id. Where Professor
Slaughter uses it to describe the disaggregation of national executives, however, I go further to
highlight the discrete activity of other governmental and non-governmental components on the
world stage.
70 1d.; see also Wolfgang H. Reinicke, The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy
Networks, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1999-2000, at 44 (describing existence of transgovernmental
policy networks).
71 See, e.g., EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNMENTS IN U.S.
FOREIGN AFFAIRs (1998) (describing and assessing such activity); BRIAN HOCKING, LOCALIZING
FOREIGN POLICY: NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AND MULTILAYERED DIPLOMACY (1993)
(describing various case studies demonstrating the increased activity of subnational governments,
including U.S. states, at the international level); STATES AND PROVINCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY (Douglas M. Brown & Earl H. Fry eds., 1993) (describing increased international
economic activity).72 See, e.g., Timothy Fort & Cindy Schipani, Companies Can Help Make Peace, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 21,2001, at 16 (describing how corporate conduct can contribute to international stability);
Joseph Kahn, Multinationals Sign U.N. Pact on Rights and Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2000, at A3 (describing formal agreement between corporations and the United Nations).
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of intra-governmental communication.) The density of such relationships will also
give rise to the possibility of leverage against component units of other states,73 thus
diluting the necessity of central government responsibility.
International legal doctrines holding states responsible for the conduct of their
constituent elements, it is true, remain firmly in place.74 But to the extent that the
unitary state has been a social construction of the international system, recent
developments pose a probable challenge to the long-term hold of corresponding legal
constructions. 75 As states and other international actors find that the rule of
7 This leverage will most obviously take an economic form, thus combining the
disaggregation phenomenon with the advent of economic globalization. See infra text
accompanying notes 285-303. It may also play out in exercises in international shaming, as part of
the international social constructs that arise in the wake of denser communications networks. See
infra text accompanying notes 309-14. Finally, at least as a matter of theory, it can play out in the
realm of force. In the Kosovo campaign, NATO attacked Serbia but not Montenegro, even though
the two provinces comprise a state, on the clear premise that Montenegro should not have been
held responsible for the misdeeds of the Milosevic regime. Even the response against bin Laden
can be processed as part of the disaggregation of the state. Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda
organization are of course non-state entities. The Taliban regime was held responsible for
harboring AI-Qaeda, but the latter is clearly considered autonomous of any state and has been
pursued as such.
74 At least with respect to component governmental units. For example, draft articles of state
responsibility now being considered by the International Law Commission (something of an
international equivalent to the American Law Institute and its restatements) shows no sign of
retreating from longstanding doctrine under which states are held intemationallyresponsible for the
conduct of subnational units. See Report ofthe International Law Commission on the Work of its
Forty-Eighth Session, art. 6, UN GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 126, UN Doc. A/51/10
(1996) ("The conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of that State under
international law, whether that organ ... holds a superior or a subordinate position in the
organization of the State."). State responsibility for individuals has been eroding for some time,
however. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
75 Cf Friedmann, supra note 65, at 148 ("The law cannot ignore social change beyond a
certain point, for no law can command respect which bases its rules on the society of yesterday.").
The disaggregation thesis is also bolstered by the increasingly elusive notion of "the national
interest." As Gu~henno observes:
[A]s the American economy is being internationalized, and foreigners learn theirway around
the American system, the notion of an American national interest expressed by the Congress
of the United States is becoming more and more abstract. By definition, there is no lobby to
defend the interests of the 'American nation.'
GutHENNO, supra note 2, at 22; see also, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, The Erosion ofAmerican
National Interests, FoREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 28; Mathews, supra note 28, at 13 ("The
discrepancy between the fixed geography of states and the non-territorial nature of today's
problems and solutions is only likely to grow. Nation states may simply no longer be the natural
problem-solving unit."). Nor is September 11 likely to retard this trend. On the contrary, to the
extent that nearly all states consider terrorism a threat, it is not distinctively in the interest of any to
combat it. In this respect, the events of September 11 may actually accelerate constitutional
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international law is advanced by disaggregating the state, rules of responsibility will
be modified accordingly. No longer will the international system be blind to entities
other than states; on the contrary, it will take account of the full range of actors
engaged at the global level.
C. Economic Globalization
Economic globalization hinges on the mobility of capital and the globalization of
markets. The two phenomena are intertwined beyond their dependence on improved
communications, transportation, and travel systems. Manufacturing and service
operations can be relocated with relative ease. This is partly because the engines of
today's economy are more easily moved from one place to another. But it is also
because in the context of a global marketplace states have facilitated the possibilities
for relocation. Staying competitive in the global economy is critical to economic
success,76 and so former barriers to the movement of capital have been lowered. 7
Globalization has constrained the discretion of states not only with respect to the
movement of capital, but also with respect to other forms of regulation. Mobility and
the importance of attracting capital has led to unprecedented regulatory competition
among states.78 States now face a situation in which increasing regulatory burdens
(including labor standards, 79 environmental controls,80 and taxes81) may prompt the
globalization. See infra notes 280-95 and accompanying text.
761 will not pretend to undertake a survey of economic developments since the advent of
globalization. A sampling of trends will suffice. Between 1990 and 1999, for example, the level of
annual foreign direct-investment inflows more than tripled (from $209 billion to $865 billion),
increasing in 1996-99 at a rate of 31% annually. See UNrTED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD INvESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS
AND ACQUISmONS AND DEVELOPMENT 4 (2000). The value of cross-border mergers involving U.S.
entities increased more than 400% between 1995 and 1999, from $53 billion to $233 billion. Id. at
240.
77 See, e.g., JAMES H. MrTTELMAN, THE GLOBALIZATION SYNDROME: TRANSFORMATION AND
RESISTANCE 25 (2000) ("To realize material gain from globalization, the state increasingly
facilitates the process, acting as its agent.") (citations omitted). Mittelman characterizes this as a
"courtesan" role for the state in the globalization construct. Id. at 25-26.78 See, e.g., Richard Falk, State of Siege: Will Globalization Win Out?, INT'LAFF., Jan. 1997,
at 123, 125 ('Territorial sovereignty is being diminished on a spectrum of issues in such a serious
manner as to subvert the capacity of states to control and protect the intemal life of society .. ");
Saskia Sassen, The State and the New Geography of Power, in THE ENDS OF GLOBALIZATION:
BRINGING SOCIETY BACK IN 49, 55-56 (Don Kalb et al. eds., 2000) ('The possibility of moving
from one to another jurisdiction with lower regulatory demands, puts downward pressures on
regulations across all jurisdictions .... ).
'9 See, e.g., Terry Collingsworth et al., Labor and Free Trade: Timefor a Global New Deal,
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 8 (asserting that state competition in the face of globalization will
result in depressed labor conditions); Ethan B. Kapstein, Workers and the World Economy, FOR.
AFFAIRS, May-June 1996, at 16.
8o See, e.g., Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International
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departure of capital."2
Of course, mobility is restricted by the availability of substitutes. For
underdeveloped states, the competitive restraints on regulation are greatest insofar as
they are most substitutable as a location for capital. If Indonesia raises corporate taxes
or imposes labor regulations, a corporation will move its operations to an India or
Thailand that does not impose such burdens. Developed countries have had less to
fear from such impositions, insofar as the costs of substitution are higher. For many
enterprises, the costs of relocating from the United States would be high, leaving the
United States with greater regulatory discretion than other states, though perhaps less
than in a world of largely immobile capital.
But here is where economic globalization intersects with the disaggregation
phenomenon in a way that may level the playing field. Insofar as regulatory policy is
set at the subnational level, economic actors can pit subnational jurisdictions against
each other as regulatory competitors. Where the United States and Mexico may not be
substitutable (although they are for an increasing number of economic operations), a
Tennessee and a Texas are substitutable for all but the most immobile types of
businesses (the recovery of natural resources serving as the classic example). To the
extent, then, that authority is found at the subnational level, even powerful nations
become vulnerable to the levers of economic globalization.
As do their component parts. Obviously, as in the above explanation, national
subunits must become situated in the international context. But corporations must as
well. They, too, must maintain global competitiveness. Maintaining competitiveness
in global markets translates in part into reducing locational costs (resulting in
competition among states). But they must also protect against non-economic liabilities
that may reduce their competitiveness in global markets, especially global consumer
markets. At the same time as globalization has diminished state capacity to discipline
corporations (one premise of the old system of state responsibility), it has added
another mechanism, one that plays out across national boundaries. To the extent that
corporations face the discipline of global markets on questions of operational venues
(that is, where they do business), they can in turn exercise leverage over govemmental
authorities, central and subnational. States, non-govemmental organizations (NGOs),
and consumers can pressure corporations to boycott jurisdictions whose practices are
for one reason or another objectionable, in which construct corporations emerge as a
and Domestic Evidence, in I FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
81 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1590-92 (recounting evidence that the mobility of
capital has driven down effective tax rates); see also GUEHENNO, supra note 2, at 10 ("[Tlaxation
is no longer a sovereign decision."). The diminished capacity to tax, of course, has implications for
other areas of government policy. See, e.g., DANi RODRIK, HAs GLOBAI1ZATION GONE TOO FAR? 6
(1997) (highlighting how mobility facilitated by globalization undermines the welfare state).
82 See Debora Spar & David Yoffie, Multinational Enterprises and the ProspectsforJustice,
J. INT'L AFF., Spring 1999, at 557 (setting forth factors that contribute to regulatory competition).
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tool for advancing international agendas.8 3 The availability of these levers against
some state components facilitates the direct responsibility of state components to
international law. Economic globalization also facilitates recognition of these
components and an understanding of how they are situated within the state. The
mobility of capital, for instance, will increase the incentives for international actors to
understand the extent of subnational authorities within particular nations, and to
communicate directly with them, as well as with discrete non-diplomatic elements of
central governments. In that respect economic globalization is an important cause and
reinforcement of the disaggregation phenomenon. States are no longer critical to the
discipline of their component parts, and they no longer need be their channel to the
outside world.
84
The institutionalization of interstate relations, the disaggregation of the state, and
economic globalization all suggest foundational shifts in the structure of the global
system. To the extent constitutional doctrines have been grounded in the old
framework, they must be reexamined against the new. Frameworks conceived in
other times may emerge inappropriate in the changed global context.
11M. THE HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Unlike other areas of the law, foreign relations law definitionally implicates a
context beyond our control. Foreign relations law may be described as that which
governs the intersection of international affairs and the domestic legal regime. On
domestic questions, we can at least hold out the possibility of changing the context
itself, so that anything is possible. Foreign relations law, by contrast, must confront an
exogenous context, something that must be taken largely as a given. This context has
been particularly constraining to the extent that it has included hostile entities of equal
13 See generally Peter Newell, Environmental NGOs and Globalization: The Governance of
TNCs, in GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 117 (Robin Cohen & Shirin M. Rai eds., 2000); Peter J.
Spiro, New Global Potentates: Non-Governmental Organizations and the 'Unregulated'
Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957 (1996); Gary Gereffi et al., The NGO-Industrial Complex,
FOR. POL'Y, July-Aug. 2001, at 56; Sebastian Maltby, Activists, Acting Governmental, WASH.
POST, Feb. 26, 2001, at A19; see also infra notes 288-89, 302-03 and accompanying text
(describing examples of this dynamic).
84 Economic globalization appears largely unaffected by September 11 attacks. See, e.g.,
Gerard Baker, Globalisation Has Survived the Terrorist Attacks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1,2001, at21; Is
it at Risk?, supra note 52, at 66 ("[M]ost aspects of globalisation have survived the shocks of 2001
remarkably well."). Indeed, the dictates of economic globalization appear to have constrained the
U.S. response to the terrorist attacks. For example, proposals for a moratorium on student visas
were rejected in the face of a significant loss in income for educational institutions. See, e.g., Diana
Jean Schemo, Eager for Foreign Students, Universities Persuade Senator to Drop Plan to Limit
Visas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at B7. Efforts to impose heightened security at ports of entry
(especially border crossings) have come up against the costs of processing delays. See, e.g., Sam
Dillon, As Border Delays Grow, Process Draws Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at A8.
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or greater means, potential conquering adversaries, as it has since the Founding era.
Because that context has threatened the entire American project, it has inevitably
compromised other important constitutional values. But now that the context has
changed and that threat has passed, those other values should come back to the fore.
Even if the old threat has been replaced by a different one, a reassessment is in order.
Globalization may eliminate the necessity for a foreign relations differential.
This section traces the roots of three core doctrines of foreign relations law to the
international context in which they were developed. The doctrines are representative
of the foreign relations differential; each departs from baseline constitutional norms
that would otherwise prevail in the domestic sphere.85 The political question doctrine
85 As opposed to those doctrines of foreign relations law that are peculiar to the foreign
relations context-most notably the war and treaty-making powers-and thus less easily deployed
by way of demonstrating a foreign relations differential, and arguing for its abandonment. These
doctrines, of course, also implicate the external global context, and they all will be impacted by
globalization. But because they do not involve a differential (that is, because they do not pose a
deviation from otherwise controlling constitutional norms) there will be no template for assessing
this effect. With respect to these other doctrines, elements of globalization other than those featured
here will likely come into play. For instance, war powers doctrine may come to be recognized with
a constitutional significance in the authorization of international organizations. See, e.g., Thomas
M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 63, 70-71,74 (1991) (arguing that United Nation's authorization of the Korean and Gulf
Wars eliminated the otherwise applicable constitutional requirement of congressional approval).
But see Yoo, War Powers, supra note 16, at 1720-29 (rejecting the relevance of U.N.
authorization). Of course, insofar as the democratic peace prevails, the war power becomes less
singular; in that respect, Congress might be expected to play a more prominent role in decisions
relating to the use of force. See Peter J. Spiro, Old Wars/New Wars, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723
(1996) (arguing that the changing nature of warfare affords Congress greater opportunities to
exercise control of the use of force).
The growth of international institutions may also pose new or revived issues of foreign
relations law, relating for example to the possible application of the Appointments Clause. See,
e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MNN. L. REV. 71 (2000); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty
and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15
CONST. CoMM. 87, 116-29 (1998) (asserting Appointments Clause "difficulties" with accession to
Chemical Weapons Convention). Aside from important federalism issues, compare Bradley,
Treaty Power, supra note 16 (asserting that federalism constraints apply to Treaty Power), with
Golove, supra note 18 (rebutting Bradley's argument), it is unclear how globalization will change
the contours of the treaty power. It does not cut clearly one way or the other on the choice between
and acceptability of executive agreements relative to Article I1 treaties. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman
& David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Peter J. Spiro,
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEx. L. REV. 961 (2001)
[hereinafter Spiro, Constitutional Method]; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV.
1221 (1995); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 99 MiCH. L. REV. 757 (2001). Implicit in the premises of this article, however, is the
possibility that U.S. constitutional doctrine will bend to the dictates of globalization; insofar as it
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reverses the usual presumption in favor of judicial review; federal exclusivity over
foreign relations deviates from the presumption that the states play an important
institutional role in our federal system; and the dilution of core individual rights in the
name of national security derogates the fundamental place of such rights in our
constitutional framework. All three deviations were a product of the old international
dynamic, but each must be reexamined in the face of globalization. The differential
may no longer be sustainable; and the usual presumptions may be vindicated.
A. The Political Question Doctrine in Matters Involving Foreign Relations
The political question doctrine dates to the very dawn ofjudicial review. At the
same time that Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison86 famously
declared it to be the duty of the judiciary emphatically "to say what the law is," 87 it
also carved out from judicial scrutiny the exercise by the President of "certain
important political powers ' 88 for which he "is accountable only to his country in his
political character, and to his own conscience. ' ' 9 Among such acts insulated from
review-which "can never be examinable by the courts" 9° -Marshall singled out
those of the department of foreign affairs insofar as its officers are to "conform
precisely to the will of the President."9'
Courts have repeatedly invoked the political question doctrine to deny review of
matters involving the nation's foreign relations, including cases involving the control
of territory,9' recognition of govemments,9' and the consequences of breach by a
does not, international norms may be imposed on the United States through other mechanisms. See
infra text accompanying notes 286-91 (describing a model in which U.S. compliance with
international norms is accomplished through non-institutional channels).
Perhaps the most historically significant statement of the foreign relations differential
appeared in a context in which the changes in baseline values-that is, doctrine applicable in the
domestic context---changed so as to eliminate the differential. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936) (upholding the delegation of power from Congress to the
Executive in a foreign relations context, even assuming such delegation to be invalid in a domestic
one). At the time Curtiss- Wright was decided, the non-delegation doctrine still had teeth, so that in
its wake a differential prevailed. However, as the non-delegation doctrine lost force in the domestic
context as well, that differential was eliminated. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531
U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting a non-delegation challenge to an environmental protection statute).
16 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803).
87Id. at 177.
88Id. at 165.
89 1d. at 166.
9 Id.
91 1d.
92 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,212 (1890); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38
U.S. (13 Pet.)415,420 (1839).
93 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938); Oetjen v.
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610,
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treaty partner.94 The doctrine has also barred judicial review of war powers
controversies.95 In recent decades it has come under sustained attack by the
commentators.96 In the face of these attacks, and because the doctrine deviates from
the core constitutional norm in favor of judicial review, the courts have elaborately
defended the doctrine. Baker v. Carr97 remains the starting point. Although not
implicated in the case before it,98 the Carr Court highlighted the prominent
application of the doctrine in cases involving foreign relations. "Not only does
resolution of such issues frequently turn on standards that defyjudicial application, or
involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or
legislature," 99 the Court there concluded, "but many such questions uniquely demand
single-voiced statement of the Government's views. ' °
Some of these defenses are not persuasive, at least not as the doctrine is applied
to foreign relations. The argument that there are no applicable legal standards by
634-35 (1818).94 See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 473-75 (1913); Kwan v. United States, 84 F.
Supp. 2d 613, 623-24 (E.D. Pa. 2000).95 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Lufig v. McNamara, 373
F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339-40 (D.D.C. 1987); see also
GLENNON, supra note 15 (attacking use of the political question doctrine in a war powers context).
This article for the most part brackets issues relating to war powers. See supra note 85. To the
extent that one is talking about real war, that is, conflict involving significant and sustained
national commitments, with a high risk of casualties, see Peter J. Spiro, WarPowers and the Sirens
of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1348-55 (1993) (distinguishing real wars from "strike
operations" and peacekeeping deployments), the possibility is inconsistent with the premise ofthe
democratic peace. That is not to deny the possibility of real wars in the future (at least of the
Persian Gulf sort), only to concede that constitutional questions arising therefrom should be
addressed under old-world constructs, including the political question doctrine. To the extent,
however, that war powers questions are prompted by smaller-scale deployments, there may now be
room forjudicial scrutiny. See infra note 137.
96 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15; see also Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in
Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 805 (1989) (accepting the propriety of judicial
abstention in some situations involving foreign relations, but asserting that "the burden should lie
heavily upon those urging thejudiciary to abdicate its responsibilities").
" 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9' The Carr case involved the constitutionality of a state legislative districting scheme. See id.
at 187-88. On the political question doctrine beyond the foreign relations context, see, for
example, ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 183-200 (1962); JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLmCAL PROCESS (1980); and Martin H. Redish,
Judicial Review and the 'Political Question', 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031 (1985).
99 Carr, 369 U.S. at 211.
100 Id. These three factors are among the six identified as among the "several formulations
which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise." Id. at 217 (highlighting
the "lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" a dispute, a'"textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," and the
"potentiality of embarrassment from multi farious pronouncements by various departments on one
question," as among thosejustifying application of the doctrine).
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which to determine a rule of decision is, first of all, alternatively circular or self-
fulfilling. The sorts of issues posed by foreign relations law are not as a matter of legal
interpretation inherently different from other questions of law.'01 In this respect the
rationale is circular. Of course, to the extent that the courts have consistently refused
to inject themselves in controversies relating to foreign relations, judicial precedent in
the area is considerably less refined; application of the political question doctrine itself
leads to the paucity of standards as articulated by the courts. In this respect the
rationale is self-fulfilling, but unpersuasive, nonetheless: there are other standards to
apply than those found in the case reports. In historical practice, most notably, one can
usually delineate constitutional standards in the area. 102 In those instances in which
the courts have ruled on the merits, they have demonstrated the capacity to find
applicable standards in these non-judicial precedents.'° 3
Likewise with respect to cases assertedly "involv[ing] the exercise of a discretion
demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature."'04 The framework for
finding "demonstrable commitment" has never been adequately sketched, beyond the
argument that it can be detected in the constitutional text itself Indeed, as Professor
Henkin has noted, there seems no constitutional power for which demonstrable
commitment is established. 0 5 Outside of the foreign relations context, those
constitutional provisions that seem most amenable to such interpretation have not
been insulated from judicial consideration.'0 6 The "demonstrable commitment"
101 Take the notable invocation of the political question doctrine by a four-justice plurality in
Goldwater v. Carter 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Goldwater involved the question of whether the
President may unilaterally terminate an Article 1I treaty approved by the Senate. Justice Rehnquist
stressed the Constitution's silence on the issue of treaty termination, arguing that the absence of a
governing provision left the question to be governed by political standards, not judicial ones. See
id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). But the fact that the constitutional text leaves an issue
unanswered cannot stand as an excuse forjudicial restraint; controversies that find their wayto the
Court almost inherently involve such questions. See infra note 103 (rebutting the argument that
foreign affairs cases transcend judicial competence).
102 See, e.g., Spiro, Constitutional Method, supra note 85, at 733-43 (setting forth a model for
processing the constitutional significance of particular historical episodes).
'03 Where courts have adjudicated foreign relations cases on the merits, it is often to history
that they turn by way of precedent. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, for example, the Court traced a
long practice under which presidents have unilaterally (that is, without participation of Congress)
settled claims and controversies with foreign nations through so-called sole executive agreements.
453 U.S. 654, 679-83 (1981); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which
life has written upon them.").
"04 Carr, 369 U.S. at 211.
105 Henkin, Political Question Doctrine, supra note 15, at 603-05.
'
06 See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515-21 (1969) (finding expulsion of
congressman by House of Representatives to bejusticiable notwithstanding its power under Article
1, section 5, to expel a member by two-thirds vote).
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rationale is, in short, makeweight.
The weakness of these rationales is not to argue the indefensibility of the political
question doctrine, at least against the old-world backdrop. But the doctrine
appropriately stood only on justifications that correlated to that backdrop,
justifications that supported this differential treatment of foreign relations cases. First
has been the "high stakes" rationale for non-review of foreign relations matters, a
rationale that, while not included in the standard list of political questions (absent,
most notably, from the catalogue of Baker v. Carr), has clearly figured in some
applications of the doctrine.'° 7 Of course, the courts will often rule on controversies of
fundamental importance; "high stakes," by itself, doesn't seem to demand judicial
restraint. But high stakes in the international context are different from high stakes in
the domestic context to the extent that the implication of third parties (read: foreign
countries) beyond our control greatly magnifies the risk of error. If a court makes a
mistake in the domestic context, there are various mechanisms by which to overcome
that error and minimize its damage. In the international context, the commission of
the error can, at least in theory, spark a chain of events taking the matter out of our
hands, so that the damage is irretrievable. And in the international context that
damage has been, as a historical matter, potentially severe. In the worst case, a dispute
provoked by judicial error could plausibly have led the country into armed hostilities
with another state;' °8 as the Court noted in Oetjen v. CentralLeather Co.,1°9 to get it
wrong (in that case, deciding which government legitimately ruled post-revolutionary
Russia) would "imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the
peace of nations."' 10 That prospect sufficed to overcome the ordinary presumption in
favor of judicial review; if one accepts the underlying model, it seems difficult to
argue otherwise.
The risk of error has, at least in the past, been compounded by a lack of judicial
expertise with respect to foreign policy, at least relative to the executive branch.
Indeed, beyond Carr's inventory, it is perhaps the profession of institutional
incompetence that has most frequently justified judicial abstention from ruling on
foreign relations controversies."' At one level this incompetence was clearly
107 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 98, at 184 (including asjustifications for application of the
doctrine "the sheer momentousness of [an issue], which tends to unbalance judicial judgment");
see also FRANCK, supra note 15, at 50-58 (attacking "too much at stake" defense of political
question doctrine).
10' Leaving aside the case where the United States is already engaged in such hostilities. In the
case of real war, see supra note 95, the enormity of the stakes are self evident, implicating at least
American lives and possibly national survival. Even a small risk of judicial error in that context
emerged intolerable.
109 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
"o°Id. at 304.
... See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
(foreign relations decisions "are ... of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities,
nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not
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overblown. Courts rule all the time in much more complex (not to mention dull) areas
of law; it is hard to argue that the average federal judge, even in the era before
globalization, was less informed on matters of foreign affairs than on such issues as
energy regulation, bankruptcy law, or the federal pension regime.1 2 To the extent that
challenge was one of distinguishing those cases directly implicating relations with
other countries from those that did not, the courts have always commanded a requisite
understanding of international affairs. 1 3 Where the foreign relations context did (at
least in the era before globalization) put the courts at a potential institutional
disadvantage was in securing full information. What has distinguished foreign
relations from other matters of policy is the accepted element of secrecy, both in
information gathering and policy implementation. As Justice Jackson observed in the
Waterman decision, the President "has available intelligence services whose reports
are not and ought not be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the
Executive taken on information properly held secret."1 4 Even if it would have been
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry").
112 Jonathan Chamey observes:
The role of the judiciary in these cases does not differ from that played in other cases it
routinely decides. The courts are provided with the necessary information by attomeys acting
in their roles as advocates....
... In purely domestic cases, novel and highly complex technical issues are regularly and
successfully addressed.
Charney, supra note 96, at 809; see also KOH, supra note 15, at 221-22 (highlighting
"demonstrated ability [of the courts] in domestic cases to derive workable standards from even the
vaguest constitutional provisions").
113 Thus I disagree with Jack Goldsmith's conclusion that federal courts cannot, "in the
absence of guidance from the political branches, accurately determine when and how foreign
relations interests require abstention or preemption." Goldsmith, New Fornalism, supra note 16, at
1415. The determination of whether a case affected U.S. relations with international actors was a
fairly straightforward calculation, at least before globalization complicated the very meaning of the
nation. See Spiro, supra note 14, at 1256-57.
114 333 U.S. at 11l. Although the observation no doubt held true in some contexts, it is almost
amusing that it was delivered in a case involving a dispute over the granting of a Caribbean air
route to Chicago, hardly a matter of great international moment. See also United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("[The President] has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in
respect of information gathered bythem may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of
it productive of harmful results."); cf Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (upholding delegation
pf power to prohibit travel to Cuba in part on the grounds that"the Executive is immediately privy
'to information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the
legislature, Congress"). The observation would, again, best apply in the context of controversies
relating to military conflict. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973)
(refusing to review challenge to bombing of Cambodia on political question grounds; "[w]e are not
privy to the information supplied to the Executive by his professional military and diplomatic
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the rare case in which an undisclosed back story would have skewed judicial
decision-making, the fact that in any given case the courts could not have been
confident of full information justified their passivity, at least in light of the downside
risks of error.
There remains, of course, the question of how misjudgments on the part of the
courts might have undermined American interests on the international plane. Here the
old-world conception of the unitary state presented the critical contextual vector.
Because states were assumed to be unitary, any act of the courts was considered an act
of state, for which the state was held responsible-hence Bakerv. Carr's justification
of non-review as avoiding "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question."' 5 Though cryptic at first
glance, the use of the word "embarrassment"--a persistent riff in foreign relations law
doctrine 1 6-implies both the presence of an outside entity and a framework of
responsibility; one cannot be embarrassed except in relation to others, and one is not
embarrassed for anything for which one does not feel responsible. In this case the
"others" are foreign countries, and the responsibility has been imposed by
international law.' 17 Indeed, the courts have shown a demonstrably greater
willingness to entertain foreign relations matters that do not directly implicate other
countries. 1 8 Where they have, the embarrassment avoided might have been literal, for
advisers and even if we were, we are hardly competent to evaluate it").
115 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
116 See, e.g., Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,434-35 (1968) (striking down a state law the
application of which posed "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" at the international
level); Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876, 878 (1948) (denyingjurisdiction over war crimes trials
on the ground that it was "bound to embarrass the United States" with respect to allied nations
jointly overseeing the process); Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (asserting
"that courts may not so exercise theirjurisdiction, bythe seizure and detention of the property of a
friendly sovereign, as to embarrass the executive arm of the Government in conducting foreign
relations"); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (observing that the need to avoid embarrassment
justifies affording the President "a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved"); United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 209 (1882) ("In such cases thejudicial department of this government follows the action
of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonisticjurisdiction.").
For a misapplication of the concept, see Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1996)
(rejecting a claim by state officials against the federal government for costs associated with illegal
immigration; "this court's adjudication of questions as to the success or failure of the federal
government's immigration policy poses a grave risk of national embarrassment").
117 See supra notes 64-66.
1' See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing to enjoin
publication of the Pentagon Papers); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952 ) (dispute over seizure of steel mills by presidential proclamation); see also Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-05 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (distinguishing Youngstown
from case in which effect would be "entirely external to the United States, and [falls] within the
category of foreign affairs"). One can, with this distinction, explain virtually all of the cases that
Franck highlights in asserting a "significant countervailing trend [towards a] nonabdicationist
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the nation's diplomatic representatives, faced with offended foreign officials whose
goodwill (at the very least) would be more difficult to secure on other issues as a
result of the judicial miscue (especially to the extent that the executive branch felt
obligated to respect the judicial action). 119 Embarrassment results as well when those
diplomats are left to grapple with a decision undercutting their efforts with foreign
counterparts. It is the fact and features of the exogenous context that have dictated
that the nation "speak with one voice" 20 when it comes to foreign relations (another
jurisprudence." FRANCK, supra note 15, at 61. See generally id. at 61-96 (describing cases in
which courts have rejected application of the political question doctrine in foreign relations cases).
The few cases in which courts have gone to the merits in cases directly implicating relations with
other countries all seem to have approved political branch action. This is true of the two most
frequently cited decisions refusing to apply the doctrine in the foreign relations context. The Court
in Dames & Moore upheld the constitutionality of a U.S. agreement with Iran to end the 1978-81
hostage crisis. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). In Japan Whaling, the Court
found an executive agreement with Japan to satisfy a statutory mandate to impose sanctions on
states violating international prohibitions on whaling. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,241 (1986); see also Goldsmith, New Formalism, supra note 16, at
1403 n.30 (citing only Dames & Moore and Japan Whaling for the proposition that courts often
adjudicate cases with significant foreign relations implications); id. at 1427-28 (holding outJapan
Whaling as evidence that the Court has adopted a "new formalism" in which courts adjudicate
foreign relations cases "without [the] safety valve of abstention"). Because both decisions on the
merits merely confirmed executive branch action-as would, of course, have been true if the
decisions had been grounded in the political question doctrine-there was no danger of upsetting
the bilateral relationships involved. Cf Henkin, Political Question Doctrine, supra note 15, at 606
(arguing that invocation of political question doctrine disguises rulings on the merits in support of
executive branch action). Indeed, the other countries would have had no need even to take note of
the decisions. These exceptions to application of the political question doctrine in the pre-
globalization era are thus consistent with the "embarrassment"rationale, and bythemselves present
a thin basis for asserting that courts have or should participate in foreign relations decision-making.
119 Here one finds a subsidiary justification for judicial reticence in the sphere of foreign
relations: that there is a higher risk than in other areas that the political branches will simply ignore
judicial attempts at constraint, with consequential damage to the institutional legitimacy of the
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882) (observing that courts should
abstain from deciding foreign relations cases because they lack "the power to adjust them");
CHOPER, supra note 98, at 129-70 (approving the argument as a basis for judicial restraint);
FRANCK, supra note 15, at 57-59 (describing and rebutting this basis for the political question
doctrine in foreign relations law cases); Chamey, supra note 96, at 811 (same). This concern surely
has contributed to the consistent refusal of the courts to rule on questions involving the
commitment of forces into combat.
120 The phrase appears first to have been used by Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in
United States v. Pink. See 315 U.S. 203,242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In our dealings
with the outside world, the United States speaks with one voice and acts as one, unembarrassed by
the complications as to domestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of political power
between the national government and the individual states."); see also, e.g., Chamey, supra note
96, at 811-12 (describing "one voice" rationale to support the political question doctrine in a
foreign relations context).
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persistent theme in foreign relations law) and that that voice not be the judiciary's.
Assuming the sensitivity of foreign relations, and the danger that judicial intervention
will upset that balance, non-review emerges supportable.
The same assumptions justified the correlate act of state doctrine,121 under which
U.S. courts have refused to examine the validity of acts undertaken by a foreign
government in its own territory."2 If anything, the act of state doctrine was more
clearly mandated by the structure of the old global system.123 By definition, the cases
directly involved the interests of a foreign state. The prospect of finding a foreign
state's conduct to be invalid almost necessarily posed a risk to foreign relations with
that state; 114 even where such acts were validated, such relations could be complicated
and U.S. interests undermined.125 It is no surprise, then, that the act of state cases lean
heavily on the "embarrassment" and similar rationales emphasizing the consequences
for national relations with the state involved. 126 As in the political question cases, the
act of state decisions showed a consciousness of the peculiar stakes of foreign
relations and were necessarily premised on the aggregated state.
But as discussed in Part 11, those assumptions seem weak in the face of
globalization. The international system is far less fragile today than in the recent past,
and the risks of catastrophic developments are slight. The hazards of judicial error
(even assuming the continuing conceptions of state responsibility) have been reduced
accordingly. The courts are not going to lead us into World War lII, or a trade war, or
any other serious conflict; the institutional infrastructure at the international level now
,21 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 715-16 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (I How.) 635,657-59 (1853) (noting shared foundations for
the two doctrines); FRANCK, supra note 15, at 98 (asserting that the act of state and political
question doctrines have been treated as "more or less interchangeable").
1 See RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 16, § 443; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (refusing to consider the legality of Cuban expropriation);
Underhill v. Hemandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (refusing to entertain a damage suit arising from
detention by the government of Venezuela).
123 Even though, like the political question doctrine, it enjoyed only "constitutional
underpinnings" rather than a constitutional mandate. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
"' See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432 (noting that when the executive branch has refrained
from claims of international law violations, "a determination to that effect by a court might be
regarded as a serious insult... [e]ven if the State Department has proclaimed the impropriety of
the expropriation, the stamp of approval of its view by ajudicial tribunal, however impartial, might
increase any affront").
I5 Id. (noting "serious and far-reaching consequences" of a judicial finding of validity
contrary to the executive branch's view).
126 See, e.g., id. at 433 (explaining that "the very expression of judicial uncertainty might
provide embarrassment to the Executive Branch"); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621
F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Relegating grievances from acts of this sort to executive
channels of international diplomacy, the rule is an embodiment of the deference to be accorded the
sovereignty of other nations; it averts potential diplomatic embarrassment from the courts of one
sovereign sitting in judgment over the public acts of another.").
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includes multiple safeguards against such results. The likelihood ofjudicial error has
also diminished as more international policy is undertaken openly by a variety of
actors (public and private), and with little or no reliance on secret channels of
information or action. 127 The threat of terrorism does not sustain this differential; there
is no risk of courts upsetting delicate or sensitive relations with terrorist entities any
more than courts risk upsetting drug cartels or other criminal organizations. 12 Insofar
as the risks and likelihood of error have thus been reduced, it seems no longer
justifiable to suppress the otherwise strong constitutional presumptions in favor of
judicial review.
The decline of state responsibility supports this notion even more so. Where other
nations in the past would have held U.S. representatives accountable for judicial
decision-making, today they are likely to be more understanding. This is in part an
empathetic phenomenon; most countries now have independent judiciaries of their
own, and their representatives have a first-hand knowledge that courts are not
instruments of national executives. 129 It has also resulted from the increasing
sophistication of other countries when it comes to internal U.S. governance structures.
Foreign governments not only understand the status of courts in the United States,
they are beginning to play the system directly. There are many recent examples of
prominent foreign government participation in U.S. judicial proceedings not just as
defendants (which more likely involves a lack of sophistication) but increasingly as
plaintiffs130 and amici curiae... in a broad range of cases.
127 See, e.g., Ann Florini, The End of Secrecy, FOREIGN POL'Y, June 22, 1998, at 50
(describing global pressures towards greater transparency in state decision-making); Mathews,
supra note 28, at 10 ("Revolutionary developments in computer and telecommunications
technologies have broken the monopoly governments used to hold on collecting, managing and
using large amounts of information and have eroded the deference governments enjoyed because
of that greater knowledge."); see also DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE (1998) (calling for an end to secrecy in all governmental decision-making).
.2 In other words, if one conceives of terrorism as crime and the response as law enforcement
(bracketing the phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism), see supra text accompanying notes 51-
60, judicial restraint emerges as inappropriate. Of course, secrecy and dispatch are important in
dealing with terrorism, but insofar as courts are involved only in the prosecution of terrorism, any
need for secrecy can be addressed in the same way that, for instance, it is addressed in the
organized crime context.129 See KOH, supra note 15, at 222 (noting that insofar as the embarrassment rationale for the
political question doctrine "rests on foreign confusion, it denigrates our allies' intelligence and
assumes that they cannot comprehend a constitutional system of shared powers"); Eyal Benvenisti,
Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de Droit International's Resolution on
'The Activities of National Courts and the International Relations of Their State,'5 EuR. J. INT'L
L. 423,437 (1994) (observing that "the risk of the forum State being embarrassed by a decision is
negligible, and the executive actually may prefer judicial intervention that relieves it from the
necessity to make a politically difficult choice").
13o See, e.g., Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (seeking reversal of
a death sentence imposed on a Paraguayan national whose rights under consular convention had
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Such participation, and the willingness of courts to reject foreign government
positions, 132 should mark the end of the political question doctrine in foreign relations
law cases. In this context, judicial pronouncements that may trouble other countries
are nothing to be embarrassed about; those pronouncements simply become another
factor in the increasingly layered dynamic of international relations. Indeed, the
disaggregation of the state poses the possibility of disaggregated alliances, so that
foreign ministries might cooperate to confront independent judicial agendas. Other
governments do not hold U.S. diplomatic representatives responsible for judicial
decision-making; 133 rather, they try to reverse through political channels those
been violated by state law enforcement authorities); Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 59 F.
Supp. 2d 120 (D. Me. 1999) (deciding a suit by Mexico in parens patriae for Mexican nationals
claiming unlawful employment practices). Courts are now entertaining a raft of claims brought by
several countries and subnational jurisdictions against American cigarette companies. See
generally Attorney General of Canada v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
134 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); State of Sao Paulo of the Federative Republic of Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
No. 00-0922, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 9617 (E.D. La. May 26, 2000); Republic of Bolivia v. Philip
Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., No.
98-3279, 1999 U.S. Dist. LExis 8135 (E.D. La. May 28, 1999); see also Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc.,
847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (deciding a claim for environmental injuries brought by, among
others, an Ecuadoran "quasi-municipality").
131 Amicus participation by foreign governments is becoming routine. See Stephen A. Plass,
The Foreign Amici Dilemma, 1995 BYU L. REv. 1189 (describing amici participation by foreign
governments); see also, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (including Germany as amicus in a case involving the taking of
evidence abroad); Inland Steel Bar Co. v. United States, 155 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (including
the United Kingdom as amicus in a case involving a trade subsidy); United States v. Nippon Paper
Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (including Japan as amicus in an antitrust case); Burger-
Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999) (including Germany and Poland as amici
in a case involving Holocaust-related claims against foreign corporations); Potabe v. Robichaux,
No. 99-1132, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9798 (E.D. La. June 25, 1999) (involving Papua New Guinea
as intervenor); Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1357 (E.D. Tex.
1993) (noting communication to the court from Republic of Kazakhstan in a case involving
mineral rights in Kazakhstan).
132 See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 324 & n.22
(1994) (noting and rejecting arguments by several foreign government amici); Marathon Oil Co. v.
Ruhrgas A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting German government position on
removal issue).
133 The first judicial recognition of this development is found in recent consideration of
foreign country tobacco litigation. Defendants in those cases sought removal to federal courts for,
among other reasons, the possibility of divergent results in different state courts, with detrimental
effects on foreign relations with loser countries. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care
Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31,37 (D.D.C. 2000) ("[The removing defendants hypothesize that a
favorable decision for Bolivia in a Texas state court that is contrary to an unfavorable decision for
Venezuela in a Florida state court may appear inequitable to Venezuela and adversely affect our
foreign relations with that country."). To this argument the court appropriately responded:
If the removing defendant's hypothetical came to pass, however, Venezuela would be under
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decisions contrary to their interests, in rather the way that a domestic party will often
turn to political institutions after defeat in court.134 The downside to allowing judicial
consideration of foreign relations controversies is thus further minimized; no longer
will judicial participation pose much of a risk of destabilizing international relations.
In short, where the political question doctrine was once defensible, even
demanded, by the international context, its functional virtues have dissipated. It is still
deployed in the context of disputes with states whose understanding of the U.S.
system may be limited (and who might therefore hold the nation responsible for
perceived judicial slight),135 as well as a narrowing class of cases that present old-
world justifications for judicial restraint. 136 But one can in globalization's wake safely
no illusion that the United States government chose to treat it inequitably. Instead, as a
sophisticated participant in ourjudicial system-who itself chose to litigate in state court, and
persists in its desire to do so--Venezuela should understand that the differing outcomes of the
cases are a result of the fora in which the different foreign sovereign plaintiffs chose to bring
their cases.
Id. at 37-38.
114 For instance, after its view on extratemtorial abduction was rejected bythe Supreme Court
in the Alvarez-Machain litigation, the government of Mexico secured an amendment of its
extradition treaty with the United States expressly to prohibit such conduct. See United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (interpreting extradition treaty not to prohibit
extraterritorial abduction of a Mexican citizen from Mexican territory by U.S. drug enforcement
agents, with Mexico participating as amicus); Steven A. Holmes, US. Gives Mexico Abduction
Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1993, at Al l (describing how in the wake oftheAlvarez decision the
Mexican government secured assurances against future cross-territorial abductions).
135 See, e.g., Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia,
218 F.3d 152, 159-62 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting, on political question grounds, a suit against
successor states to Yugoslavia for payment of debt incurred by it); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d
160, 165 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting a claim by former Vietnamese citizens to property of the
Vietnamese government frozen under Trading with the Enemy Act); see also Anne-Marie Burley,
Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLuM L.
REV. 1907, 1917-27 (1992) (proposing a model of transnational legal relations where courts
would entertain disputes relating to democratic states, but not undemocratic ones).
"' The old-world justifications include, for instance, issues involving the recognition of
foreign states. See, e.g., Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142,
1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to review an executive branch determination that Taiwan was not
bound by China's adherence to the Warsaw Convention). The doctrine has also figured in the
refusal by some courts to entertain claims relating to the World War [I era, which might be
explained (the sophistication of the interested governments notwithstanding) as a valid trans-
historical application of the doctrine. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,
485 (D.N.J. 1999) (finding no jurisdiction on political question grounds over claims relating to
forced labor during WWII in plants operated by Ford's German subsidiary). But the classic
applications of the doctrine to issues such as the control of territory and the recognition of foreign
states are themselves largely old-world controversies, which poses the possibility of the doctrine
withering away, rather than being reversed outright, along with the context in which it flourished.
In the meantime, one can expect continued resort to the doctrine as a sort of doctrinal hangover,
even where other grounds would suffice to reach the same result. See, e.g., Kwan v. United States,
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predict greater judicial involvement in cases involving foreign relations.'37 Also
consistent with this analysis (and unexplained by those commentators who have
attacked it in the past) was the persistence of judicial non-review in the days before
globalization. It is only by considering the historical contingency of the doctrine that
one can rationalize its former durability and likely erosion.
B. Federal Primacy Over Foreign Relations
One finds much the same story with respect to the constitutional bar on state
activity affecting foreign relations, another differential rule of foreign relations law
once dictated by the international context, but now contestable in the wake of
globalization. It, too, reversed a constitutional presumption, in this case that the states
play a critical role in our system of federalism. That reversal can be explained by the
same twin concerns behind the political question doctrine: that the high stakes of
international relations make intolerable any added risks of destabilization, and that
state action presents such a risk because the nation would be held responsible for the
misjudgments of its subunits. With globalization, however, these concerns have
dissipated, and so has the rationale for the rule. The states and other subfederal actors
should no longer suffer any constitutional bar from foreign policy-making activities.
The principle of federal primacy has been an entrenched one, with a pedigree
stretching back to the Founding.138 It was reflected in the textual prohibitions of
84 F. Supp. 2d 613, 624 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (rejecting a claim to disability payments under a U.S.-
Korean agreement on both standing and political question grounds).
"' One can now contemplate, as suggested above,judicial participation regarding the use of
force. This would be especially true of backward-looking controversies not directly implicating the
interests of other states, as in the case of damage claims against the U.S. government. See Koohi v.
United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting application of the political
question doctrine to a damages suit relating to the accidental U.S. downing of an Iranian passenger
jet, though denying the claim on the merits). But see Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400, 1401
(11 th Cir. 1997) (denying review on political question grounds of a negligence suit by members of
the crew of a Turkish destroyer accidentally attacked by a U.S. naval vessel). More importantly, it
might also be possible with respect to core decisions regarding the use of force. Consider the
Kosovo operation. The stakes were fairly high, but nowhere near those of a Korea or Vietnam
(never mind the World Wars) in terms of security interests and military vulnerabilities. I think the
courts could have insinuated themselves into the decision-making process without undue risk. One
can even imagine the courts ordering a halt to operations such as the Kosovo campaign (and that
order being respected by the President). There are signs that the courts are in fact moving away
from the political question doctrine as it applies to the use of force abroad, although other
jurisdictional doctrines have to date kept them from the merits. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203
F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting on standing grounds a war powers claim brought by a
congressman challenging the legality of the Kosovo campaign); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
1141, 1152 (D.D.C. 1990) (rejecting on ripeness grounds a request to enjoin military operations
against Iraq in the absence of congressional authorization).
138 See Spiro, supra note 14, at 1228-41; see also Swaine, supra note 18, at 1212 n.308
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Article I, section 10, which barred the states from engaging in war, imposing duties
on imports, and entering into treaties or alliances. 139 A string of nineteenth-century
decisions from the Supreme Court progressively excluded the states from other
intemationally-oriented powers, including extradition,140 foreign commerce,' 41 and
immigration. 142 The Compact Clause was generally interpreted to bar state authorities
from so much as communicating with foreign governments. 43 The federal
government was, in effect, extended a dormant power over foreign relations;
excluding the states from policy-making even in the absence of federal action. The
first half of the twentieth-century, meanwhile, expanded affirmative federal powers to
trump state law in the area.' 44 Decisions upholding the assertion of such powers were
dismissive of any role for the states on the international plane.1
45
(highlighting early twentieth-century evidence of the norm against state interference in foreign
relations). But see Goldsmith, Federalism, supra note 16, at 1649 (arguing that no rule against state
foreign policy-making prevailed before the Zschernig decision).
"9 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1-3.
140 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 561-79 (1840) (opinion of Taney, J.)
(disapproving a state attempt to undertake international extradition). Although Holmes involved an
evenly divided Court, the Taneyposition was later approved in dicta and in a leading nineteenth-
century treatise on the subject. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886); 1 JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADmON AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 53 (1891).
14' See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,435 (1827) (extending the reach of the
dormant domestic Commerce Clause to the foreign Commerce Clause).
142 See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1875) (striking down a California law
empowering a state official to deny admission to various classes of undesirable aliens, including
paupers and prostitutes).
143 See Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 560 (reversing an attempted extradition of defendant by
the State of Vermont to Canada on the ground that action would violate the Compact Clause
restriction on state communications with foreign governments); see also Political Subdivisions, 5
Hackworth DIGEST § 527, at 596 (describing the 1908 State Department denial of a German
government request to deal directly with the State of Georgia regarding defaulted state bonds);
Spiro, supra note 14, at 1231 & nn.41-42; Swaine, supra note 18, at 1224-30.
144 Most notably expanded by confirming the preemptive effect of treaties and other
international agreements on state law. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1942)
(finding an executive agreement to trump state law); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,33 1-
32 (1937) (same); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (finding the treaty power to
extend to all matters of international concern). The Court also expansively framed the preemptive
effect of federal legislation in the foreign affairs context. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,74
(194 1) (striking down a Pennsylvania statute requiring registration of aliens, notwithstanding the
absence of conflict with a similar federal registration requirement). One can of course frame these
affirmative powers as another example of the foreign relations differential, insofar as they stand for
the proposition that the authorities of the federal government are greater in the foreign affairs
context than in the domestic one.
145 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("In respect of all
international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does not exist."); see also United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) ("[T]he states severally never possessed
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A trio of Cold War-era decisions marked the high point of federal exclusivity
over foreign relations. The Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 4 I found
customary international law to fall into the exceptional category of federal common
law, in derogation of the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins;147 and the
interpretation of international law was thereafter assumed the exclusive province of
federal courts.141 In the Foreign Commerce Clause context, Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles149 reinforced the strict ouster of states from economic
regulation implicating foreign countries, even where such regulation would be
considered "de minimis" in the domestic context.' 50 Finally, and most notably, in
striking down a state probate measure discriminating against residents of East Bloc
nations, the Court in Zschernig v. Miller'5' deemed unconstitutional all state activity
having "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect"" 5 2 on foreign relations.' 
53
These decisions and the differential rule they supported were plainly driven by
international exigencies. In confirming the primacy of federal power in this sphere,
the Court has often adverted to the momentous and sensitive nature of foreign
international powers."); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For local
interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations
with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.").
14' 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
147 304 U.S. 64(1938).
141 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § Ill n.3, at 50 (1987) (noting that
"implications of Sabbatino" support the position that customary international law is part of federal
common law).
149 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
So Id. at 455-56.
... 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
152 Id. at 434.
153 It is important to note that the dormant foreign relations power has never been a categoric
exclusion from activity involving all matters international, but rather a bar on state-level activity
having an effect on national foreign relations. Jack Goldsmith so characterizes the current doctrine,
see Goldsmith, New Formalism, supra note 16, at 1406-08 (asserting that adoption of the "effects"
test was an important innovation of Zwhernig), though I think it explains prohibitions on the states
going back to those found in the Constitution; here I disagree with Ernie Young's argument that
the rule suffers the same flaws as dual federalism by attempting to divide the actually inseparable
domestic and foreign. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the
Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139 (2001). (In this respect the tendency to
frame the doctrine as one enshrining "exclusive" federal power, though useful shorthand, does
suffer a significant drawback.) The potential of such effects does result in categoric exclusion from
certain kinds of foreign policy related activity. Some of these prohibited activities have always
been clear, such as the prohibition on war-making by the states. Some have shifted with time, such
as the once-strict bar on communications by state officials with foreign government authorities,
largely as a result of shifts in the international context. Now-pervasive trade missions by state and
local officials are a good example of an international activity that (at least today) would pose no
problem under the effects test, even though it is obviously international.
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relations'5 4 and the dangers of involvement on the part of state authorities.'55 The
critical exogenous link is again found in the notion of state responsibility, that is, the
legal construction of the international system in which nations have been held
responsible for the conduct of their component parts, including such subunit
governments as the states of the Union. 5 6 The concern that the United States as a
nation would be held responsible by the international community for the misconduct
of state authorities has echoed as a rationale for the exclusivity principle, among the
Framers,' 57 in the nineteenth' 58 and early twentieth' 59 centuries, and through the Cold
154 See, e.g., Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 456 (noting that even "slight" overlapping of state and
federal taxes "assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national
sovereignty are concerned").
155 See, e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (finding that application of state probate law could
result in international controversies, "illustrat[ing] the dangers which are involved if each
State.. . is permitted to establish its own foreign policy"); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,232
(1942) ("If state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences might
ensue."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941) (striking down state alien registration
measures on field preemption grounds, observing that mistreatment of aliens by states could lead to
"international controversies of the gravest moment"); see also Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 540, 574 (1840) (justifying expansive interpretation of the Compact Clause on grounds that
communication by states with foreign sovereigns would be "dangerous to the Union").
156 See sources cited supra note 64.
'57 See, e.g., I RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (recording Madison's concerns regarding state violations of treaties and of the law of
nations; "It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its
power to bring [calamities] on the whole."); THE FEDERAUSTNO. 80, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("[T]he peace of the WHOLE, ought not to be left at the disposal of a
PART. The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members.").
158 Perhaps most clearly in Chy Lung v. Freeman, in which Justice Miller contemplated
enforcement of a state immigration measure provoking a claim from foreign nation:
Upon whom would such a claim be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our
Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations with other nations. It would be made upon the
government of the United States. If that government should get into a difficulty which would
lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union? If
we should conclude that a pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for the injury,
would California pay it, or the Federal government? If that government has forbidden the
States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the
whole subject of these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this,
done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose
enforcement renders the general government liable tojust reclamations which it must answer,
while it does not prohibit to the States the acts for which it is held responsible?
The Constitution of the United States is no such instrument.
Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279-80. The state law, Miller observed, would otherwise allow a "silly, an
obstinate, or a wicked commissioner [to] bring disgrace upon the whole country, the enmity of a
powerful nation, or the loss of an equally powerful friend." Id. at 279; see also The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (I How.) 282,408 (1849) (opinion of McLean, J.) ("The general government only
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War-era cases. 160 Here, as with the political question doctrine, the need to "speak with
one voice" has assumed almost mantric proportions. 61
Against the backdrop of fragile and dangerous intemational relationships, and the
doctrine of state responsibility, the rule against state-level foreign policy-making
emerged as not only prudent, but also potentially important to the survival of the
nation. More so than federal courts-which are, after all, part of the federal
government, and whose judgments ultimately require the acquiescence of other
federal officials-state governments, to the extent they are unconstrained, are as a
structural matter likely to engage in conduct violating international norms and
obligations. At least in the past, state authorities have been blinded in their view of
international controversies, eager to satisfy local constituencies at the same time that
they faced no consequences from such action, and facing no incentive to comprehend
those consequences or more generally secure an expertise in international affairs.162
is known in our foreign intercourse."); id. at 450 (opinion of Catron, J) ("[A]Il power to treat, or
have foreign intercourse, was surrendered by the States .... This became 'the nation' known to
foreign governments, and was solely responsible to them for the acts of all the States and their
inhabitants."); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 419,447 (1827) ("What answer would the
United States give to the complaints and just reproaches to which [state regulation of foreign
commerce] would expose them?"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (I Wheat.) 1, 228-29 (1824)
(Johnson, J., concurring) ("The States are unknown to foreign nations .... Whatever regulations
foreign commerce should be subjected to in the ports of the Union, the general government would
be held responsible for them .... ); S. Doc. No. 54-56, at 5 (1897) ("[A] State of the Union,
although having admittedly no power whatever in foreign relations, may take action uncontrollable
by the Federal Government, and which, if not properly a casus belli, might nevertheless as a
practical matter afford to some foreign country the excuse for a declaration of war."); cf Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) ('The only government of this country, which
other nations recognize or treat with, is the government of the Union; and the only American flag
known throughout the world is the flag of the United States.").
,9 See, e.g., Pink, 315 U.S. at 232 (declaring that if states were allowed to interfere with
foreign policy, "[t]he nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State created difficulties with
a foreign power"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936)
("Considering [the states] as political beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to any
foreign sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not hear any propositions from such
sovereign.").
160 See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450 (1979) (stressing
the danger that state tax on international instrumentalities could provoke the retaliation of foreign
nations, which "retaliation of necessity would be directed at American transportation equipment in
general, not just that of the taxing State, so that the Nation as a whole would suffer"); id. at 453
("The risk of retaliation by Japan, under these circumstances, is acute, and such retaliation of
necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole.").
161 See, e.g., id. at 449; Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) ("[T]he
Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments .... );La. Land & Exploration Co. v. Pilot Petroleum Corp., 900 F.2d 816,819 (5th
Cir. 1990) ("[T]he Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments.").
162 See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 15, at 828 (highlighting lack of expertise as one basis for the
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These tendencies spring from the notion of state responsibility. A Michigan or North
Carolina that targeted a cheap export country (at the behest of a local producer) would
shoulder no necessary consequence of that action, insofar as retaliation would be
directed against the United States as a whole. The structural incentives for state-level
action are apparent in those episodes in which subfederal actors have worked to defy
the exclusivity principle. 163 Combined with the traditionally fragile characteristics of
international relations, these incentives also have justified the rule and its imposition
as a dormant power,' 64 even though it reverses usual constitutional presumptions.
rule of state exclusion). In this respect, again, one finds a clear parallel to the withdrawal of the
courts from foreign policy-making under guise of the political question doctrine. See supra notes
111-14 and accompanying text. This assumption regarding the capacities of state officials was, of
course, itself a product of an old world in which state and local officials did not need such
expertise in order to satisfy their responsibilities.
163 These have often involved state-level enactments reflecting dominant racist sentiments,
without heed to the international consequence of such measures. The antebellum Negro Seaman
Acts present a prominent example. These measures, providing for the detention of black sailors
regardless of nationality in several southern states, provoked a serious diplomatic dispute with the
United Kingdom. See Spiro, supra note 14, at 1234-36. The state tax context offers a less
problematic example in which state incentives will be to garner maximum receipts, regardless of
the international consequences (so long, of course, as the taxes do not result in relocation of foreign
business).
164 Recent commentators arguing against the rule have focused their attack on the dormant
element, insisting that any danger posed by state-level action can be corrected by affirmative action
of the political branches and the normal rules of preemption. See Goldsmith, Federalism, supra
note 16, at 1681-83 (arguing that Congress will effectively monitor and address problematic state
activity); Young, supra note 153, at 172 (arguing that any difficulty in securing political action
presents "precisely the sort of political and structural impediments to federal preemption that courts
must respect"). But see Swaine, supra note 18, at 1247 (concluding that "there is cause to be
skeptical that Congress presents a sufficient altemative" to the judiciary in policing federal
prerogatives in the area). While I agree that today such powers present an adequate (though
perhaps unnecessary) safeguard, that is only by virtue of globalization. In the old-world construct,
there were two basic reasons why a dormant power was mandated. First, the stakes were such that
one could not afford to take the hit posed by the initial state-level action, even if in theory it could
be remedied and prevented thereafter. Lacking refined dispute resolution mechanisms, the old
international system was one in which an initial injury could spark a conflict that would quickly
spiral out of control. Second, domestic political realities were such that the political branches could
hardly be expected to police their institutional prerogatives. The state whose conduct was at issue
would represent an intense interest in defense of the action, even where it might represent a harm
to the nation as a whole; any foreign interests involved would have little voice in that domestic
process. Globalization has dissipated these features of the old system, eliminating the need for a
dormant power. First, as repeatedly emphasized above, the world today is not a tinderbox in which
a single spark can result in maximum damage. Any offense caused by state-level action can be
settled by institutionally regularized means. Second, disaggregation and economic globalization
correct the political imbalances that once protected state-level action from affirmative preemption.
Today, foreign interests are directly advanced at all political levels. For instance, foreign officials
now routinely work on the Hill, where in the past such activity would have presented a breach of
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But that presumption should be resurrected in the face of globalization. Foreign
relations continue to comprehend important interests, but the institutionalization of
multilateral trade and security regimes has greatly reduced the danger that state-level
misconduct will initiate controversies that subsequently spiral out of control. There
are now too many brakes on what might otherwise be catastrophic sequences; in this
respect, international relations are less sensitive, and the downside risks less dramatic
than they once were.
Disaggregation and the probability that it will undermine conceptions of state
responsibility presents an equally powerful rationale for abandoning the rule.
International actors increasingly recognize political subdivisions as autonomous actors
within spheres of exclusive authority, they understand that a Massachusetts or a Texas
may have the last word on some matters. This understanding comes with a greater
understanding of our federal system; it also comes with greatly increased direct
contacts, especially on economic and commercial matters, between states and foreign
governments. 165 It almost goes without saying that such contacts are facilitated by
improved communications. When foreign nations have a problem with a state-level
policy, it is now routinely a part of the response to go to the source, with diplomatic
and other initiatives targeted at responsible subfederal actors. 16 6 The American system
protocol if not also a possible constitutional trespass on presidential powers. See infra note 305 and
accompanying text. Perhaps more importantly, global economic integration has made it likelythat
when "foreign" entities oppose some measure, "domestic" ones will as well. See infra text
accompanying nGtes 329-32 (noting the increasing non-distinction of national boundaries). This
was apparent with respect to the Massachusetts Burma law, where the politically powerful
National Foreign Trade Council succeeded in blocking congressional approval of such state
measures. In any case, however, it is only the globalization thesis that explains why the dormant
power was once necessary but no longer is.
165 As of 1999, for example, forty-one U.S. states maintained 240 offices in thirty-four foreign
countries. See Dave Naftzger, The States'Role (if any) in Foreign Affairs, STATE LEGISLATURES,
Dec. 2000, at 24,25. In 1993, governors from twenty-seven states and territories undertook eighty-
one trips abroad for "economic development purposes." FRY, supra note 71, at 69.
166 See, e.g., Ronan Doherty, Note, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of
Criminal Law Implicates Federal Responsibility Under International Law, 82 VA. L. REv. 1281,
1326-27 (1996) (citing examples); Raymond Bonner, Mexican Killer is Refused Clemency, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A8 (describing communications between the Governor of Oklahoma and
the President of Mexico regarding execution of a Mexican national); Spencer S. Hsu & Peter Finn,
Allies oflnmate Push to Prevent Execution, WASH. POST, July 22, 1997, at E l (reporting pleas for
clemency to the Governor of Virginia from the President of Italy and the Mayor of Palermo
regarding Joseph O'Dell). Foreign countries have also made direct approaches to subfederal
authorities with regard to other difficulties involving treatment of their nationals in the United
States. See, e.g., Doherty, supra, at 1330 n.223 (describing the visit of a "high-level" Swedish
government delegation to California to discuss request that a Swedish citizen in a Califomiajail be
allowed to serve out time in Sweden under prisoner transfer treaty); id. at 1339 (describing a
meeting of Japanese officials with the Governor of Louisiana regarding the investigation of the
murder of a Japanese exchange student in Baton Rouge); see also Steven Greenhouse,
Greengrocers to Pay $315,000 in Back Wages, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2001, at D3 (describing
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of federalism is in this respect hardly opaque to international actors.
Query whether at least some international actors have long enjoyed this
understanding of the federal system and have even composed entreaties to subfederal
officials (though never without controversy). 167 On this score, economic globalization
supplies a crucial additional ingredient. The dependence of the states on global
sources of investment and exports gives international actors a consistent tool by which
to discipline them concretely and directly. This is something new. In the past, even if
a foreign state understood that subnational authorities bore responsibility for a
particular practice or instance of misconduct, there was little it could do with that
information, for the foreign state would in most cases have no discrete leverage over
the offending jurisdiction. 68 In that context, state (that is, national) responsibility
made sense, insofar as the nation presented the only practicable platform against
which to enforce international norms. But that proposition falls in the face of
economic globalization. International actors will now almost always enjoy channels
through which to retaliate more or less cleanly against a particular subnational
jurisdiction, by redirecting their economic activity elsewhere, usually at minimal
cost.169 The efficacy of targeted retaliation has already been demonstrated, 170 and
cooperation between the Mexican government and the New York State Attorney General in
bringing suit regarding working conditions of Mexican immigrants).
16' The posture of Great Britain with respect to the Negro Seaman Acts, see supra note 163,
presents a good historical example in which an offended foreign sovereign understood that actual
political authority in the controversy rested mostly in state capitals. See Spiro, supra note 14, at
1234-36. One could well suppose that European states at least in fact enjoyed a sufficient
sophistication of American governance to know when and how state-level authorities were
implicated on matters involving their interests.
16' This fact also diminished the incentive foreign states would have had to develop a more
sophisticated understanding of particular subnational entities and supports the general proposition
that knowledge of the internal federalism dynamic was surely more primitive in the old world than
it is today.
169 This cost is reduced at the subnational level insofar as the availability of substitutes is
multiplied; it is often cheaper to replace a Texas with a Tennessee than to replace the United States
with a Mexico. See infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text. There may also now exist
possibilities for shaming subnational actors where they are responsible for violations of
international norms. See infra notes 310-14 and accompanying text (suggesting shaming
possibilities with respect to disaggregated institutions of central government).
170This has been demonstrated perhaps most notably in the efforts of several countries to win
repeal of so-called unitary tax methods adopted by several states in the 1980s that were
unfavorable to multinational corporations. As part of those efforts, the British Parliament enacted
legislation authorizing revocation of certain tax credits for U.S. corporations headquartered in
states adhering to the objectionable approach. See Finance Act 1985, c. I, § 54 & sched. 13, para. 5
(Eng.). Several Japanese corporations declined to locate new production facilities in such states,
expressly citing the tax scheme as the deciding factor. See HOCKING, supra note 71, at 148-50.
These efforts on the part of foreign actors "were a key part of the process in whereby the unitary
tax issue was transformed in the minds of state politicians," id. at 149, and were critical to the
eventual repeal of the tax scheme in all states that had employed it. Indeed, several states agreed to
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there may be other examples just over the horizon.171
abandon the unitary tax as part of quid-pro-quo deals with Japan. Timothy C. Blank, Significant
Development: A Proposed Application of the Compact Clause, 66 B.U. L. REv. 1067, 1073-75,
1080-85 (1986) (describing agreements signed between Indiana, Oregon, and Florida with
Japanese corporations providing for the repeal of unitary taxation in return for promises of
investment). Eventual litigation before the Supreme Court regarding California's tax occurred after
repeal, involving only the matter of refund for taxes previously paid.
Among other examples of targeted retaliation is Japanese action against Texas-based banks in
response to a Texas prohibition on foreign bank branches. JOHN M. KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT
INFLUENCE IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PoucY 179 (1983). There are other unperfected
examples. In the wake of California's 1994 adoption of Proposition 187 (which would have made
undocumented aliens ineligible for most public benefits, including public primary and secondary
education), Mexico made thinly veiled threats of relocating business to other states. Although the
ballot measure never went into force, relations between Mexico and California nonetheless
suffered dramatically. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era ofDemi-Sovereignties,
35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 165-66 (1994) (describing the response of Mexican officials and
executives to Proposition 187). Similarly, during the dispute over a Massachusetts restricting
procurement from corporations doing business in Burma, there were suggestions by Japanese
officials that the measure could result in diminished investment in the state. There were also
suggestions that any sanctions authorized by the World Trade Organization against the United
States be targeted against Massachusetts entities. Gordon Fairclough, Massachusetts Trade Law Is
Challenged, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1997, at B17; Michael Grunwald, Mass. Law Targeting
Burmese Junta Could Spark Trade War with Japan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1997, at A 1.
One also finds support for the concept of targeted retaliation in the domestic context, as when
the State of Arizona bowed to a tourism and convention boycott against its failure to adopt Martin
Luther King Jr.'s birthday as a state holiday. Jane Gross, Arizona Hopes Holiday for King Will
Mend Its Image, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1993, § 1, at 16; see also David Firestone, Battle Flag is
Lowered, But War Isn 't Quite Over, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, § 1, at 10 (describing redesign of
state flag containing confederate stars and bars, in face of tourism boycott launched by NAACP).
17 The most notable example is the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders, a
practice inconsistent with increasingly clear international norms. See Bruce Shapiro, Dead
Reckoning, THE NATION, Aug. 6, 2001, at 14 (describing consideration of a campaign among
European investors who oppose the death penalty to target investment away from death penalty
states); Letter Regarding the Death Penalty from the Chairman of the European Parliament's
Delegation for Relations to Governor George Bush, PRNEWSWIRE, June 25, 1998, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File (observing that "[m]any companies, under pressure from shareholders
and public opinion to apply ethical business practices, are beginning to consider the possibility of
restricting investment in the U.S. to states that do not apply the death penalty"); see also Peter J.
Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567, 574 (1997)
(describing international law regarding juvenile death penalty); Steven A. Drizin & Stephen K.
Harper, Old Enough to Kill, Old Enough to Die, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 16, 2000, at ZI (describing
increasing probability of economic pressure against states that undertake the execution of
offenders). Jack Goldsmith and others have questioned this theory of targeted retaliation on the
grounds that it is empirically unproven. See Goldsmith, Federalism, supra note 16, at 1679 n.253;
Swaine, supra note 18, at 1240-42 ("Although cases of targeted retaliation are not unknown, it is
hard to find examples demonstrating its sufficiency."). To take the objection on its own terms,
every major controversy provoked by state-level action over the last decade has at least suggested
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This strand of disaggregation further reduces the risks of state action both by
limiting the consequences of state-level misjudgment and by reducing the incentives
for states to commit such errors in the first place. To the extent that Massachusetts
shoulders the consequences of its international activity, the rest of us have no great
reason to suppress that activity, which presumably reflected some preference on the
part of the people of Massachusetts. Of course, to the extent that Massachusetts is
forced to shoulder those consequences, it may desist from the action in the first place.
There is some evidence that the courts are softening the default rule against state
involvement in foreign policy-making. In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board, 72 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state tax that had drawn
vigorous protests from foreign governments.13 The decision appears unprecedented
insofar as the state measure at issue had shown more than the mere potential to
interfere with the nation's foreign relations, and commentators have highlighted its
break with the one-voice tradition.' 74 Although the Court's more recent decision in
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council 75 is consistent with the exclusivity
principle-the decision struck down a state procurement restriction from companies
doing business in Burma-the ruling was narrowly framed as a preemption case, and
refused to pass on the continued viability of the Zschernig and Japan Line
precedents. 176 Crosby applied the same preemption analysis as in the domestic
context; 177 in other words, it acknowledged no foreign relations differential, at least
the possibility of a direct response against the offending state. And the objection does not
undermine the logic of targeted retaliation, nor the potential for its deployment in the face of
globalization. Even though Goldsmith agrees that the dormant foreign affairs power should be
abandoned, he would find it difficult to buy into any such globalization thesis to the extent it is
inconsistent with a submerged anti-internationalist premise. As Judith Resnik puts it in criticizing
recent federalismj urisprudence from the Supreme Court, the trend toward limiting federal power
"reveals yet another function of categorical federalism--its role in attempting to buffer the United
States from the effects of lawmaking beyond its borders." Resnik, supra note 7, at 657.
171 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
'71 Id. at 324 n.22 (noting that "[t]he governments of many of our trading partners have
expressed their strong disapproval of California's method of taxation").
174 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 16, at 866; Jack Goldsmith, Statutory
Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 175, 212 (2001) ("Many believe that [Barclays]
Bank marks the end of all dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrines.").
17' 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
176 Crosby is attracting an array of academic commentary. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby
and the "One-Voice" Myth in US. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975 (2001); Goldsmith,
supra note 174; Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Relations of Federal Systems: A National
Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015 (2001); Sanford
Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2189 (2001); Edward T. Swaine, Crosby As Foreign Relations
Law, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 481 (2001); Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz
World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000); Young, supra note 153.
177 See 530 U.S. at 374 n.8 (declining to consider so-called "field" preemption, dormant
foreign commerce, and foreign affairs power arguments).
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not as a matter of formal analysis. 78 Because it deployed a preemption rationale,: it
could in effect be overruled by subsequent congressional action (with respect to
Burma as well as future sanctions regimes), 79 which would itself evidence a change
in constitutional norms.1
8 0
In short, Crosby may well emerge as a transitional case on the way to a more
permissive doctrinal regime for state foreign policy-making, as evidenced by other
developments. There can be little doubt that the states will become even more active
in the international arena; in the wake of disaggregation, that activity poses a
diminishing threat. It is sometimes overlooked that the rule against state foreign
policy-making itself involves costs, in the form of suppressed state-level preferences.
That makes the case for permitting, even embracing, state action at the international
level more compelling. 8 1 Of course, there will be episodes in which the states
178 Both Ernie Young and Ed Swaine (though working from opposite sympathies) make a
good case that the preemption test in Crosby was more expansive than that exacted in the domestic
context, and that one can in fact still detect a differential, the Court's protestations notwithstanding.
See Swaine, supra note 176, at 483 (suggesting that the Crosby opinion "displays a
constitutionally-premised sensitivity to international comity, and to the President's foreign relations
powers"); Young, supra note 153, at 170 (asserting that the Crosby opinion "reflected strong
exceptionalist influences"). But of course it remains the case that the analysis was framed as
garden-variety preemption, to which characterization the Court might become true in future cases,
while jettisoning the dormant powers doctrine altogether. Barclays Bank would seem to point the
way. In this respect, however, Crosby is a transitional case, one likely not to establish a durable
resolution of the issue.
1791 think this unlikely with respect to the Burma laws themselves, for all the standard reasons
that make the passage of freestanding legislation difficult, along with the presence here of an
intensely interested and powerful domestic opponent in the form of U.S. companies involved in
foreign trade (also the plaintiffs in Crosby). It is, however, possible that in the wake of Crosby,
subsequent sanctions packages might more likely include provisions expressly approving state-
level selective purchasing and other measures alongside federal measures. To the extent that such
savings clauses became boilerplate, Crosby would lose any continuing effect.
180 For of course it is now well accepted that Congress and other non-judicial institutions
contribute to the evolution of constitutional norms. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The
Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 IHARv. L. REV. 963, 1011-14 (1998) (describing the
contribution of non-judicial actors to the making of constitutional norms); Neal Devins & Louis
Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 83-84 (1998) ("Among
legal academics.., it is now commonplace to discuss constitutional law as something larger and
more complex than merely court rulings."); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal
Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7-15 (1999) (describing scholarship focused on constitutional
development outside the courts).
181 In this vein, Resnik highlights the possible "inventions" of transnational activity by
subnational entities, including "joint ventures" in the form of transnational compacts. Resnik,
supra note 7, at 671-80; see also Spiro, supra note 171, at 590-95 (suggesting that U.S. states
could be permitted discretely to accede to human rights conventions in the absence of accession by
United States). To the extent that this kind of activity takes place across national boundaries, it is
also made possible only by disaggregation, the idea of which maybe implicit in what Resnik calls
the "permeability of institutions." Resnik, supra note 7, at 680.
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transgress international norms and be held accountable for it. But that is what law is
all about. In this context, globalization is what activates responsibility mechanisms
that allow for independent action on the part of the states.
C. Individual Rights and Foreign Relations
There is, finally, the foreign relations differential in the sphere of individual
rights. This category is a broad one, comprising at least two doctrinal strands. First,
there are those individual activities that have been limited in the face of state
responsibility, including communicating with foreign governments, traveling to
foreign countries contrary to national security interests, and undertaking activities as a
citizen of another country. Though these limitations have never posed significant
constraints on individual rights and have dissipated with the erosion of the
responsibility of states for the acts of their citizens, a form of disaggregation that to
some extent antedated globalization, they nonetheless present an illustration of how
the old global structures were reflected in U.S. law. Second, there is the plenary
power doctrine, under which political branches have been afforded extreme deference
in regulating the immigration status of aliens. This doctrine, persistent in the face of
sustained academic attacks,' 82 is grounded in the perceived gravity of foreign relations
and the perceived threat of aliens to national security. It is also related to notions of
state responsibility, however, to the extent that aliens have been associated with their
country of citizenship. It too should be reexamined in globalization's wake.
1. Restrictions on Speech, Association, and Travel
The restriction of the rights of American citizens as driven by the international
context enjoys a lengthy pedigree. The 1799 Logan Act barred American citizens
from unauthorized communications with foreign governments.' 83 Although no
prosecutions have been undertaken under the Logan Act, it has not been altogether a
"paper tiger," in the suggestion of one commentator. 8 4 Although the Act has served
182 See sources cited supra note 15.
183 The Logan Act provides:
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of the United
States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with
any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence the measures
or conduct of any foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any
disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 953 (2000).
114 See Detlev F. Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant?, 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
268, 268-69 (1966) ("Though only one indictment and no trial have taken place under the Act,
who can tell when a new Administration, thinner skinned or harder pressed than its predecessors,
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as the basis for only one indictment,185 it has been invoked several times in the
modem era as a threat against high-profile unofficial initiatives on the international
stage,' 6 evidencing a perception of the Act's contemporary legitimacy and likely
resulting in deterred conduct as prohibited by the Act, at least in earlier times. 117
The Logan Act reflected old-world global concerns of high stakes and centralized
responsibility. The overriding concern of both was the danger that the nation would
be held responsible for the acts of individual citizens, with potentially catastrophic
results. Thus, the Logan Act targeted communications outside of centralized,
coordinated policy-making, which might be mistaken for authoritative
pronouncements and result in the disruption of sensitive relationships. It is one of only
a handful of criminal statutes in which American citizenship counts as a required
element, and that applies regardless of territorial location. 188 Perhaps more than any
other measure, the Logan Act embodied the "one voice" principle, insofar as it
literally prohibited a form of speech.
The longstanding bar on active participation by a U.S. citizen in the political
may in its irritation call into play this sleeping giant.").
181 Id. at 271 (describing an 1803 indictment of an individual for publishing a newspaper
editorial advocating a separate western U.S. nation allied with France). The act's common name is
owed to George Logan, a Philadelphia doctor whose freelance negotiations with France
purportedly on behalf of the United States in 1798 were considered unhelpful by U.S. officials, and
which resulted in enactment of the restrictions. Id. at 270-71.
186 The most prominent example in the postwar era involved the contemplated investigation of
House Speaker Jim Wright by the Reagan Administration for unauthorized discussions with
officials of Nicaragua's Sandinista regime. Sara Fritz, Wright's Latin Role Assailed by
Republicans, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1987, at A 1. The Act has figured in other recent controversies.
Congress requested that the Justice Department investigate Louis Fan-akhan's contacts with Libyan
leader Muammar Quadaffi. Michael Briggs, Justice Dept. Investigates Farrakhan, Foreign Trip
Spurs Probe, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at 1. House Republicans sought to prosecute a
Clinton campaign staffer who allegedly attempted to persuade European Union officials to hold off
on a trade deal until after the 1992 elections. John Maggs, House Republicans Want Probe Into
Possible Sabotage of Talks, J. COM., Nov. 2, 1992, at 10A. President Reagan suggested that Jesse
Jackson take notice of the measure in traveling to Cuba and Libya. Francis X. Clines, Reagan
Contends Jackson's Mission May Violate Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1984, at A 1; see generally
Kevin M. Keamey, Note, Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis, 36
EMORY L.J. 285, 303-11 (1987) (describing contemporary invocations of the Act).
187 See Brad R. Roth, The First Amendment in the Foreign Affairs Realm: 'Domesticating'the
Restrictions on Citizen Participation, 2 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 255,266 (1993) ("[T]he
lack of ajudicial test has, paradoxically, preserved the Act as a latent weapon for use in chilling, or
at least impugning, displays of dissent."); Vagts, supra note 184, at 271-80 (describing invocation
of the measure from enactment until Cold War era); id. at 302 ("Although the [Logan Act] will not
deter the bold world reformer, its shadows may warn off the more timorous.").
188 Treason stands as the most prominent example. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000) (applying
only to individuals "owing allegiance to the United States"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b) (2000)
(criminalizing the use or attempted use of weapons of mass destruction by U.S. nationals where the
conduct occurs outside of the United States).
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affairs of another country can be considered through a similar lens. The United States
has never categorically prohibited dual citizenship; indeed, millions of Americans
during the great waves of turn-of-the-century migration were dual nationals, at least as
a technical matter.18 9 But the United States has long precluded the active maintenance
of an alternative nationality. First by administrative practice and then by statute, the
undertaking of certain acts as a member of another polity resulted in the forfeiture of
U.S. citizenship. These acts included holding office or serving in the military of
another country; so seemingly inconsequential an act as voting in a political election
in a foreign country also provided a ground for expatriation. 190
This prohibition on active dual nationality was also, at least in part, a by-product
of the state responsibility regime. States were held responsible for the conduct of their
citizens present on the territory of other states; controversies provoked by a citizen's
participation in the political affairs of another country could give rise to bilateral
difficulties. It was on this rationale that the Supreme Court upheld the revocation of
citizenship on the ground of foreign voting in the 1958 decision in Perez v.
Brownell.'9' Echoing justifications for the political question doctrine and the
exclusion of subfederal actors from foreign relations, Justice Frankfurter's majority
opinion highlighted the possibility that such political activity by a U.S. citizen could
be attributed to the United States itself, thus raising the prospect of "embarrassing"
the U.S. government and of "embroiling this country in disputes with other
nations., ' 192 We see here again a rule explained by the attribution by the international
community of an act of a component part of a state (in this case the individual citizen)
to the state itself, together with the serious risks that could follow therefrom.' 93
The denial of a passport to a United States citizen, and with it in effect the ability
189 See generally Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1411 (1997) (describing the U.S. Government's historical disfavor of dual citizenship).
190 See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168 (1941). On the expatriation
regime that prevailed before the Supreme Court's decision in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967), see generally John P. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality-The Development of
Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25 (1950).
191 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958).
192 Id. at 60. As Justice Brennan observed in Trop v. Dulles:
[M]any foreign nations may well view the political activity on the part of Americans, even if
lawful, as either expressions of official American positions or else as improper meddling in
affairs not their own. In either event the reaction is liable to be detrimental to the interests of
the United States.
356 U.S. 86, 106 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring). A 1907 act terminating the citizenship of U.S.
citizen women upon marriage to aliens was upheld on similar reasoning. See McKenzie v. Hare,
239 U.S. 299,312 (1915) ("It is the conception of the legislation under review that [mamage to an
alien] may bring the Government into embarrassments and, it may be, into controversies.").
193 See supra note 116 (highlighting centrality of "embarrassment" to foreign relations law
cases); see also Vagts, supra note 184, at 297-99 (applying "embarrassment" paradigm to the
Logan Act, but finding it insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections in most cases).
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to travel internationally, has also been justified on such reasoning. Passports have
been characterized in terms of responsibility; a passport is the equivalent of a letter of
introduction in which the issuing sovereign vouches for the bearer and his conduct. 
194
If an American passport holder were to engage in activity causing offense to a foreign
nation, that responsibility could damage the nation's foreign relations. Coupled with
the "great importance" of foreign policy, this notion of international responsibility
stood prominently in the Supreme Court's upholding in Haig v. Agee195 of the
Secretary of State's power to revoke or deny passports to individual American
citizens where the Secretary determined that a citizen's activity abroad undermined
U.S. foreign policy. 196 A similar justification has grounded so-called area restrictions,
under which all holders are prohibited from using passports for travel to designated
countries. 19' In its 1965 decision in Zemel v. Rusk, 198 the Court upheld a ban on travel
by U.S. citizens to Cuba in part because such travel might "involve the Nation in
dangerous international incidents,"'199 rendering the restriction justified by the
194 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,292 (1981); Passports and Registration, 3 Hackworth, DIGEST
§ 268, at 499; see also JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE,
CmIZENSHIP AND THE STATE 160 (2000) (suggesting that passports have transformed travelers into
"quasi-diplomatic representatives of particular countries, simply because the issuing state has
usurped the capacity to authorize movement and thus 'embraced' the traveler as a citizen-member
of the nation-state").
195 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
196 The Court highlighted several episodes fitting neatly into the responsibility analysis,
including the denial of a passport to an American residing in China whose promotion of "gambling
and immoral houses" had developed into a scandal that was "likely to embarrass the United
States." Agee, 453 U.S. at 296 & n.32; see also Developments in the Law-The National Security
Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1146 (1971-1972) (describing, though
disagreeing with, the "embarrassment" rationale for the denial of passports). The particular
passport denial at issue in Agee fits less well into the responsibility paradigm than into one
stressing the high stakes qualities of foreign relations. Agee intended to reveal the identity of U.S.
Covert intelligence operatives while abroad, an activity that would have undermined national
security directly, not by "embarrassing" the United States.
197 See 22 U.S.C. § 211 a (2000) (authorizing restriction of travel to countries "with which the
United States is at war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger
to the public health or the physical safety of United States travelers"); see also 22 C.F.R. § 51.73
(2000) (authorizing Secretary of State to designate countries for which U.S. passports "shall cease
to be valid").
'9' 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
199 Id. at 15 (adverting to previous incidents under Castro's regime in which Americans had
been imprisoned without charges). The reasoning in Zemel was premised on the possibility that a
U.S. citizen would find himself requiring, as either a statutory or practical matter and at great
potential cost, the diplomatic protection of the United States. See id. (citing the Hostage Taking
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958), which requires the President to "use such means, not amounting to
acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper" to secure the release of U.S. citizens detained by
foreign governments); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 196, at 1145-46. This
rationale also explains the more recent example of travel to Lebanon, which was prohibited during
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"weightiest considerations of national security ' ' 20 0 against the backdrop of "the
changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations.,
20 1
Indeed, the Logan Act and Perez prohibitions, as well as the passport denials,
represented an extreme version of state responsibility. It is one thing to attribute the
acts of governmental components of a state (namely, for our purposes, courts and
subunit governments), another so to treat the unofficial, unsanctioned acts of private
individuals merely by virtue of the tie of nationality. These practices also represented
a departure from baseline constitutional values. With respect to the Logan Act and
active dual citizenship, the differential is in the restriction of rights of speech and free
association that would be protected in the domestic context. 20 2 One's speech rights
are, in the domestic context, not limited by the audience to which they are directed.0 3
Likewise, rights of political association are core to the First Amendment; 204 one could
hardly ban membership in an Irish fraternal organization in the way that the
Nationality Act effectively banned membership in Ireland, the state. With respect to
passport denial, the differential is in the restriction of the right to travel. In the
domestic context, the right to travel has been held out as a constitutional
touchstone.20 5 The Agee and Zemel decisions imply not just a limitation of that right
in the international context, but its complete non-existence. In perhaps no other
context has the foreign relations differential manifested itself so starkly.
Reflecting the doctrine's zenith, state responsibility under international law for
the 1980s and 1990s in the wake of several hostage-taldng incidents there. Again, the notion of
responsibility is implicated, even though in this context it is a responsibility to the individual citizen
rather than a responsibility for his conduct.200 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16 ("That the restriction which is challenged in this case is supported by
the weightiest considerations of national security is perhaps best pointed up by recalling that the
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 preceded the filing of appellant's complaint byless than two
months.").
201 Id. at 17.202 See Roth, supra note 187, at 265-71 (considering the Logan Act's consistency with the
First Amendment); Vagts, supra note 184, at 293-99 (same).
203 Of course, there might be certain contexts in which restrictions of communications with
foreign governments would satisfy the "compelling interest" test for restrictions on speech in any
context, in which case one could assert the absence of a foreign relations differential. But to do so
as a categoric matter, as does the Logan Act, would seem to give rise to a clear overbreadth
problem. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (striking down state statute criminalizing
use of "opprobrious or abusive language").
204 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
205 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (affirming the right to interstate travel under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause). The passport denials have also implicated First Amendment
concerns where, as in the Agee case, they have been prompted by speech activities that a citizen
intends to engage in while traveling abroad. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981)
(considering a passport denial justified on the ground that the citizen intended to divulge sensitive
national security information while abroad); Roth, supra note 187, at 269 (considering First
Amendment aspects of Agee).
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individual conduct corroded before the advent of globalization, and these examples of
the foreign relations differential corroded along with it. Because the international
community no longer assumes that individuals represent their country of citizenship,
there is no harm to be protected against by constraining their activity in or with
foreign polities. Thus application of the Logan Act against private individuals has not
been contemplated in the recent past,2°6 there have been no recent reports of passport
denials on foreign policy grounds;207 and the maintenance of active dual citizenship
has been tolerated since 1968, when the Court overruled the decision in Perez. °8
Although the passport denial provisions upheld in Agee remain on the books, they
appear rarely, if ever, to be deployed in individual cases; and the use of area
restrictions has withered to a small handful of rogue states.20 9 The law and practice
here has already conformed itself to the change in international context and how that
context has constructed the scope of the state.210
106 Although the act has occasionally been invoked in recent decades, see supra note 186,
leaving aside instances in which Americans have dallied with rogue leaders, it appears to have no
continuing efficacy.
207 Passports, of course, may be denied on other grounds, including, for instance, where the
applicant poses a flight risk from criminal prosecution, but such denials do not implicate foreign
relations.
208 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).209 Such restrictions appear currently to include only Libya, see 65 Fed. Reg. 75,761 (Dec. 4,
2000), and Iraq, see 66 Fed. Reg. 14,241 (Mar. 9,2001); see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,8-11
(1965) (describing historical examples of travel restrictions). More prevalent todaythan in the past
are restrictions on the expenditure of funds by U.S. citizens in certain states, including Cuba, North
Korea, and Serbia. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (2000). But those restrictions have the objective of
tightening sanctions regimes imposed on those countries, an objective unrelated to responsibility
imposed by international law. In that sense, the expenditure restrictions are difficult to situate in the
same differential category as travel restrictions.
"0 The 1794 Neutrality Act, which criminalizes the launching of hostile expeditions from the
United States against nations with which the United States is "at peace," see 18 U.S.C. § 960
(2001), presents a partial fit with the contingency model. The Act was driven by the international
legal responsibility of the United States for such expeditions. See, e.g., The Three Friends, 166 U.S.
1,52-53 (1897) (recognizing the Neutrality Act as in furtherance of international law obligations);
H. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 22 AM. J.
INT'L L. 105 (1928); Jules Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and
Congressional WarPowers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'LL. J. 1, 15-20 (1983).
Conduct prohibited by the Act thus posed an extreme threat to the national interest, insofar as
privately-sponsored expeditions could result in retaliatory measures, including armed attacks,
against the United States by the foreign country involved. See, e.g., United States v. O'Sullivan, 27
F. Cas. 367, 376 (D.C.N.Y. 1851) (No. 15,974) ("The rule is founded on the impropriety and
danger of allowing individuals to make war on their own authority, or, by mingling themselves in
the belligerent operations of other nations, to run the hazard of counteracting the policy or
embroiling the relations of their own government .... ); Neutrality, 7 Moore DIGEST § 1300, at
923 (quoting Millard Fillmore's second annual message to Congress, "[n]o individuals have the
right to hazard the peace of the country.. . upon vague notions of reforming governments in other
states"). This concern figured in the passage of the measure. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 743 (1794)
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2. Plenary Power and the Rights ofAliens
Far more glaring and controversial, both in terms of the differential presented and
the numbers of persons affected, has been the so-called plenary power doctrine, under
which aliens have been deprived of most rights of due process in immigration
211proceedings. Pronouncements from the Court in the field of immigration law are
replete with statements that would shock the sensibilities of the domestic
constitutional lawyer.212 Perhaps most famously, the Court in Knauff held that
(remarks of Congressman Ames) (noting purpose of the bill to prevent being "driven into war by
the licentious behavior of some individuals"). Prosecutions under the Act were once assiduous,
especially in the context of nineteenth century Latin American liberation movements. See, e.g.,
Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896) (expedition to liberate Cuba from Spanish rule);
United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1233 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342a) (prosecution involving
expedition intended to help liberate Venezuela from Spanish rule). Indeed, the Act was once
amended at the request of Spain to clarify its application to colonial holdings. See The Three
Friends, 166 U.S. at 55-56. Consistent with the model proposed in this article, the Act has recently
fallen into disuse with the attenuation of state responsibility for individual conduct. For instance,
where the participation of U.S. citizens as Kosovar freedom fighters might once have posed serious
diplomatic and military complications, such activity in the current context was hardly worthy of
note, except as fodder for newspaper features. See David Stout, Marching Off to Other Nations'
Wars, Americans Must Tiptoe Around a 1794 Neutrality Act, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 20, 1999, at A 14;
see also, e.g., Lobel, supra (describing the Neutrality Act's decline).
But the fit with the model is incomplete. First, in contrast to the Logan Act, the statute's
coverage is defined not in terms of citizenship but rather of territory. The Act applies to activityby
aliens in the United States; it does not apply to conduct initiated by U.S. citizens outside of the
American territory. In this respect the measure does not reflect the aggregation of individuals to the
state. Second, it is difficult to locate the constitutional baseline from which the Neutrality Act
represents a departure. Much of the activity covered by the Act is simply criminal. Some is
commercial. See 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 177, 180 (1870) ("To prevent our mechanics and merchants
from building ships of war and selling them on the markets of the world, is an interference with
their private rights which can only be justified on the ground of a paramount duty in our
international relations .... "). It is also true that the Act has been used to punish activitythat would
clearly qualify as "freedom fighting." See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 441 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1971)
(involving attempts to depose the Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti); Casey v. United States, 413 F.2d
1303 (5th Cir. 1969) (same). In that respect it maybe taken as derogating from vaunted American
principles supporting the cause of democracy abroad as well as at home. But the Act's objective of
prohibiting armed activity ultimately seems to coincide with the institutionalization and democratic
peace phenomena. In other words, globalization justifies the Act's persistence even if it does not
explain its origins.
211 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 15; Legomsky, supra note 15; David A. Martin, Due Process
and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv.
165 (1983); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Co nstitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); Schuck, supra note
15.
112 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 865 ("Immigration law has remained blissfully
untouched by the virtual revolution in constitutional law since World War II .... ).
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"whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as the alien
denied entry is concerned." 2t 3 Aliens seeking initial entry at the border are denied any




those within the country have no substantive rights and only limited procedural
rights.2'5 The constitutional treatment of aliens has long been lamented by scholars,
most recently in the wake of 1996 immigration law reforms broadening the grounds
for deportation and scaling back statutory protections in removal proceedings. 21 6 The
use of secret evidence in removal proceedings had attracted widespread media
attention even before the September 11 attacks brought it regularly to the headlines.21 7
This area of constitutional doctrine is once again amenable to contextual
explanation. As Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurrence in Harisiades, "[i]t is




Perhaps more than in any other area, the cases here appeal to the overriding concerns
of national security and the perils of a hostile world. Several of the decisions most
restrictive of alien rights were, not coincidentally, delivered at the height of the Cold
War. 21 9 The plenary power cases repeatedly advert to the sensitive element of foreign
213 United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
214 See id.
215 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (finding no substantive due
process rights for aliens in deportation proceedings); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86
(1903) (holding that a landed immigrant is entitled to procedural due process in deportation
proceedings); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (confirming that a
"continuously present resident alien has a right to due process," while noting that the Court has
"rarely held that the procedures provided by the executive were inadequate").
216 See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1615 (2000); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas
Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal ofAliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961 (1998).
211 See, e.g., Vernon Loeb, Iraqi Dissidents' American Dream and Nightmare: Nebraska
Warmth Contrasts with Kajkaesque INS Ordeal, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2000, at A l (reporting on
the plight of the "Iraqi Six," whose exclusion from the United States had been sought on the basis
of secret evidence); Ronald Smothers, U.S. Bars or Expels Suspect Immigrants on Secret
Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1998, at A l (reporting on the use of secret evidence in more than
two dozen exclusion and deportation cases). The secret evidence cases have provoked scathing
editorial comment. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, The Uses of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2000, at
A21 (applauding the court-ordered release of an alien held on the basis of secret evidence); Secrecy
and Due Process, WASH. PosT, Oct. 25, 1999, at A28 (concluding that the use of secret evidence
"can never be legitimate").
... Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 596 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
219 See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214-16 (1953)
(upholding the exclusion of an alien notwithstanding the practical result of indefinite detention in
the face of refusals by any other country to accept him); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 596 (upholding
the deportation of three long-term permanent resident aliens on the basis of former membership in
the Communist Party); United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,544-47 (1950)
(upholding, on the basis of secret evidence, the exclusion of an alien seeking admission as a war
bride).
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relations in immigration decision-making and the resultant need for extreme judicial
deference to the will of the political branches.22° There is in this respect a clear
doctrinal overlap between the political question and plenary power cases.22'
Although not as direct as in other areas, the element of state responsibility also
entered into the plenary power equation. Here, however, it was not the responsibility
of the United States for the individuals involved (obviously, as they were aliens), but
that of the countries of which they were nationals. For constitutional purposes, aliens
have been treated not as individuals but rather as components of other nations. In that
respect, they have been considered as part of the intemational threat in the world of
hostile nation-states; they have been assumed, by U.S. courts, to be doing the bidding
of their country of nationality, and as such are a threat to U.S. security.222 It has also
220 See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-89 (observing "that any policy toward aliens is vitally and
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations
[and] the war power"); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 ("The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of
sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 713 (1893) ("The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government .... "); Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,659 (1892) (stating that the power to exclude aliens "is vested
in the national government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of
international relations"); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,606 (1889) ("To preserve its
independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty
of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated.").
221 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712 (denying the applicability of the Due Process
Clause in a deportation case, concluding that "it behooves the Court to be careful that it does not
undertake to pass upon political questions, the final decision of which has been committed by the
Constitution to other departments of the government"); FRANCK, supra note 15, at 54-55; Fritz
Scharpf, JudicialReview and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517,579
n.218 (1966). Indeed, in some respects plenary power is more readily situated with the political
question doctrine as part of the foreign relations differential. One can explain plenary power as a
matter of institutional deference to the political branches rather than a substantive delimitation of
the rights of aliens. See, e.g., Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny
of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998
Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 32-40. Continuing assaults on the plenary power in the wake of September II
may also be more successful along this line of attack, insofar as the political question doctrine turns
more on the disaggregation of the state (a question of institutional recognition) rather than on the
assertion of diminished security threats. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the plenary
power doctrine has had the effect of diminishing the rights of aliens in the immigration process,
eliminating a check on political branch overreaching.
22 The Harisiades decision, for instance, accepted as an institutional matter a legislative
premise that "the Communist movement here has been heavily laden with aliens and that Soviet
control of the American Communist Party has been largely through alien Communists."
Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 590. The Court also stressed the "ambiguity of [the alien's] allegiance" in
retaining original citizenship. Id. at 587. Frankfurter's concurrence stressed the fact of the
international ordering "whereby the citizens of each State are aliens in relation to every other state."
Id. at 596 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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been assumed that their interests will be protected on the international plane by their
country of nationality, so that even as they are deprived of individual constitutional
rights, their rights will be protected through diplomatic channels.223 Here it was U.S.
assimilation of the doctrine of state responsibility, rather than its assertion by other
states, that gave rise to the foreign relations differential.
In its historical international context, perhaps such justifications for the plenary
power doctrine were plausible. Particular applications of the state responsibility
doctrine were, to be sure, sometimes formalistic. For the deportable Communists in
the Harisiades case, for example, the possibility of diplomatic protection hardly
amounted to an equal substitute for the constitutional rights denied.224 But in the old
world of hostile nation-states, it may not have been in all cases unwarranted to ascribe
antagonistic loyalties to the citizens of other states and to afford political branch
decision-making on immigration greater deference than in the domestic sphere.
Especially in the Cold War context, the downside risk of erroneous entry decisions
was potentially catastrophic, involving, at least in theory, the survival of the nation
itself.225 That is not to say that such cases as Knauff, Mezei, and Harisiades were
rightly decided. On the contrary, history has shown them to have been unjust
responses to the perceived Soviet threat.226 But it is easy to draw hypothetical cases in
which the deprivation of due process would have been justified from the perspective
of the overriding national interest.
227
223 See, e.g., id. at 585 (highlighting that an alien "may claim protection against our
Government unavailable to the citizen... he retains a claim upon the state of his citizenship to
diplomatic intervention on his behalf'); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)
("If the government of the country of which the foreigners are excluded are subjects is dissatisfied
with this action it can make [a] complaint to the executive head of our government... and there
lies its only remedy.").224 Harisiades involved the deportation of three aliens of Greek, Italian, and Soviet nationality
respectively, all of whom had been residing in the United States for at least thirty years. 342 U.S. at
581-83. The probability of the anti-Communist Greek or Italian governments exercising
diplomatic protection in favor of former Communist Party members must have been slim; and
even if willing, the Soviet Union would not have been in much of a position to assist its nationals
in the United States at the height of the Cold War. In other words, the additional rights afforded
aliens under international law would hardly have made up for the absence of constitutional
protections at the time the case was decided.
225 As Justice Jackson intoned in Harisiades, acknowledging the constitutional significance of
global context, "[w]e think that, in the present state of the world, it would be rash and irresponsible
to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or qualify the Government's power of deportation." 342
U.S. at 591; see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953)
(rejecting the relevance of other countries' refusal to accept an excludable alien, observing that "the
times being what they are, Congress may well have felt that other countries ought not to shift the
onus to us").
226 See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention ofAliens: Lessons from the
Lives of Ellen Knauffandlgnatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 933,954-84 (1995) (recounting how
Knauff and Mezei eventually won admission into the United States).
227 For example, if the exclusion of an alien were based on intelligence whose origin could not
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But however one comes down on the historical justifications of the plenary power
doctrine, they offer no support for its persistence. To the extent the doctrine may once
have represented an appropriate response to the international context, globalization
has brought that foundation into question. First, the risk of catastrophic, unrestrained
state-to-state conflict has diminished to the point where it is no longer plausible to
assert that the nation's survival hangs in the balance thereby. There is today no
foreign menace on the order of the Cold War Soviet Union. Indeed, as a part of the
democratic peace, there is today no significant state-based foreign threat of any
description. Even if there were, assumptions of an individual's allegiance to her
country of nationality (or, more accurately, to the government in control of that
country), contrary to U.S. interests, seem misplaced in today's world. Those of Iraqi
nationality present in or seeking to enter the United States can, for example, hardly be
assumed to be loyal to the regime of Saddam Hussein. The premises on which
plenary power was based have been eroded.
Nor does terrorism appear to offer an alternative foundation. One surely cannot
assimilate terrorists to their country of nationality, which is all but irrelevant to the
threat they pose or their place in the world.228 As explained above,229 one cannot
make an equivalence between the historical threat of conflict between states and the
dangers, however grave, posed by terrorist activity, even in the wake of September
11. Unlike interstate conflict, terrorism can be addressed with a law enforcement
model, complete with its baseline constitutional protections. One does not reduce the
due process rights of mobsters, drug traffickers, or Timothy McVeighs for fear that
they, their organizations, or other sympathetic elements will overwhelm law
enforcement and cause continuing injury. To separate out immigration and aliens for
differential constitutional treatment on the grounds that some terrorists are aliens
emerges as a category mistake.
Thus, even an intensified onslaught of terrorism should not impede the
reproblematization of the constitutional anachronisms of immigration law. That does
not mean that constitutional frameworks will yield the same answers across the
immigration/non-immigration divide, or even within the context of immigration law.
Take the use of secret evidence in removal proceedings. The Immigration and
have been disentangled from the information itself. Assume that a mole in the inner circles of the
Kremlin identified an incoming saboteur, whose identity was known only to a very few Soviet
officials. To have revealed to the alien such information as the basis for his exclusion would have
compromised the continuing utility and safety of the source, whose information might have been
considered critical in the bipolar struggle. This sort of scenario may seem farfetched today, but at
the height of the Cold War it was plausible if not persuasive.
228 Fifteen of the nineteen individuals involved in the September 11 attacks were nationals of
Saudi Arabia, a staunch U.S. ally. The others were from Egypt, Lebanon, and the United Arab
Emirates, and the alleged would-be twentieth hijacker is a French citizen. Neil A. Lewis & David
Johnston, Justice Dept. Identifies 19 Men as Suspected Hyackers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at
A2.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
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Nationality Act 230 has long provided for the use of secret evidence with respect to the
exclusion of aliens seeking entry to the United States and applications by aliens for
various forms of discretionary relief.231 In 1996, its use was permitted in removal
proceedings involving allegations of terrorist activity.232 Those so-called "Alien
Terrorist Removal Procedures" provide for the establishment of a special court. 233, In
the terrorist cases, secret evidence on which basis removal is sought will in all cases
be reviewed in camera by a judge of the court. 3 When possible, an unclassified
summary of the secret evidence will be delivered to the alien whose removal is
sought.235 In cases involving permanent resident aliens, the court is required to
appoint a "special attorney" to represent the alien's interests, who is cleared to review
classified information and thus permitted to review the secret evidence, though barred
from revealing the information to his alien client.236
In other contexts, the use of secret evidence is anathema to our constitutional
237
system, offending due process norms and the right to confront evidence. In the
foundational plenary power decisions of Knauff and Mezei-the latter involving a
permanent resident alien whose exclusion raised the specter of his indefinite
detention238-the Supreme Court upheld the unrestrained use of secret evidence (that
is, where the evidence was not reviewed by any official outside of the executive
branch, much less by the alien herself) with barely a nod to constitutional due
239process. 3 In the wake of globalization and the diminished threat of interstate
conflict, the rationale for the departure from due process norms comes into question.
Before September 11, the use of secret evidence was coming under a sustained
attacked, both in the courts and in Congress, as fueled by media attention to the
230 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 4, § 235(c), 66 Stat. 198 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2000)).
231 See id. (authorizing the Attorney General to remove arriving aliens on the basis of
"confidential information"); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2000) (allowing an alien to
examine evidence against the alien in removal proceedings, except "such national security
information as the Government may proffer in opposition to the alien's admission to the United
States or to an application by the alien for discretionary relief under [the Immigration and
Nationality Act]").
232 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37 (Supp.
IV 1998) (setting forth special procedures, including the use of confidential information, in
removal cases involving terrorists).
233 Id. § 1532(a).
234 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(A).31 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(B).
236 Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F).
237 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation [and] to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... ).
238 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953).
239 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212; United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543-
44(1950).
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issue.24 ° Several decisions limited its use in the context of denials of discretionary
relief?241 Serious moves were afoot to scale back on legislative authority for its use in
removal proceedings.242 With respect to the unchanneled use of secret evidence in
removal proceedings and applications for discretionary relief, September 11 provides
no cause to retard this trend, at least not in the courts.243 Executive branch
protestations that such power is necessary to combat terrorist threats seem alarmist, up
against the alternative of some form of in camera review by the courts to prevent
against arbitrary enforcement decisions. 44
Deployment of the 1996 alien terrorist removal procedures presents a different
story. The procedures have not been used to date; September 11 may well result in the
first test cases.245 Abandoning plenary power and a differential approach would not
necessarily result in a finding of unconstitutionality. The fact is that most of the
regime now in place for the removal of alleged terrorists could pass constitutional
muster under non-exceptional analyses. In other words, the Court could approach
constitutional challenges to the removal of terrorists with its usual toolbox, and find
those challenges wanting. The result is the same as under plenary power, but the
judiciary would assert itself as a relevant player and the Constitution as the relevant
240 Perhaps most significant was a 60 Minutes segment on the plight of Iraqis who were
denied entry on the basis of secret evidence. See 60 Minutes: Unfinished Business (CBS television
broadcast, Mar. 28, 1999) (chronicling the plight of Iraqi dissidents who had worked with the CIA
to overthrow Saddam Hussein). Their cause was championed by former Central Intelligence
Agency director James Woolsey. These proceedings did not yield anyjudicial decisions regarding
the use of secret evidence. See 5 Iraqis Are Released from US. Detention Center, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1999, at A 18 (describing agreement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service in
which aliens were released pending acceptance by another country).
241 See Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding reliance on secret
evidence in denying bond to violate a deportable alien's due process); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F.
Supp. 2d 402, 411-19 (D.N.J. 1999) (finding that the use of secret evidence to justify detention
during removal proceedings violated a resident alien's due process rights); see also Haddam v.
Reno, 54 F. Supp. 2d 588, 598 (E.D. Va. 1999) (denying on jurisdictional grounds an alien's
challenge to the use of secret evidence in exclusion proceedings, but characterizing such use as "an
obnoxious practice, so unfair that in any ordinary litigation context, its unconstitutionality is
manifest").
242 See Secret Evidence Repeal Act, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. (2000); see also Tim Weiner,
Congress Reviewing Use of Evidence Kept Secret, N.Y. TIMEs, May 23, 2000, at A 19.
243 Efforts to secure legislative repeal will of course be set back in the wake of September 11,
although Congress has shown some surprising fortitude in resisting proposals that would have
significantly expanded executive branch discretion with respect to the treatment of suspected alien
terrorists.
244Here again a hypothetical comparison to the Cold War era is instructive. It is possible to
conceive of Cold War scenarios in which the disclosure of intelligence assets high in the Kremlin
apparatus even to judges could have posed an intolerable security risk. On the law enforcement
model, similar disclosure with respect to terrorist groups seems unexceptional.
245 See, e.g., William Glaberson, US. Asks to Use Secret Evidence in Many Cases of
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at B1.
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standard.
Thus, the legislative scheme for the removal of terrorists on the basis of secret
evidence could be rationalized within a Mathews v. Eldridge46 framework. As
applied against permanent resident aliens whose removal is sought-the case in
which the individual interest is greatest-the special removal procedures supply an
elaborate scheme intended to safeguard individual interests while protecting against
the disclosure of information that would harm the national security.247 The scheme
would not pass muster were it applied in the context of criminal prosecutions .4 But
however grave a remedy it may be, deportation would seem (on average) one level
removed from imprisonment, and the distinction, perhaps, allows for a finding of
adequate due process in this context. A Mathews analysis might even sustain some
unconstrained uses of secret evidence, at least where the alien's interest is not grave.
The removal on the basis of secret evidence of an arriving alien on a tourist visa does
not seem dramatically unjust, even if the procedure will sometimes generate false
positives, given the relatively insubstantial individual interest at stake. These are close
questions; and a strong case could be made against finding these procedures to satisfy
due process requirements .49 Eliminating a foreign relations differential does not
always change results, just as not all constitutional challenges to governmental
deprivations are successful.
Those cases in which secret evidence is used are, of course, exceptional. In most
cases, immigration proceedings are totally removed from foreign policy
considerations. The arguments for a continuing foreign relations differential in these
cases is weaker still. The equal protection challenge rebuffed on plenary 'power
reasoning in Fiallo v. BelfP50 is instructive. The Fiallo decision considered an
immigration act provision that discriminated against fathers in their capacity to
petition for the admission of (or be petitioned for by) their illegitimate children,
14' 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews has elsewhere been imparted in the immigration context.
See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,32-34 (1982) (applying the Mathews framework to find the
exclusion of a returning permanent resident alien unconstitutional on procedural due process
grounds).
247 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3) (2000) (providing for disclosure to "special attorney"
representing alien's interests of secret evidence on which basis removal is sought).
248 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,496 (1959) ("[W]here governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the
evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an
opportunity to show that it is untrue.").
249 Compare Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret
Deportation Proceedings, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Summer 1996, at 23 (generally approving of
terrorist removal procedures), with Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, The Immigration
Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens
and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833 (1997) (condemning removal procedures).
2o 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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relative to the capacity of mothers of such children.25' Outside the immigration
context, such a provision would face a double-barreled intermediate scrutiny for
discrimination on the basis both of gender and legitimacy.252 The Court, however,
afforded the claim no more than a rational basis-type review, 253 accepting stereotype-
based arguments that would never pass muster in the ordinary domestic context.254
On top of the usual recitations of plenary power themes, the Court adverted to the
potentially sensitive foreign relations issues posed by immigration policy-making.
255
The invocation of foreign relations interests was absurd even in 1971 with respect
to the discrimination addressed in Fiallo. And yet the Court's decision demonstrates
how reticent it was to involve itself in any aspect of immigration lawmaking, for fear
of upsetting foreign relations. And perhaps in that context the decision was defensible
on that basis. To have afforded non-differentiated review in one area, even one with
so little possible bearing on foreign relations, might have been difficult to cabin on
any principled basis. To have ruled otherwise in Fiallo, in other words, might have
left the Court with few moves by which to avoid ruling in a case that did in fact
involve foreign relations. Better to maintain the strict agnosticism on immigration
matters generally.
As of 1971, that position was weak but tenable. In the persistent shadow of the
Cold War, immigration did still implicate a significant foreign relations component.
Indeed, immigration issues comprised a significant component of our bilateral
relationship with the Soviet Union.256 Although much of immigration policy was far
251 At the time of the decision in Fiallo, the relationship of the father and his child born out of
wedlock had no status under the immigration law, while a mother's relationship with such a child
was recognized as equivalent to that of a parent and a legitimated child. See id. at 797 (describing
genesis of statutory scheme). The illegitimate child could not petition for the admission of his
father nor the reverse. Current law provides for recognition of the father-illegitimate child where
the "father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship" with the child. 8 U.S.C.
§ I101(b)(l)(D) (2000).
252 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (striking down a state law that categorically
denied the rights of a father to care for an illegitimate child).
253 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5 (accepting only "limitedjudicial responsibility" for reviewing
the power of Congress over the admission and exclusion of aliens).
254 See id. at 792 ("[I]n the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization,
'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."') (quoting
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)).
255 Id. at 796 (rejecting claim that unlike other immigration law decisions this one did not
involve foreign policy, deferring to congressional classification because "these matters may
implicate our relations with foreign powers") (quoting Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81).
256 As evidenced by the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, under which the
Soviet Union (and other nations with non-market economies) would be denied favorable trade
status insofar as it "seriously restrict[ed]" the right of its citizens to emigrate. See 19 U.S.C. § 2432
(1994); see also HENRY A. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 1271-73 (1979) (describing the
importance of negotiation with the Soviet Union over the question of Jewish emigration); Aristide
R. Zolberg, From Invitation to Interdiction: U.S. Foreign Policy and Immigration Since 1945, in
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removed from the summit table, this high diplomacy element may have deterred the
courts from any intrusion in the field. Because of their competence and expertise in
the making of foreign policy-making, the political branches were assumed to have
appropriately calibrated immigration policy in the nation's best interests.25 7 For the
judiciary to disturb that calculation would have posed the same dangers as with other
foreign relations matters. Today, the foreign relations content of immigration
decision- making has diminished.258 Although immigration may still figure in some
foreign policy contexts (Haiti and Cuba, most notably in recent years"), in the wake
of the democratic peace it no longer implicates, even potentially, the high stakes of the
Cold War years.
In the face of globalization, then, the plenary power doctrine should be
abandoned, and immigration laws and their application subjected to standard
constitutional tests. Once again, those tests are flexible ones that can be adapted to the
peculiarities of the immigration context. Thus, those denied visas might, under the
Mathews framework, be afforded only an administrative second look, rather than full
judicial review. That would not mark a significant departure from existing practice.260
In some cases, however, eliminating the foreign relations differential and deploying
standard constitutional analysis would impose new discipline on immigration
lawmakers.261
That process appears to have begun. With two possibly watershed decisions in its
2000 Term, the Court has indicated its willingness to reconsider the plenary power
doctrine. In Nguyen v./ NS,262 the Court considered a naturalization provision that,
similarly to the measure at issue in Fiallo, disadvantaged the father-child relationship
THREATENED PEOPLES, THREATENED BORDERS 117, 135-37 (Michael Teitelbaum & Myron
Weiner eds., 1995).
257 See supra note Il1 and accompanying text.
258 See, e.g., Sergio Diaz-Briquets, Relationship Between U.S. Foreign Policies and US.
Immigration Policies, in THREATENED PEOPLES, supra note 256, at 160-161 ("U.S. immigration
policies (other than refugee policies) since the 1960s have been largely driven by domestic
agendas. Foreign policy concerns have been rarely taken into account, and when they have, only
tangentially.").
259 See, e.g., Charles B. Keely, The Effects oflnternational Migration on US. Foreign Policy,
in THREATENED PEOPLES, supra note 256, at 215,225-27 (discussing the Cuban refugee problem);
Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm "in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE .J.
2391 (1994) (discussing policies for solving the Haitian refugee problem).
260 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY (4th ed. 1998) (describing informal review mechanisms for review of visa determinations);
U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT
POLICY 181-82 (1997) (recommending formal administrative review be available for denial of
certain types of visas).
261 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 211, at 208-34 (applying the Mathews test to a range of
immigration-related decisions).
262 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
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relative to the mother-child relationship in the context of out-of-wedlock births. 263
Although the Court upheld the discriminatory scheme, it did so after applying the
same constitutional analysis that it would have applied in the domestic context. 264 In
other words, it addressed the question as if there were no foreign relations differential.
Indeed, the Court expressly bracketed "the implications of statements in our earlier
cases regarding the wide deference afforded to Congress in the exercise of its
immigration and naturalization power. '265 That statement itself impliedly puts plenary
power back into play, even in the face of its long doctrinal pedigree.
The Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis2 66 confirms the possibility of a turning
point. Zadvydas rejected the indefinite detention of deportable aliens whose
homelands refused to accept their repatriation. Although the decision rested as a
formal matter on statutory interpretation-the Court found the detention provision of
the immigration act not to afford the Attorney General the power to undertake such
indefinite detention 26'-the interpretation was itself grounded on the serious
constitutional problems that the Court found the practice to raise.26 ' The decision,
263 With respect to the child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother and alien father, the
child is extended U.S. citizenship automatically at birth. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2000). The child
born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father and alien mother, by contrast, must show that the father
agreed to provide financial support for the child before reaching the age of eighteen, as well as
(also before the age of 18) establish that the relationship was either legitimated, acknowledged by
the father, or established by a court. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2000). In 1998, the Supreme Court
rejected on standing grounds a challenge to the same provision. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420 (1998); see also Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 221, at 30-32 (arguing that in the wake of
the Miller decision, the challenged provision should be considered unconstitutional).
264 See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2058-66. In applying the standard constitutional test for gender-
based classifications, see, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,533 (1996) (requiring that
such classifications be "substantially related" to the achievement of "important governmental
objectives"), the Court found the discriminatory provision adequate to further governmental
interests in determining the existence of a biological father-child tie and in assuring that existence
of a genuine relationship between the citizen father and the child and with it a genuine tie to the
United States. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2058-66. Whether the equal protection analysis in Nguyen
is well-founded is altogether another matter. See Joanna Grossman, A Victoryfor Motherhood and
for Sexism, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman /20010618.html (June 18, 2001) ("The
Court's decision is remarkable not only because it condones Congress' blatant sex discrimination,
but also because it does so without a second thought.").
261 Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2065.
'66 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001).
117 The detention was undertaken under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) (2000), which by its terms
imposes no time limits on the length of such continuing detention. Id.
161 See Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2502 (finding that "an alien's liberty interest is, at the least,
strong enough to raise a serious question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the
Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent") (citation omitted). In
concluding that the detention raised constitutional problems, the Court applied doctrine relating to
civil confinement, developed outside of the immigration and foreign relations law context. See id.
at 2498-500; see also, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (requiring special
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with a tone unprecedented in other immigration decisions, emphasized that the
immigration power "is subject to important constitutional limitations. ' 26 9 As in
Nguyen, the decision refused to consider the general scope of the immigration
power.27° Perhaps without precedent, the Court rejected the government's assertion of
a foreign policy interest.27' To the extent the decision recognized the need for
deference to the political branches in the context of immigration law, it did so by
reference to "[o]rdinary principles of judicial review. ',2 7 2 Insofar as these principles
themselves recognize "the Nation's need to 'speak with one voice' in immigration
matters"273 as well as "Executive Branch primacy in foreign policy matters," 274 the
Court found, they "require courts to listen with care when the Government's foreign
policy judgments ... are at issue, and to grant the Government appropriate leeway
when its judgments rest upon foreign policy expertise." '275 That standard-listening
with care and granting appropriate leeway-is a far cry from the world in which the
invocation of foreign relations effectively afforded the executive branch a trump card
against standard constitutional constraints.
Zadvydas and Nguyen may thus open a breach not only with respect to plenary
power, but also with respect to the foreign relations differential more generally.
Although the opinions made no allusion to the changed global context in which they
procedural protections for civil commitments based on predictions of future dangerousness);
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding confinement of insanity acquitee on the basis of
antisocial personality to be a violation of due process).269 Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2501. As Alex Aleinikoff observes, "the laconic, astonishingly
casual, phrase may represent a radical shift, a turning point for immigration law" in the same way
that Miranda was a watershed for criminal procedure. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary
Power: The Meaning and Impact ofZadvydas v. Davis, GEO. IMM1JGR. L.J. (forthcoming 2002)
(manuscript at 2, on file with author).270 Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2502 ("Nor do the cases before us require us to consider the
political branches' authority to control entry into the United States.").
271 As the Court noted:
The sole foreign policy consideration the Government mentions here is the concern lest the
courts interfere with "sensitive" repatriation negotiations. But neither the Government nor the
dissents explain how a habeas court's efforts to determine the likelihood of repatriation, if
handled with appropriate sensitivity, could make a significant difference in this respect.
Id. at 2502. As Justice Kennedy observed, in tellingly overheated characterization, the decision
carries the "potential to undermine the obvious necessity that the Nation speak with one voice on
immigration and foreign affairs matters," and "goes far to undercut the position of the Executive in
repatriation negotiations." Id. at 2510, 2511 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy raised as a specter
the possibility that "[h]igh officials of the Department of State could be called on to testify as to the
status of negotiations[,J" id. at 2517, as if such officials remain national avatars whose position
puts them above the ordinary, sometimes disorderly process of government.
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were decided, they are best explained by that change. No longer does judicial
intervention risk upsetting the sensitive balance of foreign relations. The international
system is now sturdy enough to absorb the participation of the courts; indeed, the
system has come, with disaggregation, to recognize them as independent players. The
United States as an entity need no longer fear the global consequence of judicial
missteps. On this score, again, September 11 need prove no impediment to the further
erosion of plenary power, although obviously it could have retarding implications.276
Thus, each of these three examples of the foreign relations differential-relating
to application of the political question doctrine, federalism, and individual rights-is
explained and undermined by the global context and its transformation. Each was
historically contingent on particular features of the old international system, one in
which states confronted each other as such in a condition of near anarchy. The high
stakes and serious instabilities of that system, combined with its recognition of
exclusive state responsibility for the conduct of component elements, almost
demanded that otherwise core constitutional values be suppressed. That is the only
way to justify the development of these differentials; explanations for them are
inevitably exogenous. But those justifications dissipate in the face of globalization.
What once served as justification no longer persists, and the differential should be
abandoned.
IV. GLOBALIZING THE WHOLE CONSTITUTION
But this is only a small part of the story. That globalization should ramify through
the canon of foreign relations law does not take a great leap; after all, as described
above, it should be rather obvious that change in the global context should have
implications for that body of law the very definition of which implicates the global
system. In this section, I tentatively sketch the more radical proposition that the
tentacles of globalization will reach far beyond foreign relations law into the
Constitution's core. The premise of an insulated Constitution may become contested.
The same features of globalization that demand reexamination of the foreign relations
differential may result in at least the partial subordination of the Constitution to
international norms. In particular, the combination of disaggregation and economic
globalization may enable the imposition of international norms on the United States.
Such imposition would be undertaken by the decentralized instruments of global
277governance, and not through the channel of some global super-state. Nonetheless,
federal constitutional law may come in the future to resemble the role of state
constitutional law today-of significance, yes, but clearly of secondary importance in
the broader norms system.
276
For an elaboration, see Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End ofPlenary Power, GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
217 See, e.g., GutHENNO, supra note 2, at 49 ("[T]hose who expect of the twenty-first century
the advent of the universal republic.., are profoundly mistaken.").
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My purpose, and the task in confronting globalization's deeper reach, is different
than in demonstrating its implications for foreign relations law. With respect to the
latter, the normative equation was straightforward. The starting point of a differential
implied the existence of an otherwise prevailing baseline, deviations from which
require justification. Once the justification for such deviation disappears, return to the
baseline itself requires no workout. The imposition of global norms on the United
States, by contrast, represents change in the baseline itself. That poses a more
daunting challenge, especially at the point where the parameters of those changes
remain largely indeterminate. As noted above,278 I do not pretend here to prove that
globalization is an inevitable condition. But there is now sufficient evidence of its
ascendancy to merit a close investigation of its possible implications for the American
constitutional construct.
In the face of that challenge, I offer two possible responses, one instrumental, the
other normative. I first suggest that the possible imposition of international norms
makes it important to focus on the new instruments of global governance by which
those norms are devised and enforced. If, in fact, the United States proves unable to
resist global norms, then the features of international norm-generation become
critical, from both justice/accountability and national interests perspectives (to the
extent that the latter remains a useful concept in the face of globalization). This
argument serves as a rallying call for theorists to consider the peculiar difficulties of
generating norms at the global level. It also takes aim at the New Sovereigntist school
of scholars and policymakers who call for the United States to reject international
norms and institutions.
179
The second, more provisional, response attempts a justification for the
submission of domestic constitutional values to global ones, or at least a non-
materialist explanation for the development. This argument rests on the proposition
that constitutions must coincide with communities. To the extent that the national
community may be breaking down (even in the wake of September 11, which may
prove less reinforcing of national identity than preliminary assessments would have
predicted), the Constitution would break down with it. Nation-states are themselves a
historically contingent unit of governance, ones that have been reified in the wake of
centuries during which they did, by and large, coincide with actual community
boundaries. There is evidence that community is increasingly coming to be defined in
terms other than the state. If that shift proves sustainable, the state itself would
become artifact, or at least be demoted from its longstanding position of institutional
primacy. As those signs unfold, the sharp lines of the Constitution that have made it
America's Constitution may begin to erode, and other structures will dictate to it.
278 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
279 See supra note 16.
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A. Insinuating Globalization
The old international order was one in which norms were largely segmented
along state lines. In the face of weak transnational networks and the absence of
supranational institutions, there were few mechanisms for the enforcement of norms.
The use of force presented the basic tool for enforcing international law. Using force
is costly to the enforcer (more so in that world than today, in the absence of
institutionalized interstate relations), and that by itself might explain the traditional
thinness of international law. States would only find it worth their while to use force
when concrete interests justified it; those interests would likely only be present with
respect to interstate relations.280 In that context, it is not surprising that a clear line
prevailed between the international and the domestic, and that matters in the latter
category were not contemplated by international law. Even if past generations had
been inclined towards the international protection of human rights, for example, there
would have been little institutional opportunity for such norms to have been enforced.
Globalization may provide those tools. In economic globalization, first of all, one
finds a density of transnational interaction whose restriction can be brought to bear in
norms enforcement. To the extent that global competitiveness is an important priority
for states, states are vulnerable to international action that diminishes their
competitiveness. We now thus see the increased deployment of economic sanctions
and embargoes to the end of enforcing international norms.281 But state-to-state
economic action, even with the possibility of exploiting economic interdependence
and the vulnerabilities it creates, standing alone remains a crude enforcement
mechanism. 282 Sanctions are also costly to states that impose them, so much so that
they are only realistically contemplated against states that are themselves
economically inconsequential. 283 That is why one sees state-to-state sanctions
280 To this extent, I would agree with Goldsmith and Posner's conception of international law
as largely reflecting the rational behavior of states, see Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 16, but
only as applied to the old world in which states were in fact discrete, insulated communities. It is
telling that their case studies all involve old-world norms, including diplomatic immunity, the
exemption of enemy property on neutral ship from wartime seizure, and rules regarding the
territorial sea. See id. at 1139-67.
... See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONALECONOMIC SANCTIONS 10-11 (1988) (noting
increased use of sanctions since World War H).
282 See, e.g., Hearings on Sanctions Reform: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 106th Cong. 63 (1999) (statement of Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat)
("[S]anctions are a blunt instrument. They are not a panacea nor are they cost free.").
283 See, e.g., CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE
DOMEsTIC COSTS OF SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN COMMERCE 28-34 (1999); ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (Richard Haas ed., 1999); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization
and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 75-76 (2000); Robert A. Pape, Why
Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, INT'L SEcuRrrY, Fall 1997, at 106 (asserting that sanctions have
a success rate of less than five percent).
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imposed on such countries as Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Serbia,284 and not on
China or Saudi Arabia or, for that matter, the United States.
Here the disaggregation phenomenon comes critically into play. It is now
structurally possible for international actors (including disaggregated actors from
other states) to apply targeted economic and other forms of pressure on discrete actors
within a state to advance compliance with international norms either by the state or
components thereof. This kind of enforcement activity can take either of two basic
forms. It can be applied directly against noncompliant components of states, or it can
be applied against (in effect) bystander components that will in turn pressure
noncompliant components or the noncompliant state itself into observing a particular
norm. These targeted levers reduce the cost of enforcement action, so that it is
possible to pursue enforcement against even the more powerful states.
Action against subnational authorities that violate international law would fall in
the first category. Insofar as a country's noncompliance with international norms is in
fact the result of noncompliance by territorial subdivisions acting within the sphere of
their own authority, then the international community can act directly against those
subdivisions.285 The same goes for non-territorial components such as corporations. If
corporations are the ultimate target of a particular norm (as, for instance, is the case
with labor rights norms), then compliance with the norm can be obtained through
pressure applied directly against the corporations as such. In both cases, the
enforcement action can be undertaken by non-state international actors. 8 6 For
instance, corporations might refuse to locate investment in a territorial subdivision
that stands in noncompliance with international norms.28 7 International NGOs can
marshal consumer pressure applied directly against noncompliant corporations. 288 In
2 4 See 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (2000) (designating Libya, Serbia and Montenegro, and North Korea
as subject to asset control sanctions).
285 See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
286 As Paul Wapner observes in an important contribution to the international relations
literature on non-governmental organizations: "When [their] ideas have more resonance outside
government, they will shift the standards of good conduct and persuade people to act differently
even though governments are not requiring them to do so .... To the degree this sensibility sways
people, it acts as a form of governance. Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental
Activism and World Civic Politics, 47 WORLD POLrIcs 311, 322, 336 (1995).
287 See supra note 171 (describing the prospect of diverted foreign investment from U.S.
states applying the death penalty).
... See generally Spiro, supra note 83 (describing extrainstitutional processes at the
international level through which NGOs can advance an agenda without securing formal
regulation). Perhaps the most prominent example of such action is found in the context of global
labor standards on such issues as child labor and health and safetymeasures. In this context, human
rights NGOs and major manufacturers have directly negotiated codes of conduct to govern such
issues on a global basis. See, e.g., CHARLES SABEL ET AL., RATCHETING LABOR STANDARDS:
REGULATION FOR CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT IN THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE 23 (Public Law
Research Paper No. 01-2 1, Columbia Law School), available at http://ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id =253833 (last visited February 6, 2002) (describing Fair Labor Association and other
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both cases, enforcement action is feasible as targeted, even if it would not be against
the nation of which the territorial subdivision is a part or with which the corporation is
identified. Alternatively, the pressure can be applied against a bystander component
that will in turn act against an offending state or state component. Thus, the
international community could act against a corporation or industry located in a
particular state or a territorial subdivision by way of securing the subdivision's
compliance with a particular norm.289 Or it could act against a subdivision with the
objective of securing national action.29°
In all cases, globalization affords the economic levers for such action. To the
extent that all actors are a part of the global economy, they are vulnerable to any
significant pressure that diminishes their competitiveness in it. Territorial subdivisions
cannot afford to lose international investment or exports. Corporations cannot afford
to lose international sales or investment. To the extent that the international
community is willing to advance compliance with international norms at some cost,291
private certification bodies); Steven Greenhouse, Anti-Sweatshop Movement Is Gaining Ground
Overseas, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2000, at A 10. For other specific examples of such action, see
Simon Birch, Peace in the Spirit Bear's Homeland: The Logger's Chainsaw Has Been Turned
Back by an Unusual Deal in British Columbia, FIN. TIMES, May 12, 2001, at 3 (noting an
international boycott against a company that planned to log rainforests in British Columbia that
were habitat to a rare species of bear); Lucette Lagnado, Gerber Baby Food, Grilled by
Greenpeace, Plans Swifl Overhaul, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1999, at A l (describing how the threat of
Greenpeace protests forced a baby food producer to stop using genetically altered product
ingredients); Michael Parrish, Pact May Stop Dolphin Deaths in Tuna Fishing, L.A. TIMEs, June
17, 1992, at A l (noting that makers of Star-Kist, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee all acceded,
prior to the implementation of federal legislation, to activist demands to stop harvesting tuna
products without using dolphin protection measures).
289 The threatened retaliation of Great Britain against corporations headquartered in California
in the face of the state's tax computation method presents one example. See supra note 170. A
more prominent developing example is presented by a campaign recently launched against U.S. oil
companies on the grounds of the U.S. failure to accede to the Kyoto Protocol on global warming.
Although the oil companies may not be bystanders in the sense of a complete lack of involvement
in the underlying issue-insofar as their activity involves atmospheric emissions, and insofar as
they have sought to advance an anti-Kyoto agenda through campaign contributions-the purpose
of the campaign is not to change their conduct, but rather to have them pressure the U.S.
government into changing its stance on the issue. See, e.g., Vanessa Houlder, Greenpeace
Threatens US. Oil Groups, FIN. TIMEs, April 27, 2001, at 8 (discussing Greenpeace's threat to
boycott U.S. oil companies unless the United States adopts the Kyoto agreement). As one observer
describes the strategy, activists "start with consumers at the pump, get them to pressure the gas
stations, get the station owners to pressure the companies and the companies to pressure the
govemment." Thomas L. Friedman, A Tiger by the Tail, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,2001, at A19.
290 See infra note 302 (discussing examples).
'9' Surveys have shown that consumers are willing to pay more for products that are certified
as having been produced in conformity with certain conditions. For instance, more than 75% of
consumers in one poll said that they would spend $25 for a piece of clothing certified as not having
been produced in a sweatshop rather than $20 for the same product that was not certified. See
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disaggregation allows them to do so at a small one.
The United States will hardly be immune to these possibilities, afforded, by
globalization, for the enforcement of international law. The authority of U.S. states
implicates a variety of human rights norms in such areas as criminal justice and
family law;292 state-level action may even come up against emerging international
standards in such areas as tax law,293 trade law,2 94 and judicial procedure. 295 Where a
U.S. state is noncompliant with any such norm, globalization allows for the direct
discipline of that state in the form of relocated international investment and
purchasing decisions, on the part of both international state and non-state actors
There are examples of such targeted action, and one would expect to see more as
international norms in these and other areas further harden.296 The same observation
could be made with respect to the compliance of U.S. corporations with international
norms, most notably human rights and environmental norms. Any corporation with
an identifiable product or service (which includes most concerns other than those
dealing in fungible natural resources) is vulnerable to international consumer action,
including consumption by other corporations. In both cases, relatively substitutable
alternatives will exist. An international actor can move its money to another territorial
subdivision or from one corporation to another with a similar product. To the extent
that international actors may themselves be subject to pressures from their own
constituencies (voters, shareholders, consumers), the cost of shiffing to the substitute
will often be smaller than that of continuing to deal with the offender.
By way of example, consider the emerging norm against the execution of
juvenile offenders, a practice that is now, for the most part, only undertaken in some
U.S. states (Texas most notably among them).297 Where international actors would
find it costly to try to enforce this norm against the United States as a whole (the only
option available before globalization), such action is practical as leveled against a few
Gereffi et al., supra note 83, at 59.
292 See Spiro, supra note 14, at 1224-25 (describing U.S. failure to ratify Convention on the
Rights of the Child as grounded in federalism concerns).
293 See, e.g., HOCKING, supra note 7 1, at 130-34 (describing how the unitary tax method used
by states to compute corporate profits emerged as an issue of international concern in the Barclays
Bank controversy).
294 The Massachusetts law at issue in the Crosby case, for example, was challenged by the
European Union and Japan as inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on Procurement. See Crosby
v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,366 (2000); see also EUROPEAN COMM'N, REPORT
ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT § 4.6, at 32 (1999) (expressing "strong
object[ion]" to state and local selective purchasing laws).295 See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 120-21 (1993) (describing how state procedural rules implicate foreign
relations).
296 See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
291 See, e.g., Sara Rimer & Raymond Bonner, Whether to Kill Those Who Killed as Youths,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, at Al (reporting that the United States has executed more juvenile
offenders over the last decade than all other countries combined).
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states. Corporations, most significantly, may increasingly fear bottom-line losses from
investing in those states that use capital punishment expansively, at the same time that
other states will present alternatives. Consumers may launch product or
tourism/convention boycotts.29' How many lost auto plants and tourist dollars would
it take for a state such as Texas to change its use of capital punishment? The
institutional logic here seems inescapable, and application of the mechanism
inevitable. 299 The end result will be, in effect, a constitutional norm against juvenile
executions, the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
notwithstanding. 00 Conduct that would otherwise be permissible as a matter of
domestic law will be delegitimized through international mechanisms.
This logic works against disaggregated component units outside of central
governments. It is not so clearly applied against central governments, disaggregated as
they may be.30 1 But globalization may also effectively discipline central government
actors, along two possible paths. The first would use disaggregated bystanders to
exert pressure against the central government as a whole. Thus, international actors
could squeeze a corporation or a territorial subdivision that themselves are innocent of
any non-compliance, but who could be expected to exert compliance pressure in turn
on a central government.30 2 This is emerging as a clear strategy in the new world trade
regime; in the wake of findings of GATT-illegality, injured states will construct
sanctions packages in part with an eye to producing maximum political pressure by
298 See Spiro, supra note 83.
299 Of course, there is the probability of overdetermination here, as other factors evidentlyalso
point to abandonment of the death penalty. See, e.g., Alan Berlow, The Broken Machinery of
Death, AM. PROSPECT, July 30,2001, at 16. Whatever the scenario, however, it will at this point be
difficult to claim that international factors played no role in its abandonment.
300 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (finding that the execution of a person
who committed a crime at the age of seventeen did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
... See Slaughter, supra note 69 (discussing the disaggregation of national executives).
302 In one recent example of the use of this mechanism, an international boycott effort was
undertaken against Beaujolais wine by way of pressuring France into halting nuclear weapons tests
in the South Pacific. Here, the industry targeted was itself innocent of any misconduct (thus, in this
model, qualifying as a "bystander"), but the loss of sales resulting from the boycott sufficed to
secure the desired change in state conduct. See Protest Hurts Wine's Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1995, at 58 (reporting an 18% drop in Beaujolais sales, attributed to the anti-nuclear protest).
Measures directed against companies doing business in human-rights abusing countries can also be
located in this category, although the corporations targeted are in that case not characterized as
simple bystanders. In those cases, the immediate aim is to secure the corporation's withdrawal
from a particular country, but the ultimate aim is to change the practices of the country itself.
Efforts against the repressive government in Burma present the most prominent recent example.
See, e.g., Ted Bardacke, Western Companies Encounter Protesters on the Road to Burma: After
Heineken Campaign Dutch Activists Will Target French Group, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at 3




affected corporations against their home-country governments. °3
Second, and more intriguing, globalization may present opportunities for direct,
non-economic action against the component parts of central governments. Pre-
globalization, component parts of central governments had little contact with
international actors, for in the aggregated state such contact was channeled through a
single institutional channel. Today, by contrast, virtually every element of the federal
government has independent channels of communication with the international
community. Almost every federal agency now has an international section, sometimes
quite substantial, undertaking its own international contacts; many place their own
officials in U.S. diplomatic facilities, only nominally under the direction of the
Secretary of State.3l Congress undertakes a variety of such contacts, both in
Washington and abroad.305 Finally, even the federal judiciary has expanded
enormously its contacts with foreign entities. There is emerging, first of all, a thick
web of interjudicial contacts, both informal306 and institutionalized.30 7 U.S. courts
increasingly find international entities, including foreign governments and
international NGOs, before them not only as parties, but also as amici.308 Cases that
303 See Helene Cooper, Why Does U.S. Pick on Pecorino in Flap with EU on Bananas?,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1999, at A l (discussing U.S. tariff sanctions on European products); see also
William Roberts, US Strategy in Banana Tiff: Divide and Conquer, J. CoM., Dec. 9, 1998, at AI
(describing a strategy of distinguishing among EU member states for purposes of sanctions by
"rewarding the 'good boys' and punishing the 'bad boys' with threats" of sanctions).3
04 See, e.g., Howard J. Wiarda, Beyond the Pale: The Bureaucratic Politics of United States
Policy in Mexico, 162 WORLD AFF. 174, 176 (2000) (reporting that more than thirty U.S.
government agencies are represented among personnel in the U.S. embassy in Mexico); see also
Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Realism and Complex Interdependence, in THE
GLOBALiZATiON READER 77, 78 (Frank J. Lechner & John Boli eds., 2000) (noting that many
foreign policy issues are now being considered outside of foreign offices).
305 See, e.g., Barbara Crossette & Eric Schmitt, UN Ambassadors in Helms Land: Smiles On,
Gloves Off, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2000, at A8 (describing a meeting between Senate Foreign
Relations Chairman Jesse Helms and fourteen U.N. ambassadors); Clyde Farnsworth, Congress
Move on Cuba Irks Canada and Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at A3 (describing direct
lobbying by foreign governments); Elaine Sciolino, New Protocol: Heads of State Now Court
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at A3 (commenting on the recent trend of the heads of
foreign governments lobbying members of Congress).
See, e.g., Claire L'Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 26 (1998) (Canadian Supreme
Courtjustice describing growing personal contacts among members of thejudiciary from different
countries, including through e-mail).
107 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103,
1120-23 (2000) (describing contexts in which U.S. judges are interacting with foreign
counterparts). In 1995, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the U.S. Judicial Conference created a
"Committee on International Judicial Relations" to coordinate contacts with foreign judiciaries and
others. See Michael H. Mihm, International Judicial Relations Committee Promotes
Communication, Coordination, INT'L JUD. OBSERVER, Sept. 1995, at 1.
308 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
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have attracted such foreign participation include constitutional and foreign relations
law cases. Indeed, in the foreign relations law category such participation is becoming
routine.
This form of disaggregation does not appear to allow for the same mechanisms of
norms enforcement as does the disaggregation of non-central govenment actors,
insofar as central government components are not amenable to economic competition.
One cannot, for the most part, threaten to take one's business elsewhere when it
comes to national courts, legislatures, or executive agencies. However, there may be
other mechanisms for the international community to hold central government
components directly responsible for their actions. Central government components
will, for starters, inevitably become more comfortable with international law as they
develop institutional ties with their foreign and international counterparts.30 9 But here
I would also tentatively suggest that there may be some forms of international
"shaming" that can be deployed in the face of disaggregation. This form of discipline
could range from seemingly trivial comments at conferences and cocktail parties to
more formal statements of condemnation from international counterparts and
umbrella associations. Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, now constantly on the
foreign junket circuit, 310 get an earful regarding various U.S. norms that are out of
step with international law.31' That certainly makes them aware of possible ways in
which U.S. practices are inconsistent with international ones; at some point the level
of discomfort presented by such criticism might at least marginally affect decision-
making. To the extent that rejection of international law by the American judiciary
comes to compromise its legitimacy, it will assimilate international law sources.312 I
would not want to overestimate the significance of this possible mechanism for
enforcing international norms, but I suspect that there may be something to it. If there
is, then of course similar shaming exercises against other component actors
309 Tus it may not long be fair to say that "[i]nternational law is a mystery to most U.S.
judges," Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 16, at 874-75, though it would also help
matters to assimilate more international and foreign relations law into the U.S. law school
curriculum. See Flaherty, supra note 10 (calling for inclusion of international law materials in the
basic constitutional law course).
310 For one report, see Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among European
Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1045 (2000) (reporting observations from a two-week
European tour by four U.S. Supreme Court justices); see also Joan Biskupic, From Moscow to
Missoula, Justices 'Jaunts Span the Globe, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1996, at A 17 (reporting on off-
term travel by Supreme Court Justices).
311 See, e.g., L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 306, at 37 (Canadian jurist criticizing Rehnquist
court for failing to account sufficiently for international norms); Shapiro, supra note 171, at 14
(describing possible impact on U.S. judges in death penalty context of their "spending more and
more time at international conferences").
3 See Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and UnitedStates Law: Predictions ofa
Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REv. 417,422-24 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court will turn to
international law sources for the same reasons that it took account of social science data in such
cases as Muller v. Oregon and Brown v. Board of Education).
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(subnational authorities 313 and corporations3 14) would add a tool to those supplied by
economic globalization.
But the theory does not depend on this last piece in order to work. The coupling
of economic globalization and disaggregation could suffice to drive the enforcement
of international norms against the United States. The result is a global
contextualization of all constitutional law, or at least that portion of it that implicates
international norms.315 This last qualifier is of course an important one, for the scope
of hard international norms on matters otherwise within the purview of "domestic"
constitutional law is still relatively narrow. But the groundwork for a broader
spectrum of such norms is in place; one need only glance at the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights316 to understand the potential swath that
international law will cut.3 17 Some such aspirational norms are already satisfied by
existing U.S. practice, so that no modification would necessarily be required even as
the norms do harden.3'8 But even with respect to those practices, there will be (as with
313 See Spiro, supra note 171, at 586 & n.72.
314 See David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1811 (2001).
315 Judith Resnik appears to be among the few constitutional theorists who sees this
conclusion, though through a different lens. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 621-22. As she observes:
And just as it cloaks the exercise of national powers from view, categorical federalism also
provides a false sense of security from transnational lawmaking. United States laws of all
kinds are increasingly altered, if not trumped, by practices stemming from quarters physically
distant from Washington but not far in forms of space that globalization has come to
represent. The United States government needs to develop means of interacting with these
laws rather than to assume an ability to remain insular. In the twenty-first century, believing
one can mandate the boundaries is seductive but wrong ....
1d.; cf Hamilton, supra note 7, at 311 ("The late twentieth century's New World is a puzzle map of
old worlds wherein the larger puzzle is decidedly more than the sum of its parts. We are
undergoing a revolution in context.").316 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 1 (1978)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
317 Ihe ICCPR includes provisions relating, for instance, to the terms of arrest and detention,
see id. art. 9 (providing that a person arrested be promptly informed of charges against him, and be
"entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release," as well as to an enforceable right to
compensation in the event of unlawful arrest or detention); to the right to freedom of "thought,
conscience, and religion," id. art. 18; to the right "to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections," id. art. 25; and to the prohibition of discrimination on such grounds as race, sex,
language, "social origin ... birth or other status." Id. art. 26. New Sovereigntist scholarship has
highlighted the broad scope of contemporary international human rights, to the point of cartooning
it. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?,
I CHI. J. INT'L L. 327, 332 (2000) (suggesting that the ICCPR could be interpreted to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of beauty, weight, or intelligence).
318 As it should go without saying, the United States is largely compliant with human rights
norms, as even its most ardent critics will concede. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US
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the U.S. Constitution) an interpretive refinement and evolution of the international
standards; current compliance does not guarantee compliance in the future.3 19 In
short, the substantive areas in which international law will govern U.S. law will likely
expand.
B. The Constitutional Endgame
Considered instrumentally, this imposition of international norms will mostly
prove rights enhancing. Insofar as international law affords lesser protection than does
U.S. law, the domestic norms will in some cases present a floor, in the way of state
constitutional protections exceeding those granted under the federal constitution.
There will be other cases in which the equation will not be so simple, however, as
where one set of rights is balanced against another. Hate speech presents an emerging
example. Hate speech is banned by the ICCPR32° at the same time as the Supreme
Court has found it protected under the First Amendment."' International family law
norms will also tend to pit the rights of one group against those of another. The point
is that international law is not just about improving human rights. There is some cause
for concern regarding the content of international norms. 322 There is also cause for
concern regarding the process by which international law is made. As the New
Ratification ofInternational Human Rights Treaties, I Ci. J. INT'L L. 347, 351 (2000) ("The
United States certainly has much to boast about when it comes to human rights.").
"9 By way of attempting to avoid any such eventuality, the United States has conditioned its
accession to various human rights accords by pegging the extent of its acceptance to parallel
provisions of domestic constitutional law. For instance, in acceding to the Torture Convention, the
United States deemed that it "considers itself bound.., under [the Convention's] Article 16 to
prevent 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,' only insofar as [that]
term... means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." U.S. Senate
Resolution of Advice and Consent to the Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REc. 36,198 (1990). Of course
it is the thesis of this article that any such attempts will fail, in the long run, to block the imposition
of norms differing from those found in the domestic Constitution.
320 ICCPR art. 20(2) ("Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."). In acceding to the
ICCPR, the United States reserved from this provision. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification of the Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG.
REC. 8070 (1992). Had the Senate not so qualified the terms of U.S. participation in the ICCPR
regime, the Supreme Court well might have. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that
treaty cannot trump individual rights protected under the Constitution).
321 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992) (striking down on First Amendment
grounds a municipal ordinance that prohibited the display of a symbol intended to arouse "anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender").
322 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 7, at 676 ("INleither transnational lawmaking nor globalism
is necessarily an engine of equality.").
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Sovereigntists are apt to highlight from a largely conservative starting point,323 and
anti-globalists from a progressive one,324 there are serious accountability problems in
international decision-making institutions, as well as with setting of standards outside
of such institutions.325 So the fact that the international community now enjoys the
power to impose norms on the United States is not necessarily cause for celebration.
But a response founded on an opt-out capacity is a vulnerable one. That response
is inconsistent with the nature of globalization; globalization, if perfected, will
preclude the possibility of opting out.326 Non-participation by the United States in
international regime-building will not exempt it from the product of such standards-
setting processes. The refusal to join such regimes could, from a U.S. perspective,
only compound the process problem, and the content problem in turn. The United
States might better accept the fact of globalization's power, and work to grapple with
the process and content problems of international law. The accountability gap in
international norms formulation can be overcome, but to take account of U.S.
interests the United States must accept the legitimacy of related institutions and of the
results of international lawmaking processes. To work from Hirschman's equation, 2 v
there is no exit here, but the United States can amplify its voice if it signs on to the
international lawmaking institutions. If there is an instrumentalist message to take
away from this description of globalization's constraint, it can be reduced to "better
join than fight"; the persistent U.S. refusal to accede to international institutions will
in the long run hurt none other than itself.
But that response does not set to rest the legitimacy objection (also voiced by
323 See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOvEREIGNTY MATrERS 64 (1998) (decrying the
infiltration of international law as formulated by "people who like people who clink glasses at
international gatherings-perfectly nice people, perhaps, but not having any real accountability in
the American constitutional scheme"); Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 16,
at 458 (highlighting "nondemocratic and nontransparent ways in which much international law is
made"); John C. Yoo, UN Wars, US War Powers, I CIU. J. INT'L L. 355, 361 (2000) ("Novel
forms of international cooperation increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to
international organizations that lack American openness and accountability.").
324 See, e.g., Lori's War, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 2000, at 37 (quoting Lori Wallach, director
of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, "[b]etween someone who actually got elected, and the
director general of the WTO, there are so many miles that, in fact, he and his staff are accountable
to no one").321 See also, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, In Defense of Universal Values, 36 IDAHO L. REv.
379,395 (2000) ("[T]he relationship between a system of international law to the various national
states .... raises complex issues of accountability, and even strong universalists about rights may
legitimately worry about the democratic credentials of international human rights bodies, when
they seek to enforce norms against democratically accountable nation states.").
326 As Gu~henno observes, "[t]he nostalgic citizens of the declining Roman republic appealed,
not without grandeur, to the virtue of ancient times. Our lamentations today will not stop the march
toward a new empire, any more than did theirs." GutHENNO, supra note 2, at xii.327 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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New Sovereigntists and anti-globalization activists alike): why should we submit to
international norms? Why not fight the imposition of norms that are not our norms?
The "better join than fight" response does not address questions of legitimacy.328
Indeed, one might detect a whiff of collaborationism in the call to accept international
legal standards on the grounds that the international community now has the power to
impose them.
The possible response to this objection goes to foundational dynamics between
identity and constitutional governance. I have thus far dichotomized the American
and international communities, working from an implicit premise that there is an "us"
and a "them" that are divided by the water's edge. If that premise held, then there
would be a legitimacy problem that no single seat at the table could cure. If the
international community represented an alien quantity, in other words, the sop of
American representation in international institutions would not validate the
imposition of norms on the United States regarding the way the national government
constitutes itself for the purpose of governing Americans.
That, of course, may explain the old world in which such matters were, under the
international law doctrine of sovereignty, left to the discretion of individual states. But
that is not today's world. The dichotomization of "us" and "them" along national
lines no longer reflects the real world; there are now many other definitions of "we"
that cut across national lines.329 Global identity systems have become unstable.
Various "international" actors and communities include many Americans. Various
"domestic" actors and communities-the component units that have been
disaggregated by globalization-now include non-U.S. entities. "American"
corporations and non-governmental organizations, most obviously, will often include
significant non-U.S. elements, including non-U.S. subsidiaries, employees, and
shareholders (in the case of corporations), 33 and non-U.S. members (in the case of
NGOs). For some purposes, the states and even the "national" community include
aliens.33' By the same token "foreign" corporations, NGOs and territorial jurisdictions
328 As Robert Post asks, in reference to the human rights law as applied by the new
International Court of Criminal Justice: "[W]ho makes this law? Whose identity does it represent?
Who sets its goals? ... Stripped of the historically-specific institutional procedures and legal
traditions of particular nation-states, what authority does naked law hold?" Post, supra note 7, at
329.
329 Thomas M. Franck, Community Based on Autonomy, 36 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41
(1997); Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1999) (reviewing ROGER
SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICING VISIONS OF CrrIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997)).
330 See, e.g., ALBRow, supra note 3, at 131 ("[T]he strategies of multinational enterprises with
diffuse ownership and location often make clear-cut attribution of nationality impossible.");
Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Policy 3.1, N.Y. TIES, Oct. 8, 1995, § 4, at 13 ("We like to think
we are a company based in America that is a global company. In every country we are Microsoft.
Not American. Microsoft.") (quoting Steve Ballmer of Microsoft).
13' Aliens are, for instance, included in the national census for legislative apportionment and
other purposes. See, e.g., Fed'n for Am. Immigration Reform (FAIR) v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp.
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will include Americans in these various capacities.
This seems more profound a change than what one would take from the already
clich6d observation that globalization has blurred the lines between the domestic and
international. It is not just a blurring, but a restructuring. The result is a global order in
which communities of transnational definition will have an interest in many elements
of the way that nation-states exercise their powers. If one accepts that as a premise,
then the setting of relevant norms at the international level follows as a matter of
course. Norms segmentation is appropriate with respect to segmented communities,
as nations used mostly to be relative to one another.332 But once communities start
significantly to overlap, norm formulation will naturally and legitimately migrate to
the level that encompasses them all, in which each can participate.333 Even were the
New Sovereigntist position sustainable as a practical matter in the face of
globalization, it would suffer a legitimacy deficit to the extent that national institutions
persisted in seeking independently to regulate matters of interest to transnational
communities. It may be that globalization results in the obsolescence of the United
States as a constitutional organizing principle.334
Although I have no pretense of expertise on the history of federalism in the
United States, some parallels seem apparent. At one time, the primary locus of
community was found at the state level, and it was at that level that most norms were
set. As the various types of community crossed state lines, however, the locus of
564 (D.D.C. 1980) (rejecting challenge to the inclusion of undocumented aliens in the 1980 census
count on standing grounds).
332 This is consistent with Friedrich's definition of community as "the thing within which
political events occur... [and] the thing upon which all the political goings-on depend." Carl J.
Friedrich, The Concept of Community in the History of Political and Legal Philosophy, in
CoMMuNrrY 3, 23 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1959). That used to be more or less true of national
communities, but clearly no longer remains sustainable in the face of globalization.
333 On this point I would question Frank Michelman's assertion that to the extent that
globalization displaced domestic law, "the law that people would regularly confront would
increasingly be law with whose creation they have had nothing whatsoever to do." Michelman,
supra note 7, at 1071. Michelman's mistake is to suppose that globalization would replace
domestic regulatory regimes with "only general background law from the ius gentium (or
whatever) to occupy those fields." Id. at 1082. On the contrary, the law that comes with
globalization has the promise of equal refinement and legitimacy, as much the product of peoples
as domestic law has been. International law (if it is to be accepted as legitimate) will be made
through the participation of various communities, composed, of course, of individuals. Those
communities have in the past been mostly of national definition; today, other communities, of other
definition, are also participating in the process. Although international lawmaking is in this sense
corporatist, individuals nonetheless are, through their group memberships, participants in the
process.
334 As conceded, for instance, even by a liberal nationalist such as political scientist Rogers
Smith. See ROGERS SMrrH, CIVIc IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CTZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
506 (1997) ("Americans should in fact accept that a time may come when the United States itself,
like preceding human political creations, is less rather than more useful as a way of constituting a
political community that can engage people's loyalties and serve their finest aspirations.").
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governance shifted to the national level. The mechanisms by which norms were
imposed on the states differ from those imposed with the tools of globalization; the
sorts of competitive pressures permitted in the face of capital mobility and dense
trading networks were not available for disciplinary purposes, and so a formal
command structure (backed by force of arms) was required. But the explanations for
the migration of norm formulation may share characteristics, in both cases
corresponding with changed definitions of community.
To the extent that it holds, the analogy is also useful in terms of suggesting the
plausibility of the significant norm formulation at the international level. Surely the
eventual extent of federal regulation in the U.S. context was beyond the imagination
of the Founding generation, 335 in perhaps the same way that it is today beyond the
imagination of many Americans that the Constitution could be subordinated to
international regimes. One cannot dismiss out of hand the possibility of a globalized
Constitution, and constitutional theorists might start thinking about what has been the
unthinkable. I have hardly offered a proof here. But I hope this plausible sketch
supports a higher sensitivity to global dynamics in evolving constitutional theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
Those elements of American law that implicate the international have always
been informed by international institutional design. Thus, one can explain the peculiar
rules of foreign relations law by reference to the international context in which they
emerged. The reorientation of constitutional values in foreign relations law-
including the refusal of courts to review cases in the area, the ouster of the state
authority, and the diminishment of individual rights-can all be pegged to a world
composed only of nations in hostile competition with each other. Indeed, that world
demanded a foreign relations differential, for in its dealings with the outside world the
United States faced threats of the gravest kind, ones against which all other
constitutional norms had to be submerged. But that world is no more. With the advent
335 As Jack Rakove writes of America in the 1780s: "For most Americans... national politics
mattered little.... When Americans thought about politics at all, they directed their concerns
toward local and state issues." JACKN. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLICSAND IDEAS INTE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 28-29 (1996). The same can be said today of international
institutions, to which Americans devote little attention. Jessica Mathews observes:
After three and a half centuries, it takes a big mental leap to think ofworld politics in any
terms other than that of occasionally cooperating but usually competing states, each defined
by its territory and representing all the people therein. Nor is it easy to imagine political
entities that could compete with the emotional attachment of a shared landscape, national
history, language, flag and currency.
Mathews, supra note 28, at 12. And yet national history demonstrates that such contemporary
focus may not evidence longer-term consequence; perhaps others in future generations will closely
study today's deliberations in such institutions as the World Trade Organization even if we do not.
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of globalization, as defined by the democratic peace, the disaggregation of nation-
states, and the intensification of global economic competition, the foundations of the
foreign relations differential have been swept away. No longer can one justify these
departures from otherwise prevailing constitutional baselines. Globalization will result
in the abandonment of the foreign relations differential.
And it may dig deeper into our constitutional system. The very features of
globalization that make the world a less threatening place will also render the United
States more vulnerable to the imposition of international norms. As the international
system unpacks the nation-state and confronts its components, no country-not even
the supposed sole superpower-can resist or insulate itself from global forces. As
community boundaries diverge from national ones, law making may migrate from
national institutions toward global ones. The legal academy should anticipate that
possibility and confront its many challenges.
